Lexicon of Citizenship

Here you will find a selection of entries related to the vocabulary of citizenship as it appears in Greek literary, epigraphic, and papyrological sources.

You can browse the lexical entries by clicking on the letter corresponding to the initial of the word.

A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z

A

Apeleutheros (ἀπελεύθερος)

The freed slave obtained the status of apeleutheros or exeleutheros (“freedman”: the former term seems to refer to those born into servitude, the latter to those born free). As Pollux states, freedmen are to be considered metaxy between freemen and slaves (III 83).

Manumissions in Greece were quite rare. The slave could be freed by various procedures. Civil manumission involved the public declaration of the master’s willingness to free the slave, in assembly, in court, at a religious festival, through the drawing up of a document in the presence of witnesses. Hierodoulia (sacred manumission), on the other hand, was a form of consecration to the deity, as a result of which the slave was freed from the master but remained bound to the temple and to the service of the god; over time, sacred manumission turned into a fictitious sale of the slave to the god, the price of which was paid to the master by the slave himself who redeemed himself.

According to some scholars, the freedman would have obtained the status of metic, that is, resident alien. Indeed, in many respects, the apeleutheros seems closer to the metic than to the citizen: both foreigners, freedmen and metics, were united by the need to have the assistance of the prostates and the payment of a residence tax. But in reality, the status of the freedmen seems to come rather closer to that of the nothoi. An account concerning the gymnasium of Cynosarges, reserved for nothoi (taken from Pseudo-Nonnos’ commentary on Gregory Nazianzen’s Fourth Oration, § 60, pp. 126-127 Nimmo Smith = PG XXXVI, p. 1016), states that “the Athenians also called nothoi the apeleutheroi,” because the latter “were nothoi with respect to the freemen by birth.” It appears that in the gymnasium of Cynosarges both nothoi and apeleutheroi were subjected to an evaluation (krisis), the former on paternity, the latter of an unspecified character and supplemented by a dokimasia concerning manumission. One of the goals of this “census” was perhaps military service, which, unlike for the nothoi, is relatively well attested for the freedmen. Performing military service, either in the (hoplite or light) infantry army or in the navy, could certainly facilitate a partial integration of the freedmen.

The freedmen were required to maintain the residence of the master who had become prostates, toward whom they maintained a series of obligations (which the sources do not specify but which can be defined, though only indicatively, on the basis of Plato’s testimony in Book XI of the Laws, 914 ff.). Some obligations could be set out in the act of manumission and are attested in the inscriptions: frequent in manumissions is, for example, the paramone clause, which obliges the freedman to reside with the patron for a fixed period of time or even until his death. If the freedman failed to fulfill his duties, the master could sue him in a dike apostasiou, a lawsuit for “abandonment” of the patron, under the jurisdiction of the polemarchos, as a result of which the freedman, if he succumbed, could fall back into slavery.

The inscriptions on the phialai exeleutherikaí (silver objects, worth one hundred drachmas, dedicated to Athena, attesting to the state of freedom) informs us that freedmen were census-tagged with an indication of residence or oikesis (oikôn en + deme) and that the freedmen’s professions mostly concerned handicraft work in urban area.

• C. Bearzot, Né cittadini né stranieri: apeleutheroi e nothoi in Atene, inM.G. Angeli Bertinelli, A. Donati (a cura di), Il cittadino, lo straniero, il barbaro fra integrazione ed emarginazione nell’antichità (Atti del I Incontro Internazionale di Storia antica, Genova 20-22 maggio 2003), Roma 2005, 77-92
• M. Bertazzoli, I nothoi e la polis: il ruolo del Cinosarge, in Rendiconti dell’Istituto Lombardo 137 (2003), 211-232
• R. Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free. The Concept of Manumission and the Status of Manumitted Slaves in the Ancient Greek World, Leiden-Boston 2005, 248-262

[C. Bearzot]

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Apodemeo (ἀποδημέω)

The verb apodemeo, literally translated as “to be far from the demos,” denotes the condition of one estranged from their homeland and fellow citizens. This term is characterised by significant polysemy: it can signify either a physical absence from one’s community of origin or a deliberate choice to undertake a journey away from the civic environment to which one belongs (demos, in fact). In this context, apodemeo stands in contrast to the verb epidemeo, translated as “to be present in the community” or “to reside.” This opposition reflects the dualism between presence and absence within the civic sphere.

This contrast is vividly illustrated in Xenoph. Cyr. 7.5.69, where Cyrus organizes guards to maintain order in Babylon both in his presence (ἐπίδημῶν) and in his absence (ἀπίδημώς). A similar dichotomy is evident in Thucydides. In 1.70.4, the Spartans are described as those who remain consistently within their own demos (ἐνδημοτάτους), in contrast to the Athenians, who are characterized as apodemeta. Thucydides’ observation underscores two contrasting models of mobility: Spartan stability, marked by a consistent physical presence within one’s own territory, and Athenian propensity for travel and distance, whether motivated by necessity or initiative.

The verb apodemeo can also denote departure with a specific purpose, such as visiting someone, engaging in business, or pursuing knowledge. In Hdt. 3.124.2, the term describes Polycrates’ departure from his residence to visit Oroetes. Lycurgus (1.57) uses it to refer to journeys undertaken for economic or commercial reasons (κατ᾽ ἐμπορίαν ἀποδημοῦντας, manuscript variant ἐπ᾽[ί]). Herodotus (1.29.1) associates the term with Solon, who, after instituting laws in Athens, “departed from the city” (απεδήμησε) in pursuit of “knowledge” (θεωρίης).

The noun apodemia, corresponding to the verb apodemeo, frequently appears in philosophical narratives, particularly in tales of philosophers embarking on journeys in search of wisdom. Philostratus employs apodemia (VA 1.3, 1.18, 3.16) and apodemeo (VA 1.18, 3.33) to describe Apollonius of Tyana’s displacements as a continuous series rather than isolated events. In contrast, Socrates stands out as a notable exception among ancient philosophers. According to Diogenes Laertius (2.5.22), he did not engage in apodemia (ἀποδημίας δὲ οὐκ ἐδεήθη) except under circumstances of military necessity (πλὴν εἰ μὴ στρατεύεσθαι ἔδει). This trait is also reflected in Plato’s Crito, the source of the Diogenian passage (cf. Cri.52b). In this dialogue, Socrates envisions a hypothetical scenario in which individuals choose to reside outside their homeland (ἀποδεδημηκώς), specifically in Thessaly, likening such a decision to a frivolous banquet that lacks seriousness or dignity.

Ultimately, the term apodemeo underscores its remarkable versatility. Beyond conveying absence or travel, it captures the underlying purposes, destinations, and objectives of these journeys, reflecting both practical and intellectual pursuits.

• M. Leigh, From Polypragmon to Curiosus. Ancient Concepts of Curious and Meddlesome Behaviour, Oxford 2013
• H. G. Liddell – R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, revised and augmented by Sir H. S. Jones. with the assistance of R. McKenzie, Oxford 1940
• S. Montiglio, Wandering in Ancient Greek Culture, Chicago – London 2005
• E. Poddighe, L’apodemia di Solone e l’inalterabilità delle sue leggi. La versione di Erodoto, Hormos 12 (2020), 290-329 < https://www.unipa.it/dipartimenti/cultureesocieta/riviste/hormos/.content/documenti/12_Elisabetta_Poddighe_Hormos_12_2020.pdf> (22/01/2025)

[E. Poddighe, M. Deriu]

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Apolis (ἄπολις)

The term apolis, formed from the word polis preceded by the privative alpha, generically indicates a person “without a city”, taking on various semantic nuances. The ancient Greek tragedians use it, for example, to refer to characters dramatically condemned to a fate of isolation. Particularly emblematic are the attestations of the term concerning Philoctetes, abandoned by his companions on the island of Lemnos because of an infected wound (Soph. Ph. 1018), Oedipus, exiled by his son Polynices and forced to a life of poverty (Soph. OC. 1357), and Medea who, betrayed by Jason, finds herself alone, without relatives, in a foreign land (Eurip. Med. 646). Herodotus uses it together with the word ‘phygas’ in reference to the Spartan Demaratus (Hdt. 7.104.2), who took refuge in Persia after being fraudulently deposed from the throne by Cleomenes I and by Leotychides (Forsdyke 2005, 297).

In another famous passage of the Histories, the Corinthian leader, Adeimantos, calls Themistocles ‘apolis aner’, claiming that the Athenians are no longer worth anything after the burning of the city by the Persians. Themistocles is considered a man “without a country” (τῷ μὴ ἐστὶ πατρίς) and “without a city” (ἀπόλι ἀνδρί) who therefore has no right to speak (Hdt. 8.61.1). The Athenian, on the other hand, who exalts the value of the city as a group of fellow citizens, believes that his community – although temporarily without a settlement – ​​is much more powerful than the Corinthian one, since the two hundred Athenian ships would be able to defeat any other Greek polis. Themistocles does not reject the link between space and civic community, underlining that his fellow citizens, even in the current complicated situation, possess “land and city” (καὶ πόλις καὶ γῆ), but he proposes a different conception of the polis, less tied to physical places (Ampolo 1996, 297-300; Ingarao 2023).

The protagonist of the Against Eubulides (Dem. 57) also emphasizes the connection between territory and citizenship. Euxitheos, who has been excluded from the citizenship by decision of the Halimous’s demos, will be sold as a slave, if the judges, after having verified his identity, consider that he does not have the necessary requirements for citizenship, that is, that his parents are both Athenians (cf. Arst. Ath.Pol. 42.1; about ephesis see Poddighe, Loddo 2022). In a final heartfelt appeal, he even threatens to take his own life if he is not given the opportunity to bury his mother in the family tombs and if he is deprived of his family, preferring to die in his homeland rather than become apolis (Dem. 57.70).

In other legal attestations, the term retains the rather generic meaning of ‘without a homeland’, indicating someone who ends up in exile (Antiph. 2.2.9), but also someone who is condemned for atimia (Lys. 20.35). Moving on to the philosophical sphere, Plato states in the Laws that in the ideal city, unlike the real one, the citizen who is disinherited must also suffer forced exile in another state (Pl. Leg. 11.928E). Finally, Aristotle (Arst. Pol. 1253a 1-4), in the famous definition of man as ‘zoon politikon’ by nature, defines apolis as someone who lives in isolation and is therefore either less than a man or superior to him (Kuokkanen 2020, 5).

• C. Ampolo, Il sistema della polis. Elementi costitutivi e origini della città greca, in S. Settis (ed.), I Greci. Storia, cultura, arte, società, II.1: Formazione, Torino 1996, 297-342.
• S. Forsdyke, Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy. The Politics of Expulsion in Ancient Greece, Princeton 2005.
• G. Ingarao, Gli spazi della cittadinanza nella Contro Eubulide di Demostene (Dem. 57), in M.M. Bianco, N. Cusumano, G. Ingarao, Storia, Retorica e Ideologia. Ricerche sul mondo antico, Palermo 2023, 59-75.
• S. Kuokkanen, Ostracism, Inner Change and the Dynamics of Reintegration in Classical Athens, Pallas 112 (2020), 67-91 <https://journals.openedition.org/pallas/21077>.
• E. Poddighe, L. Loddo, Ephesis against Eubulides (Dem. 57): Legal Arguments against the Sykophant’s Game, Dike 25 (2022), 95-150 <https://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/Dike/article/view/19927/17743>.

[G. Ingarao]

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Astos (ἀστός)

ἀστός, ἀστή, derived from ἄστυ, the city as a “center,” is already found in Homer in the sense of “fellow citizen” (Hom. Il. 11.242-243; Od. 13.192, used alongside the bride and friends: ἄλοχος … ἀστοί τε φίλοι τε). Employed in the plural, it was originally more common than πολίτης in defining membership of the city community (Aeschylus, Ag. 403-406); only in the mid-5th century the definition of πολίτης and the use of the ethnic term (Ἀθηναῖος), especially in epigraphy, tend to prevail, while ἀστός seems to have fallen within the sphere of private law.

