Gagarin – Perlman Dr1 (Nomima I, 81). Law of Dreros on the prohibition of holding the office of kosmos more than once within ten years (mid-7th century BCE)

The inscription contains, in boustrophedon script, the text of an ancient law from the small Cretan city of Dreros, dating to the mid-7th century BCE. Although the syntactic structure leaves no doubt as to its eminently legislative character (see Demargne – van Effenterre 1937, 334–335), the ratification formula ἆδ’ἔFaδε πόλι (on which see Nomima I, 64) clearly recalls that of a decree. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that, from a formal point of view, the text should be identified as a decree containing a law (Koerner 1993, 334). The subject of the law is the prohibition against holding the office of kosmos more than once before an interval of ten years has elapsed (cf. I.Cret. IV.14, g-p²), or, according to an alternative interpretation (Seelentag 2009; 2015, 148–152), the prohibition on former kosmoi continuing to exercise the functions of the office (in particular judicial functions) even after the end of their term. However, as Gagarin – Perlman (2016, 203–204) rightly object, the verb κόσμεν in the text almost certainly means “to serve as kosmos” (cf. I.Cret. IV.72 col. V, ll. 5–6; I.Cret. I, V.4, ll. 3–9), which supports the first interpretation. If this is accepted, it is not implausible that the city of Dreros maintained official lists recording those who had already held the office (Camassa 2004, 48–49; Marginesu 2006, 110–114; Faraguna 2021, 71–72).

In the event of a violation, among other penalties, the “illegal” kosmos would be declared akrēstos, an adjective whose meaning is highly debated. Some scholars have understood it to indicate total deprivation of political rights (Demargne – van Effenterre 1937, 343; Jacoby 1944; Youni 2010, 152; Camassa 2011, 83; Gagarin – Perlman 2016, 205; Genevrois 2017, 361–362), while others have seen it as implying the loss of only part of the prerogatives of the offender, in particular the eligibility for the office of kosmos or for any other magistracy (Ehrenberg 1943, 16; Koerner 1993, 336; Braun 1994; Hölkeskamp 1999, 93).

Closely connected to the problem of interpreting akrēstos is the question of the body from which the law emanated—namely, the πόλις mentioned in line 1. It is unclear whether this term should be understood as referring to the political community, i.e., the citizen body gathered in some form of assembly (Willetts 1955, 168–169; Koerner 1993, 334–335; Hölkeskamp 1999, 90; Grote 2014, 69; 2016, 139–140, who interprets the polis as a civic assembly without decision-making power, acting only to ratify by acclamation), or to a more restricted organ representing the citizens (Ehrenberg 1943, 14; Beattie 1975, 14; see also Youni 2010, 156–157, who argues that in Archaic Crete polis could designate any collegial body exercising political authority and thus capable of representing the political community). The reference in line 4 to the board of the Twenty of the polis (οἰ ἴκατι τᾶς πόλιος) among the magistracies required to swear an oath alongside the kosmos and the dāmioi suggests that the law was enacted and approved by the political community—likely comprising all male residents of the urban centre (or perhaps property owners?)—and that the Twenty of the polis represented them at the oath-taking ceremony, in contrast to the dāmos, which probably represented the rural component of the population (or non-landowners?). On the composition of polis and dāmos in Archaic Dreros see Gagarin – Perlman 2016, 57–58; cf. Grote 2014, 71–73; 2016, 142–143, who considers the Twenty to have been members of the civic council representing Dreros’ supposed twenty tribes.

Whatever the interpretation of polis, it seems beyond doubt that the law emanated from a clearly defined political body, aware of its role and prerogatives, and, above all, of the minimum requirements for those wishing to hold the office of kosmos—and, by extension, for anyone aspiring to play a significant role in the political life of the community. Even if the concept of citizenship had not yet been sharply, abstractly, and formally defined at this early date (cf. Seelentag 2015, 155), some of the prerogatives that would later constitute the criteria for determining membership in the political community—and hence the possession and exercise of citizen rights—were already taking shape. For this reason, it is not unreasonable to maintain that the adjective akrēstos was, at least partially, connected to an incipient notion of citizenship.

Dio oloion. Thus has the polis decided: once a man has served as kosmos, this same individual shall not be kosmos again for ten years. Should he serve as kosmos, on every occasion on which he acts as judge he shall be liable to pay a fine double the amount prescribed; he shall be akrēstos for the rest of his life, and any act he may have performed as (an unlawful) kosmos shall be declared null and void. Those who shall take the oath are the kosmos, the dāmioi, and the Twenty of the city.

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