Although highly fragmentary, the inscription nevertheless allows for a broad reconstruction—albeit with several uncertainties—of the law’s contents. It appears to regulate the procedure to be followed for the swearing of witnesses in the context of a specific judicial process. Most probably, the text refers to the practice whereby one of the parties (most often the defendant) would swear an oath of non-involvement in the disputed matter, supported by members of his family who would swear alongside him. In such cases, the judge’s role was limited to administering the oath to the party concerned and his supporters, and to ratifying the oath, which would bring the trial to a close.
It remains unclear, however, whether the defendant himself is explicitly mentioned in the surviving text (as, for example, in Brause’s supplementation at ll. 5–6), or whether the male descendants referred to therein were to substitute for their deceased father (and grandfather) in taking the oath. Nor is it certain—given the damaged state of the stone, especially in the opening lines—whether the law also required the judge to swear an oath. A further point of uncertainty concerns the subject matter of the dispute in which such an oath would be taken: the occurrence of the adverb adaitei at l. 13—if interpreted in the sense of “without division”—would suggest inheritance matters (van Effenterre–Ruzé; Koerner), while Guarducci, by contrast, takes the adverb to mean “without distinction,” referring instead to the status or role of the individuals who were to swear the oath.
Of particular interest is the stipulation that, for the oath sworn by the litigant’s sons to be valid, they must have passed beyond puberty—thus entering adulthood (ebionti)—and must also be in possession of the right of citizenship (poliateuonti). This demonstrates that the attainment of majority and the acquisition of citizenship were not simultaneous events. A significant parallel is found in the Great Code of Gortyn (I.Cret. IV 72, col. IX, l. 33), which prescribes the procedure to be followed when a case previously judged by the court was reopened. In that circumstance, the judge (dikastas) and the secretary (mnamon) who had dealt with the same case were required to declare this under oath, provided that they were still alive and, crucially, still in possession of citizenship.
Both instances indicate that, even in the absence of any explicit theoretical formulation of the citizen’s specific prerogatives in archaic (or protoclassical) Crete, such prerogatives were clear, evidently regulated, and formally embedded within a defined institutional framework. In both cases—the adult sons mentioned in the present text and the dikastas and mnamon cited in the Great Code—the individuals concerned were obliged to take an oath which, while lending solemnity and sacred force to a formal act, was situated entirely within a judicial context. The extreme importance of citizenship for procedural purposes should also be stressed: both cases show that any litigant unable to produce witnesses who were also de facto citizens had no means of defending himself in court.
θιõι. ὀμνύμην δὲ δικάκ̣[σαι τὸν Ζῆ-]
[να καὶ τὸν (?)] Ἀπέλλōνα καὶ τὰν Ἀθαν̣-
αίαν καὶ τὸν Ἔρμαον, οτ̣[․․․․․․․․]
[․․․ μηδένα] ἄλλον θιὸν ὀνυμαινέτ̣-
5 οˉ. το͂ δεκαστατήρō καὶ πλί̣[ονος ․․․․]
[․․․․․․․․ ]εν κ’ υἰὺνς οἴ κ’ ἠβίōντι
καὶ πολιατεύōντι καὶ τ[ούτōν υἰὺ-]
[νς οἴ κ’ ἠβίο (?)]ντι ὀμνύμην πάντανς
[ϝ]ιναυτο͂ι ϝέκαστον ἐπαριό[μενον ἦ μὰν]
10 [κακίστōι (?)] ὀλέτρōι ἐκσόλλυθαι. τὸ[ν-]
[ς]μαίτυρανς αὐτὸν ϝέκασ[τον καὶ τὸ-]
[νς ἀδευπι (?)]ὸνς οἴ κ’ ἠβίοˉντι κἠς τõ α[ὐ-]
[τ]õ πατρὸς ἴōντι κ’ ἀδαιτηὶ[․․․․․․․․]
[․․․․․․․․]ρ̣ονς αὐτὸν ϝέκαστο[ν— —]
15 [— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
5-6 πλί[ονος καὶ αὐτὸν ὀμνύμ]εν Brause : μ]ὲν Guarducci.
[…] to the god? [The judge?] shall decree that one
must swear by Zeus, [Apollo?], Athena, and Hermes […] and that no oath be sworn
by any other god. In cases involving a value of ten staters or more […] let the
sons who have passed beyond puberty and are in possession of citizenship, and
the sons of these—if they have also passed beyond puberty—swear, each and every
one, to perish by a most dreadful death should they commit perjury. The
witnesses, each individually, and the brothers (?) who have passed beyond
puberty, being sons of the same father and “without division” (of the
property?), shall likewise swear, each individually, [— — —].
- J. Brause, ΓΟΡΤΥΝΙΩΝ ΟΡΚΟΣ ΝΟΜΙΜΟΣ, Hermes 49, 1914, 102-109
- M. Gagarin, P. Perlman, The Laws of Ancient Crete c. 650-400 BCE, Oxford 2016
- M. Guarducci, Inscriptiones creticae IV. Tituli Gortynii, Roma 1950
- F. Guizzi, Gortina (1000-450 a. C.). Una città cretese e il suo codice, Napoli 2018
- N. Kennell, Age-class Societies in Ancient Greece?, AncSoc 43, 2013, 1-73
- R. Koerner, Inschriftliche Gesetzestexte der frühen griechiscen Polis, Köln 1993
- R. Parker, Law and Religion in M. Gagarin, D. Cohen (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law, Cambridge 2005, 61-81
- H. van Effenterre, F. Ruzé, Nomima. Recueil d’inscriptions politiques et juridiques de l’archaïsme grec, vol. 2, Roma 1995
- R. F. Willetts, The Law Code of Gortyn, Berlin 1967