The distinction that defines ἀστός as someone who enjoys civil rights only and πολίτης as someone who also enjoys political rights (LSJ: “astos being one who has civil rights only, polites one who has political rights also”) is based on Aristotle, who, in Politics III, 1278a34 defines polites as “one who participates in τιμαί: λέγεται μάλιστα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν”.

In reality, such a distinction does not seem entirely satisfactory (the two terms appear to be interchangeable in Hdt. 7.237.2-3). Rather, ἀστός seems to refer to belonging to a ‘family’ type of community, i.e. determined by descent and kinship, with almost aristocratic connotations (Lévy 1985); the idea of belonging to a family community seems to be reflected later in Pericles’ law on citizenship (Blok 2005, pp. 15-22: cf. Eur. Ion 668-675). Πολίτης, on the other hand, has a character more closely linked to the institutional aspect: πολῖται are defined by their right/duty to act in the political sphere (Lévy 1985, p. 66: ‘moins par un statut comme les astoi que par un droit’; cf. lemma πολίτης).

The issue is not always clearly defined. For example, analysis of Plato shows that ἀστός and πολίτης tend to overlap in the author’s usage (Fouchard 1984). Research on Athenian theater (the three great tragedians and Aristophanes) reaches different conclusions: “the term politēs prototypically designates those individuals who actively participate in political life, members of a deliberative body and therefore, by extension, citizens as members of the political community…. the term astos prototypically designates all citizens as inhabitants of the polis, regardless of whether or not they hold political rights” (Falco 2024, p. 156).

With the necessary clarifications, the difference between ἀστός and πολίτης centered on the exercise of political rights does not seem to be abandoned, even considering that the concept of ἀστός includes women and minors, who, although they hold citizenship, do not exercise it in the same way as adult males. In fact, πολίτης is also ἀστός, but not vice versa: “the category of astoi prototypically includes all citizens outside strictly political-institutional or military contexts, and therefore … all those who, in addition to male citizens, are not xenoi, such as women and minors” (Falco 2024, p. 173). The ἀστή nature of women is very important in family law as it defines the legitimacy of marriage (which required the status of daughter of a citizen and of legally promised bride through the procedure of ἐγγύη) and, after the Periclean law, of offspring (Mossé 1985).

The antithetical nature of ἀστός has been underscored in contrast to μέτοικος (Aeschyl. Suppl. 963-965; Eum. 1044-1045; Aristoph. Ach. 508; Ps.-Xen. Ap 1.12, who complains about the granting of equal right of speech (ἰσηγορία) τοῖς μετοίκοις πρὸς τοὺς ἀστούς; Xenoph. Vect. 2.2)and also to ξένος (Pind. Pyth. 3.71-72; Soph. OT 817-818; Th. 2.34.4).

This opposition can be explained by the hereditary link with the community of citizens expressed by the term ἀστός. For this reason, the hypothesis that the ἀστοί also included metics as permanent residents of the city (Cohen 2000, pp. 50-63) appears inadequate: in the definition of citizenship, the question of residence remains irrelevant. Therefore, ἀστός alludes to residence only for those who possess the status of citizen. Noteworthy is Aeschyl. Suppl. 356, in which the Danaids are defined as ἀστόξενοι, i.e., foreigners but with blood ties to the community (ἀσταί as natives of Argos, ξέναι as Egyptians).

There are not many reliable epigraphic attestations of ἀστός. IG I³ 1032, ll. 46, 110, 188, 431, an Athenian naval catalogue from the early 4th century, refers to ναῦται ἀστοί. IG II/III³ 1, 399, from the 40s of the 4th century, ll. 3-7, presents the opposition ξένος/ἀστὸς, provided that the integration is correct (μήτε ξένος μή[τε ἀστὸς).

A regulation of the sanctuary of Athena Alea in Tegea, from the early 4th century BC (IG V 2 3, l. 11) presents the term Ϝαστός. ἀστοί appears in the commemorative inscription of the Megarian citizens who fell in the Persian wars, falsely attributed to Simonides (IG VII 53, probably a late copy of a 5th-century text).

The expression ϝαστίαν δίκαν, which occurs in IC IV 13 (part of a law dated between the 7th and 6th centuries BC) and in the decree for Dionysius (IC IV 64, early 5th century), seems to refer to the role of an ἀστός in legal disputes. IG 12.5.225 (Paros), IG 9.1.333.14 (Locris), IG 9.2.1226 (Phalanna: this is a nomos), all from the 5th century, do not allow for any significant reflection, partly due to their incomplete nature.

• J. Blok, Becoming Citizens: Some Notes on the Semantics of « Citizen » in Archaic Greece and Classical Athens, Klio 87.1, 2005, 7-40
• E. E. Cohen, The Athenian Nation, Princeton 2000
• G. Falco, Politēs/politis, astos e metoikos: il lessico della cittadinanza nel teatro ateniese di V secolo a.C., Hormos 16, 2024, 133-200
• A. Fouchard, Astos, politès et épichôrios chez Platon, Ktèma 9, 1984, 185-204
• É. Lévy, Astos et polites, d’Homère à Hérodote, Ktema 10, 1985, 53-66
• C. Mossé, Ἀστὴ καὶ πολῖτις. La dénomination de la femme athenienne dans les plaidoyers démosthéniens, Ktèma 10, 1985, 77-79

[C. Bearzot]

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Atimia (ἀτιμία)

The antonym of τιμή, ἀτιμία literally indicates the ‘lack or loss of τιμή’. While τιμή is often translated as ‘honour’, the term possesses a richness that the English translation does not effectively convey. It encompasses notions of value, price, dignity, prestige, and deference, sometimes implying a state and the resulting condition—what we translate as ‘honour’—as well as the external recognition of a given condition (Cairns 2011; 2019; Cairns-Canevaro-Lewis 2025). The same mechanisms of recognition underpin the meaning of ἀτιμία, which thus signifies both a condition, the ‘dishonour’ that follows the loss of honour, and the lack of recognition of an individual’s τιμή, the ‘contempt’ that may manifest in the context of social interactions. The language of atimia is employed to illustrate both conative processes, which describe attempts to ‘dishonour’ an individual, and performative processes, which signal the success of an attempt to render an individual atimos (Rocchi 2022, 108). The idea that atimia had an essentially religious nature, however, is debatable (Woram 2022). The presence of the term in the entrenchment clause of a small number of inscriptions, sometimes associated with the payment of a tithe on goods confiscated for the deity (e.g. ML 20, ll. 38-45; IG I³ 40, ll. 33-36; IG I³ 46, ll. 24-29), does not warrant such a conclusion; the payment of the tithe relates to the confiscation of goods, not to atimia, as evidenced by the fact that the same practice is also attested in connection with other penalties, e.g. proscription in And. 1.96 (on ‘sacred fines’ see Jim 2014, 264-266).

An initial distinction in meaning is that which opposes ἀτιμία, used in a non-technical sense, as a term of the moral sphere, and ἀτιμία as a legally defined concept, implying a penalty. However, this distinction should not be taken in absolute terms, as even when used in a technical sense, ἀτιμία retains moral implications, and the two senses—technical and non-technical—seem to mutually inform and illuminate one another. This close association between moral and legal value is well exemplified by a passage from the speech On Peace (43), in which Isocrates states that those in Sparta who are deemed most worthy of dishonour (ἀτιμότεροι) are those who are unwilling to sacrifice their lives in battle, compared to those who throw away their shield. The reference to atimia in this case implies a value judgment rather than a legal concept, but that moral evaluation underpins the penal sanction for military offences to which Isocrates alludes. Conversely, even in the classical era and in a judicial context, the lexicon of atimia does not necessarily imply a penalty. Consider Euxitheos’ admonition not to despise (ἀτιμάζετε) the poor and those engaged in trade who earn their living honestly (Dem. 57.36). In this case, the penalty for someone who had been defeated in court was not atimia, but enslavement (Lib. Hyp. Dem. 57; Dion Hal. Hyp. Isae. 12).

The non-technical sense of ‘dishonour’ is already found in the Homeric poems, where Zeus addresses Poseidon, who complains of not being respected by mortals, that is, of seeing his claim to honour rejected (Od. 13.142). Although ἀτιμία occurs only once in the Homeric poems, the lexicon of dishonour is well represented, as demonstrated by the use of the denominative verbs ἀτιμάω/ἀτιμόω and ἀτιμάζω, used interchangeably to indicate the lack of honour (e.g. Hom. Il. 1.11-12 and 94, cf. Maffi 1983; Joyce 2018, 42; Rocchi 2025a). Ἄτιμος in its etymological sense is found in Cassandra’s prophecy in Aesch. Agam. 1279, where οὐ μὴν ἄτιμοί γ᾽ ἐκ θεῶν τεθνήξομεν means ‘we shall not die unavenged (literally ‘without honour’) by the gods’.

The moral significance of ἀτιμία as dishonour or infamy is particularly relevant in the military context. Tyrtaeus, in praising the heroic sacrifice of the soldier who dies fighting for his homeland, reproaches those who abandon the battlefield and become exiles, needing everything and enemies everywhere, for desertion sullies the lineage with infamy and cowardice (Tyrt. fr. 10 West, l. 10: πᾶσα δ᾽ ἀτιμίη καὶ κακότης ἕπεται; for a similar form of dishonour related to a lack of military valour, see Hdt. 7.231 on Aristodemus of Sparta). Pindar, in celebrating the Olympic victory of the Camarine Psaumis, alludes to how Clymenus’ son, Erginus, managed to avoid the jeers of the women of Lemnos (Λαμνιάδων γυναικῶν ἔλυσεν ἐξ ἀτιμίας) by defeating the swift Zetes and Calais in the race (Pind. Olimp. 4, ll. 19-25). Dishonour is sometimes the consequence of past events or the effect of specific conduct. If Athena rejects the possibility that parity in the vote count in the trial of Orestes could bring dishonour (Aesch. Eum. 796), similarly, the violence against the suppliant Heraklidai is a cause of shame for the city and dishonour for the gods (Eur. Heracl. 72). Atimia can signify absence of status, as in Hes. Theog. 395-396, where it is stated that Zeus would confer honour and rights on those who were ἄτιμος and ἀγέραστος under Cronos. Atimia as dishonour can be a subjective perception. The decision of Chrysothemis not to assist Electra in avenging their mother Clytemnestra evokes in Electra the fear of being subject to dishonour (Soph. Elect. 1035). When used concretely, as in the expression ἀτιμίαν γε παιδὸς ἀμφὶ σώματι ἐσθημάτων κλύουσαν, uttered by Atossa in Aesch. Pers. 847, it indicates the dishonour communicated by the sight of Xerxes’ now torn royal garments (cf. Garvie 2009, 322-324). On the other hand, the social dimension of atimia as dishonour emerges clearly in a fragment from Euripides’ Erechtheus (F 362 Kannicht, ll. 16-18), where poverty is associated with infamy (ἀδοξία) and the dishonour of existence (ἀτιμία βίου). Likewise, physicians who allow themselves to be guided solely by theory, ignoring their natural disposition, clothe themselves in dishonour (Hipp. De decente habitu 4.2). For the conceptual opposition τιμή/ἀτιμία see Hdt. 3.3.2; similarly, τίμιον ἢ ἄτιμον in Plat. Leg. 3.696d; ἀτιμότερον/τιμιώτερον in relation to the value of metals in Xen. Vect. 4.10.

Sometimes ἀτιμία denotes contempt or lack of respect resulting from the denial or lack of recognition of an individual’s τιμή. An emblematic instance is Gelon’s statement in response to the Greek ambassadors’ request for aid, where he contrasts his willingness to contribute to the war with the contempt he had received from the Greeks (ἀτιμίης δὲ πρὸς ὑμέων κυρήσας οὐκ ὁμοιώσομαι ὑμῖν) at the time he had asked for vengeance for the death of Dorieus (Hdt. 7.158). Similarly, among the proposed reforms concerning the metics, Xenophon includes the elimination of those obligations, which, while of no utility to the city, impose tangible marks of contempt (ἀτιμίαι) towards the resident foreign population in Athens (Xen. Vect. 2.2). The ἀτιμίαι are thus conceptualised as unnecessary reductions of the share of honour due to the resident foreign population. What provokes contempt for the metics can be inferred indirectly from the content of the proposals in 2.5-7, where it is advised to grant them the right to serve in the cavalry (cf. Xen. Eq. mag. 9.6), the ownership of land on which they have already built a house, and the establishment of the μετοικοφύλαξ (cf. Whitehead 2019, p. 115). Ἀτιμία as the negation of τιμή is evident in the episode of the killing of Boeotus by Euaeon, presented as a reaction, extreme but understandable (Dem. 21.74), of the latter to the single blow dealt to him by Boeotus. Demosthenes (21.72) clarifies that it was not the blow that provoked Euaeon’s anger, but the lack of respect (οὐ γὰρ ἡ πληγὴ παρέστησε τὴν ὀργήν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἀτιμία, cf. Canevaro 2018, 111-114; Rocchi 2023b, 328). For atimia as contempt, see also Isocrates’ exhortation to Nicocles (2.14): ‘the more energy you put into despising (ἀτιμάσῃς) ignorance in others, the more you will exercise your reason’.

The considerations regarding the relationship of meaning between τιμή and ἀτιμία can also clarify the technical use of ἀτιμία. Since τιμή can refer both to individual condition, in the singular, and to specific prerogatives or rights, indicated as τιμαί in the plural, that a status entails, in legal language, ἀτιμία may imply a penalty concerning both individual status and the rights associated with it. Starting from Swoboda’s famous article (1893) on the decree for Arthmios of Zeleia (Dem. 9.42-44), the so-called evolutionary thesis has emerged, positing that ἀτιμία and its related terms underwent a significant change in meaning between the archaic period and the beginning of the classical age. According to Swoboda, ἄτιμος meant both ‘Ächtung’ (outlawry) and ‘Ehrlosigkeit’ (dishonour). It originally signified ‘with impunity’ and implied that any member of the community declared as such could be exiled or killed without judicial consequences for the murderer. Over time, the term would have acquired a more technical meaning, so that in the classical period, a decree of ἀτιμία would deprive the person it targeted of certain rights. Swoboda argues that the pivotal point for the transition to a milder conception of atimia was represented by Solon’s archonship, based on the law of neutrality in Arist. Ath. Pol. 8.5, but the chronology of this supposed semantic change remains controversial (for the idea that it should be situated around 460 BC, at the time of the affair of Arthmios, see Ruschenbusch 1968). Others, such as Paoli (1930, 307-312), have argued for the persistence, even in the classical era, of the connection between atimia and outlawry, distinguishing between ‘relative atimia’, which involved the loss of certain rights, and ‘proscriptive or absolute atimia’, which entailed banishment (cf. also Piccirilli 1976). The evolutionary thesis has been accepted with minor variations by most commentators. For instance, in his study on the judicial procedures employed in Athens against various types of offenders, Hansen (1976), while endorsing Swoboda’s conclusions, argued that atimia retained the sense of impunity even in the classical age, emphasising that the atimoi often preferred to go into exile rather than live in Athens without legal protection. Others have highlighted the moral dimension of atimia in its origins. Maffi (1983) recognised in the use of the verb ἀτιμάζειν in the Homeric poems the expression of a negative evaluation by the community concerning a dominant code of conduct and distinguished atimia from exile based on a clear differentiation in the use of ἀτιμάζειν and φεύγειν. On this basis, it has been argued that the establishment of Solon’s politeia coincided with the legal definition of the notion of atimia (Poddighe 2001; 2006). Although the evolution of the meaning of atimia is widely accepted, the idea has emerged that the legal and extralegal meanings of atimia were not distinct even in the classical era. Thus, van’t Wout (2011) emphasised the survival of the moral meaning of atimia based on epigraphic documentation, and Dmitriev (2015) defended the thesis that exile and the death penalty were implied by atimia as a penalty even in the classical age (contra Joyce 2018).

However, the interpretation of atimos as ‘one who does not suffer the penalty’ is indefensible, as noted by Vleminck (1981, 293), since such a meaning refers not to the recipient of atimia but to the individual who kills him (a concept expressed, rather, with ἀθῷος in Syll.³ 141, l. 13). Following Vleminck’s essay, the idea that atimia never entailed proscription has gained traction. This thesis first took shape in the aforementioned essay by Maffi (1983) and later in the studies of Youni (2001; 2018; 2019), which demonstrated that atimia and proscription have always been distinct concepts.

In the history of scholarship, the term ἀτιμία, in its penal sense, has primarily been associated with the concept of citizenship, with the consequence that it has been understood as the ‘disenfranchisement’. However, the exclusivity of this connection has recently been called into question (Rocchi 2023b). In particular, Rocchi has highlighted the flexibility of the notion of atimia in relation to the subjects involved and their differing prerogatives. In this context, atimia does not manifest as a penalty directed exclusively at adult free males, that is, those who constitute the entirety of full citizens and the politically active body. Since each individual possesses a time, atimia can affect both men and women, citizens and foreigners alike. The form of atimia that affected women, for example, deprived them of typically female prerogatives. Aeschines (1.183) states that Solon punished the woman caught with a seducer (moichos) with atimia by forbidding her to adorn herself or participate in public sacrifices, and if she violated the imposed restrictions, ordering anyone who encountered her to strike her (cf. [Dem.] 59. 85-86). A similar argument can be made regarding the metics if one accepts Meyer’s thesis (2010, 75-76), according to which the few repetitions in the names of the accusers in the ‘phialai inscriptions’, which certainly include some metics, are attributable to the fact that those who lost the case were struck by atimia and deprived of the ability to pursue criminal actions of the same kind. Similar considerations can be formulated for foreigners, as in the already mentioned case of Arthmios of Zeleia, but also for Euticrates of Olynthos (Suid. δ 415 Adler, s.v. Δημάδης; π 2539 Adler, s.v. πρόξενος), individuals from whom atimia had likely removed prerogatives related to their status as proxenoi. For the imposition of atimia on foreigners in the context of relations between Athens and the allies of the Delian League, see the decree for Chalcis (IG I³ 40) and the decree on weights and measures (IG I³ 1453).

We are informed about the various forms of atimia that could be imposed as a penalty in Athens from what is reported by Andocides in a lengthy section of his speech On the Mysteries (1.73-76). He recounts the content of the decree of Patrokleides, by which the Athenians restored the citizenship status of those whose rights and responsibilities had been limited by atimia in various ways and degrees. This measure is presented as a restorative act that made the atimoi once again epitimoi (ἔδοξεν ὑμῖν τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ποιῆσαι, cf. Canevaro 2013, 203). Among these are those whom Andocides defines as deprived of rights: debtors to the state, namely magistrates found guilty after their accounts at the end of their term, those condemned in dikai exoules or graphai, or recipients of unpaid monetary penalties; those who had acquired tax collection rights from the treasury and failed to pay; and those who had acted as guarantors for others who proved to be in default. Andocides proceeds by enumerating other atimoi who had been deprived of rights (σώματα ἄτιμα, 1. 74) but continued to possess and control their property. These were individuals condemned for theft or corruption, whose status as atimoi extended to their descendants (regarding the possibility that this may duplicate what has been said about magistrates condemned during the accounting, see MacDowell 1983, 70-71); a similar fate applied to deserters, those who had evaded military service or were condemned for cowardice, those who deserted a naval battle, or those who had thrown away their shield, or who had been condemned three times for perjury or mistreatment of parents. Finally, Andocides cites a type of partial atimia, whereby an individual suffered limitations on their rights in specific domains (κατὰ προστάξεις; on the term, see Novotný 2014). Such restrictions concerned specific citizen prerogatives, such as the inability to speak in the Assembly or serve on the Council; the prohibition on initiating legal proceedings, navigating to the Hellespont or Ionia; and exclusion from the Agora.

Even outside of Athens, atimia was imposed as a penalty. In Delphi, within the phratry of the Labiades, as well as in Samos, failure to pay a fine was punished with atimia (CID 1.9, B, ll. 40-5; IG XII 6 1 172 A, ll. 79-80; cf. I.Kyme 11, ll. 8-12). Atimia is a sanction often imposed on negligent magistrates. It is prescribed in cases of violations of the safeguard clause contained in laws and decrees, for showing or supporting a proposal contrary to the provisions of the people, or for the admission of such a proposal to the Assembly as a magistrate (e.g. ML 20, ll. 38-45 from Naupactus; IG XII 8 264, from Thasos; I.Adramytteion 34 B, ll. 39-58; IG XII 9 191, ll 29-33, from Eretria). It may be imposed in cases of repeated magistracy, as occurred in Erythrae (I.Erythrai 1) and perhaps in Dreros, if the adjective ἄκρηστος is interpreted as synonymous with ἄτιμος, ‘deprived of political rights’ (Gagarin – Perlman Dr1, l. 3). At other times, atimia is prescribed when promoting or admitting a legal case in violation of popular deliberations, as in Arkesine of Amorgos (IG XII 7 3, ll. 38–46), or reconciliation agreements, as in the amnesty of Dikaia (SEG 57.576, ll. 41–3). Finally, atimia is configured as a “panhellenic” penalty imposed in the context of anti-tyrannical laws (cf. Rocchi 2025b, forthcoming): thus, in Athens, both in the earliest anti-tyranny law (Arist. Ath. Pol. 16.10) and in the law of Eukrates (RO GHI 79, ll. 16-22), in Ilium (IMT Skam/NebTäler 182 = I.Ilion 25, ll. 97-107, 132-152), and in Eretria (IG XII 9, 190, ll. 4-5).

• D.L. Cairns, Honour and Shame: Modern Controversies and Ancient Values, Critical Quarterly 53, 2011, 23-41
• D.L. Cairns, Honour and Kingship in Herodotus: Status, Role, and the Limits of Self-assertion, Frontiers of Philosophy in China 14.1, 2019, 75-93
• D.L. Cairns, M. Canevaro, D. Lewis, Introduction, in D. Lewis, M. Canevaro, D.L. Cairns (eds.), Slavery and Honour in the Ancient Greek World, Edinburgh 2025, 1-23
• M. Canevaro, The Documents in the Attic Orators: Laws and Decrees in the Public Speeches of the Demosthenic Corpus, Oxford 2013
• M. Canevaro, The Graphê Hybreôs against Slaves: The Timê of the Victim and that of the Hybristês, JHS 138, 2018, 100-126
• S. Dmitriev, Athenian Atimia and Legislation against Tyranny and Subversion, CQ 65.1, 2015, 35-50
• A.F. Garvie, Aeschylus, Persae with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 2009
• M.H. Hansen, Apagoge, Endeixis, and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi, and Pheugontes, Odense 1976
• T.S.K. Jim, Sharing with the Gods: “Aparchai” and “Dekatai” in Ancient Greece, Oxford 2014
• C.J. Joyce, Atimia and Outlawry in Archaic and Classical Greece, Polis 35, 2018, 33-60
• D.M. MacDowell, Athenian Laws about Bribery, RIDA 30, 1983, 57-78
• A. Maffi, Ἀτιμάζειν e φεύγειν nei poemi omerici, in P. Dimakis (ed.), Symposion 1979. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte, Vienna 1983, 249-260
• E. Meyer, Metics and the Athenian Phialai-Inscriptions: A Study in Athenian Epigraphy and Law, Stuttgart 2010
• M. Novotný, Andocides on ἀτιμία and the Term πρόσταξις, Eirene 50, 2014, 61-88
• U.E. Paoli, Studi di diritto attico, Firenze 1930
• L. Piccirilli, Aristotele e l’atimia (Athen. Pol., 8, 5), ANSP 6.3, 1976, 739-761
• E. Poddighe, L’atimia nel διάγραμμα di Cirene: la definizione della cittadinanza tra morale e diritto alla fine del IV secolo a.C., Aevum 75/1, 2001, 37-55
• E. Poddighe, Ateniesi infami (atimoi) ed ex Ateniesi senza i requisiti (apepsephismenoi): nuove osservazioni in margine al fr. 29 Jensen di Iperide sulle diverse forme di esclusione dal corpo civico di Atene, AFLC n.s. 24, 2006, 5-24
• L. Rocchi, Atimia: Dishonour, Disfranchisement, and Civic Disability in Archaic and Classical Athens, Dissertation, University of Edinburgh 2022
• L. Rocchi, From (Apt) Contempt to (Legal) Dishonor: Two Kinds of Contempt and the Penalty of Atimia, Emotion Review 15.3, 2023a, 200-206
• L. Rocchi, Identity, Status, and ‘Dishonour’: Was Atimia Relevant only to Citizens?, in J. Filonik, C. Plastow, R. Zelnick-Abramovitz (eds.), Citizenship in Antiquity. Civic Communities in the Ancient Mediterranean, Abingdon-New York 2023b, 327-340
• L. Rocchi, Denominative Verbs From Atimia in the Attic Orators and Beyond, CQ 75.1, 2025a, 1-16
• L. Rocchi, Citizenship and Active Participation: Timē, Atimia, and Epitimia in Ancient Greek Legislation against Tyranny, Erga/Logoi 12.2, 2025b (Atti del Convegno internazionale “Teoria e prassi della cittadinanza nel mondo greco”, Milano, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1-2 luglio 2024), in cds.
• E. Ruschenbusch, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des athenischen Strafrechts, Cologne 1968
• H. Swoboda, Arthmios von Zeleia, Archaeologisch-epigraphische Mitteilungen, 16.1, 1893, 49-68
• E.P. van ’t Wout, From Oath-swearing to Entrenchment Clause: The Introduction of ἀτιμία-Terminology in Legal Inscriptions, in A. Lardinois, M.H. Pierre, J.H. Blok, M.G.M. Van der Poel (eds.), Sacred Words: Orality, Literacy, and Religion, Leiden-Boston 2011, 143-160
• S. Vleminck, La valeur de ἀτιμία dans le droit grec ancien, LEC 49, 1981, 251-265
• D. Whitehead, Xenophon, Poroi (Revenue-Sources), Translated with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 2019
• K. Woram, Archaic and Classical Atimia: Citizenship, Religious Exclusion, and Pollution, TAPA 152.2, 2022, 303-344
• M.S. Youni, The Different Categories of Unpunished Killing and the Term ἄτιμος in Ancient Greek Law, in E. Cantarella, G. Thür (eds.), Symposion 1997. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte, Vienna 2001, 117-137
• M.S. Youni, Outlawry in Classical Athens: Nothing to Do with Atimia, in G. Thür, U. Yiftach-Firanko, R. Zelnick-Abramovitz (eds.), Symposion 2017. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte, Vienna 2018, 137-155
• M.S. Youni, Atimia in Classical Athens: What the Sources Say, in L. Pepe, L. Gagliardi (eds.), Dike. Essays in Greek Law in Honor of Alberto Maffi, Milan 2019, 361-378

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Chiliastys (χιλιαστύς)

The term translates to ‘group of a thousand’; however, like other civic subdivisions based on numerical criteria, the figure of a thousand is conventional and reveals a significant degree of artificiality. The chiliastys is documented in various locations within the Greek world, being characteristic of the cities along the Anatolian coast and some adjacent islands: Mithymna, Erythrae, Ephesus, Samos, Cos, and Miletus. The origins of this institution do not appear to be attributable to an ethnic foundation, especially considering that groups of a thousand are found in cities of Ionian, Doric, and Aeolian origin, nor to a phenomenon of dissemination from an original context. Debord (1984) has suggested that, following a general demographic increase, the ancient divisions of citizenship, which were not entirely adequate to meet the renewed civic needs, were supplemented by new subdivisions in the Hellenistic period, possibly influenced by the Persian model of chiliarchy of a military nature (cf. Sardis VII 1, 1), adopted through Macedonian mediation.

In Methymna, where the form χέλληστυς is attested, the names of four chiliastyes (Πρωτεῖς, Σκυρεῖς, Ἐρυθραῖοι, Φωκεῖς) are known from honorary decrees issued by the assembly (koinon) of each respective chellestys. The oldest document from Mithymna in this regard, dating to the reign of Ptolemy Philopator (circa 229 BC), is a decree issued by the koinon of the Proteis in honour of Prassikles for his diligent care in performing the communal sacrifices as president of the chellestys (χελληστυάρχας, IG XII 2, 498, l. 6). In Erythrae, two chiliastyes are attested: the Chalkideis (I.Erythrai 1, 41, 2nd century BC) and the Peproioi (I.Erythrai 1, 81, 1st century BC). The latter are also known from a law from the classical period (5th-4th century BC) that establishes restrictions on the reiteration of a magistracy; however, in the document in question, the Peproioi are not designated as chiliastys (I.Erythrai 1, 17; for the idea that it was a personal association controlling marshy lands, see Jones 1987, 305; Liddel 2021, 81 n. 21). It is difficult to ascertain whether the Erythraean chiliastyes were territorial units. The very connection of the chiliastys of the Chalkideis with a Chalkis tribe, based on the mention of a port of the Chalkideis in I.Erythrai 151, ll. 17-18, is uncertain, and it would be imprudent to conclude that membership in the chiliastys was determined by geographical basis or residence.

In Cos, the chiliastyes appear in a civic regulation for the festival of Zeus Polieus (IG XII 4, 278, mid-4th century BC). The document provides little reliable information: the chiliastyes are involved in civic rites; the hieropoioi and karykes administering the rite advance in the procession according to their respective chiliastys; the chiliastyes must provide suitable sacrificial animals, should those supplied by the enatai (ἔνατα literally means ‘the ninth part’) fail to meet ritual requirements. The relationship between chiliastyes and enatai remains uncertain: some scholars consider the two terms synonymous (Sherwin-White 1978, 160-161; Debord 1984, 205; Jones 1987, 237-238), but the existence of two distinct names and the fact that enatai is mentioned only in Cos, alongside the previously cited lex sacra differentiating the roles of chiliastys and enata, makes it more likely that they are distinct groups, created at different times and not perfectly overlapping (Marre 2018, 61).

In Samos, following the expulsion of the Athenian cleruchy, the return of the exiled Samians, and the reorganisation of the administrative apparatus, a reference to registration in the chiliastys appears in the formula for granting citizenship, after the tribe and before the hekatostys and genos. Although a relatively substantial number of decrees exists, only in two instances is the name of the chiliastys which the citizenship beneficiary is assigned to preserved (IG XII 6, 1 24, where it reads Εγ[…..]ν; IG XII 6, 1 56, Οἴνωπες). Additionally, in the lex frumentaria from Samos (IG XII 6, 1 178), the chiliastyes play a pivotal role emerging as “primary operational units” of the Samian administration (Fantasia 1998, 224): they assess the real and personal guarantees of those borrowing capital intended for the purchase of public grain (ll. 11-13); they elect the curators (μελεδωνοί) who manage the capital (ll. 1, 16-17); concerning the management of capital, the chiliastyes are required to respond directly if borrowers do not pay the interest on the capital, so much so that they must sell the real guarantees and pay any excess to the officials ἐπὶ τοῦ σίτου, under penalty of exclusion from grain distribution (ll. 64-71); the chiliastys forfeits its right to the grain ration to which it is entitled even if the curator it elected fails to pay interest on the capital to the officials ἐπὶ τοῦ σίτου (ll. 79-81). Also the registration of distributions considered the civic subdivision, as the lists retaining the names of beneficiaries were organised by the chiliastys.

In Ephesos, 51 chiliastyes are known as subdivisions of the five tribes. Engelmann (1996) demonstrated that the number of chiliastyes comprising each tribe varied from 5 to 8 units; a chiliastys could belong, at least in classical and Hellenistic times, to only one tribe. As in Samos, chiliastyes recur in the citizenship form in various naturalisation decrees. In some of these documents, the priests of Artemis (Ἐσσῆνες) draw lots for the chiliastys and phyle in which the new citizen must be registered (e.g. I.Ephesos 1433; 1447; 1451), while the νεωποιοί, responsible for guarding the Artemision, were required to publish the names of new citizens on the walls of the temple.

• R. Brock, Civic Subdivisions and the Citizen Community, in J. Filonik, C. Plastow, R. Zelnick-Abramovitz (eds.), Citizenship in Antiquity: Civic Communities in the Ancient Mediterranean, Abingdon – New York 2023, 226-239
• P. Debord, Chiliastys, REA 86.1, 1984, 201-211
• H. Engelmann, Phylen und Chiliastyen von Ephesos, ZPE 113, 1996, 94-100
• U. Fantasia, Distribuzioni di grano e archivi della polis: il caso di Samo, in La mémoire perdue. Recherches sur l’administration romaine. Actes des tables rondes de Rome (mai 1994 – mai 1995), Rome 1998, 205-228
• N.F. Jones, Public Organization in Ancient Greece: A Documentary Study, Philadelphia 1987
• P. Liddel, The Discourses of Identity in Hellenistic Erythrai: Institutions, Rhetoric, Honour and Reciprocity, Polis 38.1, 2021, 74-107
• S. Marre, Phylétika: divisions et subdivisions civiques en Ionie, en Carie, à Rhodes et dans les îles proches du continent de la mort d’Alexandre le Grand à l’arrivée des Romains, Diss. Université Michel de Montaigne, Bordeaux 2018
• M. Piérart, Modèles de répartition des citoyens dans les cités ioniennes, REA 8, 1985, 169-190
• S.M. Sherwin-White, Ancient Cos: An Historical Study from the Dorian Settlement to the Imperial Period, Göttingen 1978

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Demotes / damotas (δημότης/δαμότας)

The term exhibits a broad semantic range. In a strictly Athenian context, dēmótēs designates a member of one of the 139 demes into which the territory of Attica was divided (e.g. [Demosth.] 57.9; Soph. OC 78). The term bears the same meaning in the context of Cos, which was likewise divided into demes (e.g. IG XII.4 1.99, ll. 20, 32).

Dēmótēs may also more generally denote a member of the entire polis, i.e. a citizen: see Tyrt. fr. 4 West, 5 (the citizens of Sparta as a constitutional body distinct from the gerousia and the kings); Pi. N. 7.65 (the citizens of Aegina); Eurip. Supp. 895 (in opposition to xenos); IG VII 235, ll. 9, 15 (the citizens of Oropus during the period of independence from both Athens and Thebes, 386–374 BC); SEG 39.1243, col. IV, ll. 1–2 (the citizens of Colophon in the public sphere, as opposed to the idiōtai of ll. 5–6, i.e. the citizens considered individually in the private sphere); IG XII.6 1.128, l. 21, where the term may instead denote the less affluent citizens of Samos rather than all holders of citizenship (designated as politai in l. 20).

Indeed, dēmótēs frequently carries connotations tied to a specific sociopolitical context, denoting the body of citizens in opposition to the ruling elites (Hdt. 2.172.4, 17; 5.11.8; Soph. Aj. 1071; Ant. 690; Eurip. Alc. 1057; fr. 362), and, by extension, the poor in opposition to the wealthy (Xen. Mem. 1.2.59; Aen. Tact. 11.11.4; Ath. 12.26.13), or supporters of democratic factions in opposition to oligarchs (Plut. Lys. 21).

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Engye / engyesis (ἐγγύη/ἐγγύησις)

In classical Athens, the terms engye and engyesis referred to the formal and preliminary act preceding the gamos, through which the kyrios (father, grandfather, or brother) pledged a woman under his guardianship to a future husband. However, this act alone was not sufficient to constitute a marriage, which was only realized through the ekdosis, namely the actual delivery of the bride to her new household. The ekdosis did not necessarily coincide with the engye, and typically occurred at a later stage. Within the Athenian matrimonial context, the engye was a compulsory step—except in the case of epikleroi, who followed the procedure of epidikasia—and constituted the legal prerequisite for the validity of the marriage and, consequently, for the birth of “legitimate children” (paides gnesioi).

In this way, the engye safeguarded both the continuity of the oikos and the transmission of citizenship, especially following Pericles’ law of 451/0 BCE, which restricted citizenship to children born of two Athenian parents. This aspect gained increasing relevance in the courts of the fourth century BCE, where proof of a legitimate marriage was often required to establish the legitimacy of children ([Demosth.] 59.16). In this regard, two passages from the speech Against Euboulides (Demosth. 57.41 and 57.54) clearly illustrate the probative function of the engyesis: Euxitheos claims Athenian citizenship partly by appealing to the fact that his mother had been given in marriage through a proper engye witnessed by credible individuals. In Demosth. 57.41 (ἐγγυᾶται ὁ πατὴρ τὴν μητέρα τὴν ἐμὴν παρὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτῆς Τιμοκράτους Μελιτέως), the verb engyan is used in the middle voice to indicate the father’s act of accepting the bride.

The verb, in its core meaning, carries the sense of “to plight,” “to betroth” (LSJ, s.v.). Etymologically, it evokes the gesture of handing something over or sealing an agreement with a handshake—a ritual act interpreted by Wolff (1944) as indicative of a material “delivery.” Gernet (1968), by contrast, interpreted it not as a transfer in the strict sense, but as the mark of a solemn promise made by one member of the family (typically the kyrios) on behalf of another, independently of the physical presence of the object or person promised.

Moreover, the earliest known occurrence of the term is not linked to marriage but still seems to allude to a solemn form of guarantee. In Odyssey 8.351 (δειλαί τοι δειλῶν γε καὶ ἐγγύαι ἐγγυάασθαι), Hephaestus refuses the engyai, that is, the “pledges” or “solemn promises” made by Poseidon on behalf of Ares, emphasizing the futility of assurances given by dishonourable men. The use of the term already hints at a solemn form of commitment, perhaps sealed by a ritual handshake. In Herodotus (6.130 τῷ δὲ Ἀλκμέωνος Μεγακλέι ἐγγυῶ παῖδα τὴν ἐμὴν Ἀγαρίστην νόμοισι τοῖσι Ἀθηναίων.’ φαμένου δὲ ἐγγυᾶσθαι Μεγακλέος ἐκεκύρωτο ὁ γάμος Κλεισθένεϊ), the term engye explicitly appears in a matrimonial context, in the account of how Cleisthenes, between 576 and 572 BCE, issued a public proclamation to offer his daughter Agariste in marriage to the most worthy among the Greeks. Once the suitor had been selected, Cleisthenes gave Agariste in marriage to Megacles, in accordance with Athenian law. The act of bestowing Agariste as a bride is expressed using the verb engyan, in the first-person singular form. Megacles’ acceptance of her is conveyed through the same verb, now conjugated in the middle voice.

That the engye alone was insufficient to establish a marriage is confirmed by cases in which it occurred many years before the actual union, or never led to marriage at all. Particularly significant is the case of Demosthenes’ sister, who was promised in marriage to Demophon by her father when she was only five years old. Despite the engye, the marriage was never celebrated (Demosth. 27.15–17; cf. Is. 6.22–24).

A crucial component of the procedure was the presence of credible witnesses from both families (Is. 3.18–20; Demosth. 30.21, 39.22). These witnesses validated the agreement and the amount of the dowry, while their absence could invalidate or cast doubt upon the act. The two aforementioned passages from Against Euboulides (Demosth. 57.41 and 57.54) explicitly attest to the importance of witnesses in demonstrating the regularity of the marriage. Euxitheos calls upon his uncles and other unnamed individuals to confirm the engyesis of his mother and support his claim to citizenship.

Thus, although the engyesis was not formally recorded in writing, it could serve as legal proof in court cases concerning citizenship (as in Euxitheos’ case) or inheritance (Demosth. 44.49, 46.18). All of this confirms that, in Athenian law, marriage was not conceived as an emotional union, but rather as a contract aimed at producing legitimate heirs. Through the engye, the kyrios protected the legal and patrimonial interests of the oikos by selecting a husband of equal social status and good reputation (Aeschin. 1.182–183; Demosth. 40.57, 44.49; [Demosth.] 59.65).

In conclusion, the engye should not be understood as the actual transfer of a woman from one oikos to another—that role was fulfilled by the ekdosis. Rather, it was a solemn commitment that ensured a woman would become the legitimate mother of a particular man’s children. Its function was thus civic and reproductive, not emotional or relational: although the wife bore children for her husband’s oikos, she was not integrated into his anchisteia (the kinship group linked by blood and charged with legal and ritual duties), and remained, both legally and symbolically, a xene—a “stranger”—within her husband’s household. Through the engye, the boundaries of citizenship and the oikos were defined and protected, marking one of the key moments in the juridical and symbolic cycle of being Athenian.

• M. Broadbent, Studies in Greek Genealogy, Leiden 1968
• P. Cox, Household Interests: Property, Marriage Strategies, and Family Dynamics in Ancient Athens, London 1998
• L. Gernet, Anthropologie de la Grèce antique, Paris 1968
• A. R. W. Harrison, The Law of Athens. The Family and Property, Oxford 1968
• W. R. Lacey, The Family in Classical Greece, London 1968
• C. Leduc, Comment la donner en mariage? La mariée en pays grec (IXe‑IVe s. av. J.‑C.), in G. Duby, M. Perrot (eds), Histoire des femmes en Occident, Paris 2002, 309-382.
• G. Nenci, Erodoto. Le storie,Libro VI, La battaglia di Maratona, Milano 1998
• S. Patterson, Marriage and the Married Woman in Athenian Law, in S. B. Pomeroy (ed.), Women’s History and Ancient History, Chapel Hill 1991, 48-72
• K. L. Phelan, A Social and Historical Commentary on Demosthenes’ Against Euboulides, Diss. National University of Ireland, Maynouth 2016
• R. Sealey, Women and Law in Classical Greece, Chapel Hill 1990
• J.-P. Vernant, Le mariage en Grèce archaïque, La Parola del Passato 28 (1973), 51-74
• R. Wolff, Marriage Law and Family Organization in Ancient Athens, Traditio 2 (1944), 44-95

[E. Poddighe – M. Deriu]

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Enteles (ἐντελής)

The meaning of the term is rarely straightforward. In certain cases, it appears to refer with reasonable certainty to the enjoyment of full rights: e.g. SEG 46.167, l. 9, an honorific decree from Athens dating to ca. 281 BC, referring to Tarentine mercenaries who augmented the ranks of the Athenian cavalry and are described as enteleis—thus holders of full rights and probably assimilated to citizens. By the mid-second century BC, Tarentine cavalrymen are attested as full Athenian citizens under the command of two Athenian tarantinarchoi (IG II² 958, l. 55). In the same sense of “possessing full rights,” but in a Roman context, entelḗs must be understood in D.S. 34.2.31, where the adjective qualifies equites.

Less clear is the meaning of the term in a Milesian decree of ca. 330 BC (Milet I.3 136): at l. 10 it is stipulated that if a citizen of Miletus wished to join the board of timouchoi in the city of Olbia, he had to appear before the local boulē, have his name registered, and from that moment he would be considered entelḗs. The mention, a few lines earlier (l. 6), of ateleia as a privilege granted to Milesians in Olbia makes it difficult to determine whether entelḗs here is to be interpreted in terms of the possession of civic rights (in particular, eligibility for public office) or in fiscal terms, i.e. “subject to the same taxation as citizens” (so e.g. Müller 2022, 337–338).

The meaning of enteleia is likewise uncertain in several honorific decrees from Acarnania and Epirus (e.g. Cabanes, L’Épire, no. 3, ll. 4–5; no. 16, l. 6; IG IX.1² 2, 209, ll. 14, 21): it could refer either to rights or to fiscal obligations. In all these texts, however, enteleia is mentioned together with ateleia, which suggests that ateleia denoted exemption from taxes normally owed by foreigners, whereas enteleia might refer to the levying of those taxes regularly paid by citizens. Chaniotis (1986) proposes interpreting enteleia as the obligation to pay those taxes not covered by the ateleia—that is, taxes related to economic activities carried out by the honorands in the city granting them the privilege. It should be noted, however, that the texts mentioning the honor of enteleia provide no evidence as to whether the honorands were actually engaged in commerce or pursued other professions.

• P. Cabanes, L’Épire de la mort de Pyrrhos à la conquête romaine, Paris 1976
• A. Chaniotis, Ἐντέλεια. Zu Inhalt und Begriff eines Vorrechtes, ZPE 64, 1986, 159-162
• C. Müller, Migration et mémoire: Milet et ses apoikiai à l’époque hellénistique in G. R. Tsetskhladze (ed.), Ionians in the West and East, Leuven-Paris-Bristol (CT) 2022, 333-360

[G. Falco]

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Entimos (ἔντιμος)

The first occurrence of the term in an institutional context is found in an inscription preserving the text of a law, dating to the late sixth or the first quarter of the fifth century BC, by which the Locrians of Hypoknemis regulated their relations with the epoikoi of Naupactus (IG IX.1² 3 718, ll. 34–35). The term is used in provisions concerning judicial disputes between the Locrians and the epoikoi, specifically regarding the appointment of a guarantor (prostatas). Scholarly opinion has been much divided on the precise meaning of the term in this context. Some have taken it to mean “in full possession of civic rights” (e.g. Koerner 1993, 175: im Besitz der bürgerlichen Rechte; Nomima I, 43: parmi les citoyens jouissant de leurs droits), thus qualifying the prostatas; others have suggested interpreting it as “in office” (Meiggs–Lewis, GHI 20: “whoever are in office for the year”), in this case referring to the magistrates charged with appointing the guarantor.

Still within the sphere of the possession of rights, but with a more precise nuance, Gauthier (1972, 355) interprets the term as synonymous with ἐπίτιμος, thus designating citizens in possession of their rights (i.e. not atimoi), but more specifically citoyens actifs recrutés parmi les aristoi. This interpretation is particularly persuasive, both for contextual reasons (there is no evident reason why magistrates should appoint the parties’ guarantors) and for syntactic ones (the relative clause containing the term cannot serve as the subject of the preceding infinitive), as well as in light of the essentially aristocratic character of the Locrian koinon.

A possible connection with the full enjoyment of rights, specifically with reference to eligibility for public office, may also be seen in Pl. Resp. 564d, where τὸ μὴ ἔντιμον εἶναι is defined as τὸ ἀπελαύνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχῶν—i.e. exclusion from public office—although in this Platonic passage the adjective could also simply mean “honoured,” “esteemed” (cf. e.g. Pl. Resp. 555c; Arist. Rh. 1388b 4–5; Demosth. 3.29; Plut. Artax. 14.2.2; SEG 26.1214, l. 5).

Éntimos must certainly be understood in terms of the enjoyment of full rights in two decrees from Aeolian Cyme, one dating to the mid-third century BC, the other to the early second century BC (I.Kyme 4, l. 12; I.Kyme 5, l. 8: καὶ Κυμαῖον ἔμμεναι καὶ α[ὐ]τὸν καὶ ἐκγόνοις ἐντίμοις εὐθύς). In both, benefactors of the city are granted citizenship, with the provision that they be éntimoi euthýs (or eutheōs), an expression then clarified in the following lines by reference to the specific prerogatives conferred with citizenship: eligibility for public office, the right to own land and a house on Cymaean soil, and priority in cases to be heard before the courts. The emphasis in both decrees on the immediate enjoyment of full rights upon the granting of politeia is explained by the fact that citizenship was not usually accompanied automatically by the immediate and complete granting of the prerogatives enjoyed by other citizens, as shown also by the case documented in I.Ephesos 8 (86–85 BC), ll. 40–41. There, as an incentive to full participation in the Mithridatic War and thus as an extraordinary measure, it is expressly stipulated that those who had been registered as new citizens up to the moment of the decree’s issue (πεπολιτογράφηνται μέχρι τῶν νῦν χρόνων) should be éntimoi, i.e. enjoy full rights.

• Ph. Gauthier, Symbola. Les étrangers et la justice dans les cités grecques, Nancy 1972
• R. Koerner, Inschriftliche Gesetzestexte der frühen griechischen Polis, Köln 1993
• R. Meiggs, D. Lewis, A selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, Oxford 1969
• H. van Effenterre, F. Ruzé, Nomima. Recueil d’inscriptions politiques et juridiques de l’archaïsme grec, Vol. 1, Rome 1994

[G. Falco]

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Epigamia (ἐπιγαμία)

In Greek law epigamia refers to the right to enter into a legitimate marriage with a person of a different status: for example, the right for a metic to marry a citizen, or of an Athenian to marry a foreigner in the context of Pericles’ law of citizenship. This right included that of begetting legitimate children and granting them full citizenship.

Epigamy was, of course, included in the grant of citizenship: such was the case with the Plataeans, whose epigamy, acquired in 427 along with Athenian citizenship after the destruction of the city, is recalled by Isocrates (Plat. 51).

Epigamy could be granted individually to foreigners and metics in exceptional cases: see, for example, the grant by the city of Kotyrta to the Spartan Aratus son of Nicias of proxenia and a number of privileges, including epigamy (IG V,1 961, ca. 150-100 BCE).

Epigamy could also be granted to an entire civic body of another state: Lysias (34, 3) recalls the granting of epigamy to the Euboeans by the Athenians in an unspecified context, but one that seems to refer to the existence of a still firm Athenian empire; it is possible that the concession should be linked with the growing importance of Euboea in securing supplies for Athens after 413.

Some international treaties provided for the granting of epigamy: cf. the case of the Aetolians and Acarnanians (IG IX,1² 1:3, c. 262) and the Cretan city of Hierapydna and the Arcadians (Chaniotis, Verträge 14, c. 227-221 BCE).

In the context of federal states it is debated whether epigamy was always expected among the member states, as would seem to be suggested by Cligenes of Acanthos’ speech in Xenophon (Hell. V, 2, 19): he regards epigamic relations as a necessary consequence of the formation of the Chalcidian federal state under the aegis of Olynthos. There are cases, however, such as the granting of a number of privileges, including epigamy, to a citizen of Larissa by the city of Gonno (Gonnoi II 30, ca. 180-170 BCE), that seem to suggest that situation were not the same in all federal states, perhaps in relation to the varying degree to which local communities were integrated into the federation.

• H. Beck, Polis und Koinon. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Struktur der griechischen Bundesstaaten im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr., Stuttgart 1997
• A. Chaniotis, Die Verträge zwischen kretischen Poleis in der hellenistichen Zeit, Stuttgart 1996
• A.R.W. Harrison, The Law of Athens, I-II, Oxford 1968-1971 (trad. it. Il diritto ad Atene, Alessandria 2001)
• A. Oranges, La concessione dell’epigamia agli Eubei, in C. Bearzot, F. Landucci (eds.), Tra mare e continente: l’isola d’Eubea, Milano 2013, 173-189
• S. Saba, “Epigamia” in Hellenistic Interstate Treaties: Foreign and Family Policy, AncSoc 41 (2011) 93-108

[C. Bearzot]

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Epitimos (ἐπίτιμος)

In Attic sources, epitimos designates citizens in full possession of their rights, often implicitly or explicitly contrasted with the atimoi (e.g. Thuc. 5.34.2; Dem. 21.61; Aeschin. 1.160; cf. also Xen. Hell. 2.2.11; [Arist.] Ath. 39.1; Plut. Sol. 19.4). The term appears with the same meaning in I.Ilion 25 (ca. 280 BC), ll. 31–32, where it is stipulated that if the tyrant were killed by a slave, the latter would become epitimos and take part in the politeia κατὰ τὸν νόμον—a formulation that seems to indicate that epitimos here means “in full possession of the rights of citizenship,” though scholarly opinion is divided on this interpretation (for discussion, see Teegarden 2014, 184 n. 18).

Reference to the full enjoyment of political rights is also inherent in the noun epitima (ἐπιτιμά), attested in roughly thirty Delphic honorific decrees for proxenoi issued between the early fourth and the mid-third century BC. In these, it denotes the granting of full political rights; the term is accompanied by the formula καθάπερ Δελφοῖς (e.g. F.Delphes III 1, 314, l. 3; F.Delphes III 4, 380, l. 11, where the form ἐπιτιμία occurs: Δελφοὶ ἔδωκαν…ἐπιτιμίαν καθάπερ Δελφοῖς), from which it is clear that the epitima placed the honorands on the same footing as Delphian citizens with respect to civic rights. More complex is the determination of its meaning when the epitima was granted by the Amphictyonic Council or by Delphi itself to outgoing Amphictyonic hieromnemones (see Sanchez 2001, 320).

• P. Sanchez, L’amphictionie des Pyles et de Delphes. Recherches sur son rôle historique, des origines au II^e siècle de notre ère, Stuttgart 2001
• D. A. Teegarden, Death to Tyrants! Ancient Greek Democracy and the Struggle against Tyranny, Princeton 2014

[G. Falco]

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Etes/(w)etas (ἔτης/(F)έτας)

The term can first of all denote, in a general sense, a member of a civic community: see Pi. fr. 52f, 10, where the noun designates the citizens of Delphi (or of Aegina) to whom Pindar’s paean was addressed.

In addition, étas / étēs can also refer to a private citizen, a notion which itself may be understood in two ways:
a) in opposition to those holding power (Aesch. Supp. 247: étēs contrasted with póleos ágōs; Eurip. fr. 1014: étēs opposed to árchos; Thuc. 5.79.4, where the ἔται are the citizens of Sparta and Argos who might find themselves judged as private citizens before the courts; Syll.³ 141, l. 12: étas opposed to árchōn);
b) in opposition to the civic community as a whole (Aesch. fr. 281a: étēs vs. dēmos; IG IX.12 573, l. 9, where, notably, the noun is partially restored).

Particularly significant is IvO 9, in which (W)étas denotes a private citizen who holds no magistracy (and is thus not a telestēs), considered separately from the people assembled in the ekklēsia (and/or from the civic body as a whole: damos).

In a rather late document (1st–3rd c. AD) from Nubia, finally, étēs occurs with the meaning of “free citizen” in opposition to “slave” (Bernand, Inscriptions métriques 167, l. 9: καὶ ἔτας καὶ δμόας).

[G. Falco]

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Hekatostys (ἑκατοστύς)

The term ἑκατοστύς, meaning ‘group of a hundred’ or ‘centuria’, appears in two contexts: military and purely institutional. In the military lexicon, hekatostys denotes an infantry unit of approximately one hundred men. Arrian refers to this kind of hekatostys (Anab. 7.24. 4) when describing Alexander’s last days: after receiving a sacred embassy from Siwah concerning the granting of heroic worship to Hephaestion, Alexander is said to have distributed wine and meat from a recent sacrifice to the troops, who were divided into lochoi (cavalry units) and hekatostyes (Bosworth 2010; Contra Sekunda 2010, who believes that hekatostys replaced lochos to indicate a division of the cavalry corps or ἴλη to avoid confusion with the infantry lochos). Alexander had previously distributed pack animals and camels to the centuries during his  passage through Gedrosia (Arr. Anab. 6.27.6).

Hekatostys also denotes a numerical civil subdivision attested in Megara and its colonies (Byzantium, Chalcedon, Heraclea Pontica, Selymbria) and in the Ionian region (Samos and Lampsacus). The only ancient definition of hekatostys is found in an entry by Hesychius (Ε 85 Latte, s.v. ἑκατοστύς), where he first compares it to chiliastys – another numerical subdivision of the polis – and then considers it synonymous with syngheneia (a kinship group). However, it remains controversial whether hekatostys should be considered a kinship group. It is likely that Hesychius’ passage reflects the influence of the theoretical elaborations on the smaller units of the polis by Hellenistic philosophical thought and antiquarian research, rather than providing reliable information on the hekatostys.

More useful information comes from epigraphic documentation. In the Megarian area, hekatostys is mentioned in an inscription recording financial transactions between the Epidaurians and the Elisfasioi (IG IV² 1, 42): at ll. 18-20, the onomastic formula of one witness to the transaction, the Megarian Dionysius, includes the mention of the hekatostys Κυνοσουρίς. In Byzantium, where documentation dates to the 2nd century BC, hekatostys appears in the set of  formulas for granting citizenship, allowing the new citizen to register with the hekatostys of their choice (IK Byzantion 1, 2, 3). Hekatostys must have existed also in Heraclea Pontica, although it has not left traces in the epigraphic documentation. An institutional reform, datable to around 370 BC, reportedly increased the number of hekatostyes from 12 to 60 (Aen. Tact. 11.10bis-11); it remains uncertain whether this increase altered the nature of the institution from a kinship group to a territorial unit. It is possible that the new hekatostyes also had a military function.

In Samos, hekatostys appears in 58 citizenship decrees spanning from the 4th century BC to the 2nd century AD. While nothing definitive can be said about the functions of hekatostys, it played a certain role in the registration of new citizens; it is included in the set of formulas regulating the allocation of the neopolites in the civic subdivisions: phyle – chiliastys – genos (with which hekatostys is often associated, sometimes even sharing the same name). On two occasions, the name of the hekatostys to which the citizen was assigned is recorded, immediately after the mention of the drawing of lots for the registration of the neopolites in the civic units of the polis: Elandridai, IG XII 61 56, ll. 18-20; -αρνικίδαι, IG XII 61 24, ll. 27-29, 35-39 (both inscriptions are dated after 306 BC). The documentation from Lampsacus also shows the need for neopolites to register in the hekatostys (IK Lampsakos 6 and 9). Notably, IK Lampsakos 9 (ll. 39-40) mentions a register in which citizens were enrolled based on hekatostys.

• A.B. Bosworth, The Argeads and the Phalanx, in E. Carney, D. Ogden (eds.), Philip II and Alexander the Great. Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives, Oxford 2010, 91-102
• R. Brock, Civic Subdivisions and the Citizen Community, in J. Filonik, C. Plastow, R. Zelnick-Abramovitz (eds.), Citizenship in Antiquity: Civic Communities in the Ancient Mediterranean, Abingdon – New York 2023, 226-239
• F. Ferraioli, L’Hecatostys: analisi della documentazione, Tivoli 2012
• N.F. Jones, Public Organization in Ancient Greece: A Documentary Study, Philadelphia 1987
• N.V. Sekunda, The Macedonian Army, in J. Roisman, I. Worthington (eds.), A Companion to Ancient Macedonia, Chichester 2010, 446-471

[L. Loddo]

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Homopoliteia (ὁμοπολιτεία)

The only occurrence of this term, translatable as ‘sharing the right of citizenship’, is found in an epigraphic document reporting an agreement between the poleis of Cos and Calymna, dated to 201/200 BC (IG XII 4.1, 152 = Tit. Cal. XII, ll. 16 and 18). This document does not actually contain the text of the convention of homopoliteia; rather, it is a civic oath in which the citizens of Cos and Calymna pledge to uphold, among other things, the democracy and ancestral laws of Cos, as well as the restoration (apokatastasis) of homopoliteia. The original treaty, variably dated between 215 and 205 BC, was likely annulled due to the hostile actions of Philip V following the Battle of Lade. The agreement of homopoliteia sanctioned the incorporation of Calymna, reduced to the status of a deme, into the territory of Cos, indicating a process of unilateral assimilation different from the sharing of citizenship rights or sympoliteia. New lists of citizens, dating to twenty years after the unification, can be associated with the agreement on homopoliteia (cf. Tit. Cal. 88-96).

• P. Baker, Cos et Calymna, 205-200 a.C.: Esprit civique et défense nationale, Québec 1991
• S. Saba, Cittadinanza e archivi nel Mediterraneo antico: qualche postilla esegetica, Historika 11, 2021, 83-94
• A. Sherwin-White, Ancient Cos. An Historical Study from the Dorian Settlement to the Imperial Period, Göttingen 1978
• A.V. Walser, Sympolitien und Siedlungsentwicklung, in A. Matthaei – M. Zimmermann (eds.), Stadtbilder im Hellenismus, Berlin 2009, 135-155

[L. Loddo]

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Isoteles/isoteleia (ἰσοτελής/ἰσοτέλεια)

The terms isoteles/isoteleia (subject to equal taxation/equality of taxation) indicate a privilege that a Greek state (e.g. Tanagra, Boeotia: IG VII 517; Priene: I.Priene 5), including federal states (e.g. the Boeotian koinon: IG VII 2861, IThesp. 29, etc.), could grant to non-citizens and that put them at the same level as citizens in terms of financial obligations. Isoteleia was occasionally granted together with citizenship to emphasise the recipient’s complete equality with citizens (e.g. Lamia, Thessaly: IG IX 2, 69; Mesambria, Thrace: IGBulg I² 309; Opuntian Locris: IG IX 1, 276; Andros: IG XII Suppl. 245; Kalymnos: IG XII 4, 5.3948; Chalcedon: I.Kalchedon 4). The lexicographers define the isoteles as a privileged metic who enjoys fiscal equality with citizens (Hsch. s.v. ἰσοτελεῖς; Bekker, Anecd. Gr. 1. 267. 1, ἰσοτελεῖς), in some cases with the specification that this is a ‘deserving’ (axios) metic (Harpocr. and Phot. s.v. ἰσοτελής καὶ ἰσοτέλεια). At Athens isoteleis were exempt from the metoikion, an annual poll tax paid by resident foreigners. From the available evidence it is not entirely clear whether the granting of isoteleia consisted solely in the exemption from payment of the metoikion or if it entailed an equation with the condition of citizenship, except for the possibility for metics to be appointed to command roles (e.g. Moer. 199.27-28: ἰσοτελής ὁ ξένος ὁ μετέχων τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πραττομένων πάντων πλὴν ἀρχῆς; Sch. Demosth. 20.73.1-2: ἰσοτελεῖς μὲν λέγει τοὺς ξένους τοὺς τετυχηκότας τῆς ἴσης τιμῆς τοῖς πολίταις). The rare instances of occurrence of the terms isoteleia and isoteles in 4th-century BCE literary sources do not prove helpful in this respect (Xenoph. Hell. 2.4.25; Demosth. 20.29; 34.18; [Demosth.] 35.14; [Arst.] Ath. 58.2). Only in Xenophon’s Poroi (4.12) is the term isoteleia used to indicate a fiscal privilege –unfortunately impossible to determine– which was equally enjoyed by citizens and foreigners who took out concessions to exploit the Laurion mines. At Athens the term isoteles could be associated to the name of an individual to specify their status (e.g. Demosth. 34.18; IG II³ 1 1011, l. 100). This practice is attested above all epigraphically from the early 4th century BCE (SEG 18.112) to the 1st century BCE (e.g. IG II² 7866). The fact that in these cases the term isoteles did not supplement but replaced the indication of the ethnicity or citizenship demonstrates the importance of such social markers for foreigners in Athens. Epigraphically attested grants of isoteleia in Athens are rather scarce and almost entirely limited to the 4th century BCE. The earliest known case occurs in the proxeny decree IG II² 83, l. 7-8 (ante 387/6?), where isoteleia is granted together with the right to own land and a house (enktesis ges kai oikias). The infrequency with which isoteleia was apparently granted in Athens seems to be confirmed by the limited number of isoteleis attested in funerary inscriptions (about 30 in total). The vast majority of epigraphic evidence relating to isoteleia in other parts of the Greek world consists of decrees granting proxeny and other honours and belongs to the Hellenistic period (e.g. Haliartos, Boeotia: IG VII 2849 + SEG 44.409 – ante 168 BCE; Larissa, Thessaly: IG IX 2, 519 – late 2nd century BCE; Istiaia, Euboea: IG XII 9, 1186 – 232-220 BCE).

• R. Guicharrousse, Athènes en partage: les étrangers au sein de la cité (Ve-IIIe siècle avant notre ère), Paris 2022, 51–54, passim
• A.S. Henry, Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees, Hildesheim 1983, 246–249
• M.J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens, vol. 2, Brussels 1982, 32–35
• D. Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, Cambridge 1977, 11–13

[I. Bultrighini]

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Katoikeo/katoikountes/katoikoi

In the earliest literary attestations available to us, provided by Herodotus’ Histories, the verb occurs with the meaning “to be settled” and, by extension, “to reside” (Hdt. 3.35.6; 91.3; 4.5.1; 4.116.1, 79 α.1). The fact that in these cases it is almost invariably used in the perfect tense, with a resultative value, implicitly conveys the notion of a settlement established in the past but still perceptible in the present. Indeed, in most of the passages where the verb appears, even when it is conjugated in the present tense and simply denotes residing in a given place, it often points to a context in which residence is the outcome of displacement, migration, flight, or exile (Thuc. 8.6.1; Eur. Andr. 1244; Hel. 1651, 1677; fr. 696 v. 10; Plut. Thes. 16.2; Tim. 23.3; Isoc. Pan. 204–205; Phil. 19, 127; Pl. Leg. 850b–c; Xen. An. 5.3.7; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 39.5). The verb also appears in contexts where emphasis is placed on the very act of transfer—of settling, establishing oneself in a place, and thereby making it one’s residence (Thuc. 3.34.2; 8.108.4; Aristoph. Av. 153–154; Eur. Ion 1586; Isoc. Archid. 16, 17; Pl. Leg. 969c; Xen. Hell. 2.4.38; Arist. fr. 485 Rose; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22.8, 40.4). Nevertheless, there are also passages in which the verb simply denotes residence, with no reference to any previous relocation (Isoc. Nic. 41; Paneg. 27; Plut. Tim. 22.6; Thes. 24.1).

The epigraphic record reflects the same dichotomy of nuances: on the one hand, a generic notion of dwelling; on the other, residence obtained or chosen at a specific moment. In the first sense, the verb may encompass without further distinction the various civic-status categories within a given polis, including the politai themselves (IG V.1 1427, l. 7; IG V.1 1432, ll. 23, 33; IG XII.3 104, ll. 9–10, here contrasted with the parepidemountes, i.e. temporary foreigners, see s.v.; I.Mylasa 109, l. 13; I.Stratonikeia 256, l. 9; IK Priene 28, l. 14; IK Priene 42, l. 17; I.Didyma 345, l. 24). It may also refer to resident non-citizens, specified as the “other” (loipoi / alloi) katoikountes (IvP 1.249, l. 27; MDAI I 29, 1979, 249–71, II B, l. 29; OGIS 339, ll. 28–29; IC IV 168, ll. 9–10; I.Magnesia 98, l. 18; I.Mylasa 306, l. 7). This suggests that katoikein could, in principle, also apply to politai. In other cases, the verb refers to specific segments of the citizen body, indicating that they reside within a particular territorial subdivision of the polis (IG XII.4 1.98, ll. 7, 11–12: those inhabiting the chōra of Alasarna; cf. IG XII.4 1.99, ll. 9–10). That these were citizens, rather than non-citizen natives such as the Anatolian paroikoi (see s.v.), is shown by the fact that both decrees praise their respective honorands for services rendered to the dēmos of Alasarna (Hallof–Habicht 1998, 120). The verb may also describe situations in which citizens reside outside the territory of their polis as cleruchs or colonists. This is attested, for instance, in Athens (IG II² 1006, l. 73; IG II² 1008, l. 23; IG II² 1009, l. 39), and a particularly significant case is that of post-167 Delos (ID 1643, l. 1; IC I viii 12, ll. 47, 50–51; IG XII.5 271, l. 2). Similar instances occur at Miletus (IG XII.4 4 3868, l. 4; 3870, ll. 7–8; 3872, l. 3) and Samos (IG XII.7 231, ll. 29–30; 237, l. 38; 239, ll. 1–2). The verb also appears with reference to citizens in exile or refuge (Maiuri, NSER 1, ll. 5–6; IG XII.6 1 17, l. 18; SEG 27.245, ll. 3–4; on the latter case, see Papazoglou 1997, 220–221, with earlier bibliography). Another instance concerns citizens stationed in another city hosting a garrison from their homeland (I.Ephesos 1408, ll. 4–5). In all such cases, the katoikountes continue to describe themselves by means of the ethnic or the formula “dēmos + genitive of the city’s ethnic.” This indicates that even in documents produced far from the homeland, emphasis was placed on the citizenship rights retained, and that the perspective remained, in a sense, that of the mother polis (Cardinali 1908, 188, 192–193). Cardinali, though including these documents among those in which katoikeō denotes domicile in a place where full civic rights were not held, rightly observes that “in katoikeō that which is the distinctive feature of its meaning […]—the indication of the absence of full civic rights—tends to fade, and instead the sense of dwelling in a land not one’s own or of one’s ancestors prevails.”

In a considerable number of attestations, the verb—and especially the substantivized participle hoi katoikountes—designates exclusively non-citizen residents, who are thereby clearly distinguished from the politai (IG II² 505, l. 11, referring to metoikoi explicitly separated from the dēmos ho Athēnaiōn; IG II² 715, l. 5; IG XII.4 1 215, IV ll. 37–38: Phaleōn kai tōn Phalēi katoikeontōn; FD III 1.451, ll. 9–10: hoi te Delphoi kai hoi en Delphois katoikeontes; IG IX².1 2 417, l. 10: Stratiōn kai tōn en Stratiōi katoikeontōn; for further examples, see Cardinali 1908, 189–191). In such cases, however, the term does not necessarily or exclusively denote foreign non-citizens: it may also include categories of indigenous non-citizens, such as those inhabiting the chōra of Ephesus (OGIS 437, ll. 11–12; *Syll.*³ 742 II, ll. 22–23), who were more precisely referred to as paroikoi (see s.v.). It may likewise designate the inhabitants of villages subordinate to a polis, as in the case of those near Naulochon, itself incorporated into the territory of Priene as a dependent city, either through synoecism or by a sympoliteia treaty (IK Priene 1, ll. 11–12; cf. Briant 2006; Thonemann 2013, 28; Faraguna 2020, 252–258).

As for the noun katoikos, a distinction must be made, since the term bears two different meanings depending on context. In Ptolemaic Egypt (OGIS 128, l. 4; Pol. 5.65.10), Attalid Pergamon (OGIS 338, l. 16), and the Seleucid domains of Asia Minor (OGIS 229 I, ll. 14, 21; II, ll. 35, 36, 47, 49, 59, 71, 73, 74, 84; III, 92, 101), the katoikoi were military settlers—Greek-Macedonian soldiers and mercenaries, but also men of other ethnic origins (on the ethnic composition see Walbank 1957, 591; Cohen 1978, 30–33; Billows 1995, 148–157; Fingerson 2007; 2014, 69–72). They were granted plots of land as incentives to ensure their loyalty to the ruling regimes, to secure and guard conquered territories, and, probably, to provide continuity in replenishing the royal armies from generation to generation. The precise relationship between landholding and military obligations, however, remains debated (cf. Cohen 1978, 51–52; 1991; Billows 1995, 172–178). The term katoikos, however, takes on a different meaning in certain contexts. In first-century Prienean documents, it appears alongside terms such as politai, paroikoi, and xenoi parepidemountes (IK Priene 68, l. 79; 69, ll. 39, 43, 77, 83; 72, l. 13). This suggests that the word referred to resident foreigners, to be distinguished not only from the politai but also from the indigenous non-citizen inhabitants of the chōra (paroikoi) and from transient foreigners (Gagliardi 2006, 143; 2009/2010, 319–320).

• R. A. Billows, Kings and Colonists. Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism, Leiden-New York-Köln 1995.
• P. Briant, L’Asie Mineure en transition in P. Briant, F. Joannes (eds.), La transition entre l’empire achéménide et les royaumes hellénistiques (vers 350-300 av. J. C.), Paris 2006, 309-350
• G. Cardinali, Note di terminologia epigrafica, RAL 17 (1908), 157-200.
• G. M. Cohen, The Seleucid Colonies. Studies in Founding, Administration and Organization, Wiesbaden 1978.
• G. M. Cohen, Katoikiai, Katoikoi and Macedonians in Asia Minor, Ancient Society 22, 1991, 41-50.
• M. Faraguna, Alexander the Great and Asia Minor. Strategies of Legitimation in K. Trampedach, A. Meeus (eds.), The Legitimation of Conquest. Monarchical Representation and the Art of Government in the Empire of Alexander the Great, Stuttgart 2020, 243-262.
• K. J. Fingerson, Persian Katoikoi in Hellenistic Smyrna, Ancient Society 37, 2007, 107-120.
• K.J. Fingerson, Smyrnean-Magnesian Katoikoi at the conclusion of the Third Syrian War. 246-241 BC, The Ancient World 45.1, 2014, 61-78.
• L. Gagliardi, Mobilità e integrazione delle persone nei centri cittadini romani, Milano 2006.
• L. Gagliardi, I paroikoi delle città dell’Asia minore in età ellenistica e nella prima età romana, Dike 12/13, 2009/2010, 303-322.
• L. e K. Hallof – C. Habicht, Aus der Arbeit der «Inscriptiones Graecae» II. Ehrendekrete aus dem Asklepieion von Kos, Chiron 28, 1998, 101-142.
• F. Papazoglou, Laoi et paroikoi. Recherches sur les structures de la société hellénistique, Beograd 1997.
• P. Thonemann, Alexander, Priene and Naulochon in P. Martzavou, N. Papazarkadas (eds.), Epigraphical Approaches to the post-classical polis, Oxford 2013, 23-36.
• F.W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius. Vol. 1, Oxford 1957.

[G. Falco]

Koinopoliteia (κοινοπολιτεία)

The term, a hapax in the epigraphic sources, appears in an Aetolian inscription comprising two inscribed texts dated to the late 3rd century BC, namely a request from the kosmoi of the Cretan city of (V)Axos presented in the form of a letter to the koinon of the Aetolians (Choix Delphes 120 = Syll.³ 622B), and the subsequent response of the koinon in the form of a decree (IG IX² 1 178 = Syll.³ 622A). In the letter, the kosmoi assert their recognition of one Epikles, who resided in Amphissa at that time, as their fellow citizen, whose status, however, must have appeared to be controversial. They request that the Aetolians ensure that he and his children receive the benefits of the isopoliteia agreements existing between the Aetolian koinon and (V)Axos (cf. StV III 585 = Saba 45, confirming that such an agreement was in effect). This case indicates the potential for enjoying federal citizenship, which is referred to here, perhaps with a neologism, as koinopoliteia.

In literary sources, the term koinopoliteia is found solely in the writings of Theodore Metochites, a 14th-century Byzantine scholar (Semeioseis gnomikai 1.192 and 194; 22.2; 71.8; Byzantion vel Laus Constantinopolitana 35.46; 45.24), as meaning ‘state community’ (LBG s.v. κοινοπολιτεία).

• L. Boffo – M. Faraguna, Le poleis e i loro archivi. Studi su pratiche documentarie, istituzioni e società nell’antichità greca, Trieste 2021
• Ph. Gauthier, Symbola. Les étrangers et la justice dans les cités grecques, Nancy 1972
• S. Saba, Isopoliteia in Hellenistic Times, Leiden – Boston 2020

[L. Loddo]

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Metecho (μετέχω; Aeol. πεδέχω)

Related terms: meteinai (μετεῖναι), metadidonai (μεταδιδόναι), metalambanein (μεταλαμβάνειν), metousia (μετουσία), metochē (μετοχή).

The verb metechein (from meta, “with/among”, and echein, “to have”) fundamentally denotes the act of “having a share” in a divisible entity, whether concrete or abstract, rather than full ownership. Together with its cognates – the impersonal metesti (expressing a claim or right to a share), metadidonai (granting a share), and metalambanein (receiving a share) – it forms a semantic field rooted in the concept of distribution and partition (“to have a share in” – “to partake of” – “to participate in”). In most classical uses it governs the genitive (often with an explicit object), and it readily serves to articulate both status (belonging) and practice (taking part). The same semantic resources make it a natural vehicle for civic language: a polis, politeia, offices, courts, “common affairs” (ta koina), or “the affairs” (ta pragmata) can all be construed as shareable goods, burdens, or spheres of action.

The earliest attestations of μετέχειν in surviving literature show a wide, largely non-political spectrum. Lyric and early poetry apply the verb to sharing in sympotic contexts (e.g. Sapph. fr. 70.3 Voigt: πεδέχων συμποσίῳ), in fortunes and misfortunes (Thgn. 1.81; 351–359), or in socially marked dispositions and experiences (Pind. Pyth. 2.81ff.), while Attic drama uses it for shares in grief, land, fate, toils, plans, and other concrete or abstract “portions” (e.g. Aesch. Pers. 540, Ag. 507, Eum. 869; Soph. El. 1168, OT 1465). Cultic applications occur but are comparatively sparse and contextual in the early corpus (e.g. Hdt. 1.171; 2.178; cf. 2.81). Alongside μετέχειν, Greek regularly employs the cognate idiom μετεῖναι (impersonal μέτεστι(ν), often μέτεστί μοι τινος) to express “there is a share in X for Y”, i.e. a claim, right, or portion that belongs to someone, without necessarily implying enacted participation. In classical drama and prose the impersonal construction becomes a flexible way of articulating entitlement or membership (e.g. Soph. OT 630 κἀμοὶ πόλεως μέτεστιν; Eur. Hcld. 185–189, Thuc. 2.37.1). Allusions to legal and political contexts appear in comedy (Ar. Av. 1649–68, Lys. 651–2). Because this idiom can overlap with μετέχειν in civic contexts – especially where the object is πόλις/πολιτεία – they can be treated as a family of participation/entitlement vocabulary.

More clearly political colouring begins to surface in late fifth-century and early fourth-century texts, where “sharing” can be used for civic claims or loss of standing (e.g. Isoc. 20.20, 16.36–39) or political rule (Eur. fr. 912.8), and Thucydides’ Pericles makes “sharing in public matters” a marker of civic usefulness (Thuc. 2.40.2; cf. 2.37.1). The same idiom is used for political “shares” by Athenagoras in Sicily (Thuc. 6.39–40). Thucydides elsewhere applies the same lexis to the extension of full franchise to colonies (1.27.1, 28.2, 4.105.2), to equal military leadership among city-states in joint expeditions (5.47.7; cf. OR 165, l. 26), and to the giving or receiving of a share in benefits (8.21) and citizen rights (3.55.3: πολιτείας). These early uses underline that the later, quasi-technical civic collocations (πόλις, πολιτεία, ἀρχαί, τὰ πράγματα, etc.) represent a specialisation of an older and much broader idiom of “having a share” in Greek language (Baumert 2003; Filonik 2025).

A particularly pointed civic sense is “to have a share in the polis” (μετέχειν/μετεῖναι τῆς πόλεως), where the city is construed as a collective whole to which one either belongs or from which one is excluded. A classic formulation appears in the Solonian stasis-law as transmitted by the Athēnaiōn Politeia: the person who takes neither side in civil conflict is to be deprived of civic standing, “not sharing in the polis” ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 8.5). It marks a language of membership-as-share: civic inclusion is conceptualised as a portion in the common body, forfeitable under certain conditions. The same language is used in the paraphrases of Pericles’ citizenship law (Ath. Pol. 26.4, 42.1).

With πολιτεία as object, μετέχειν commonly foregrounds constitutional inclusion and political rights: “sharing in the politeia” can denote access to the regime’s entitlements and (implicitly or explicitly) to the institutional life that embodies them. This idiom becomes especially salient in the late fifth and fourth centuries – above all in Athens after 404/3 – where disputes over reintegration, exclusion, and the legitimate distribution of civic standing repeatedly invite “sharing” language (e.g. Lys. 34.2–3, 25.3; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 36–37). Isocrates similarly employs it to describe the proper distribution of political power, arguing that in a democracy, citizens should “share equally” in the constitution (Isoc. 16.39).  In such contexts, μετέχειν does not merely label a status: it lends itself to normative claims about the proper share – who deserves inclusion, who seeks more than an equal share, and who may justly be denied any share at all. This usage underscores that political “sharing” retained the distributive logic of its archaic origins: the polis was conceived as a common entity in which citizens held shares (Filonik 2023; 2025).

Offices and adjudication supply Aristotle’s canonical institutional formulation focused on participation: the citizen is (in one influential definition) the one who “shares in judgment and office” (Arist. Pol. 1275a22–23: μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς). In Aristotle the verb becomes a key tool for analysing inclusion, exclusion, and distributive justice within constitutions. For Aristotle, the nature of this “share” defines the constitution itself: democracy is where the free and poor share in power; oligarchy is where the wealthy do (Fröhlich 2016 [2017]; Filonik 2025).

In democratic–oligarchic polemic, “sharing” can be tied to who holds office and who is barred from it, as in the Old Oligarch’s sketch of democratic principle and its opponents’ critique ([Xen.] Ath. pol. 1.2–3: τῶν ἀρχῶν μετεῖναι), or in fourth-century forensic and deliberative rhetoric that treats exclusion from “the common things” or “public affairs” (τὰ κοινά) as a hallmark of civic deprivation (Filonik 2023).

A particularly context-sensitive collocation is μετέχειν τῶν πραγμάτων, broadly “to have a share in the affairs (of state).” In stable conditions it may denote engagement in civic business; under crisis it can shade toward participation in factional action, plotting, or extra-legal agency – precisely because the phrase allows a speaker to indicate involvement while leaving its legitimacy to be inferred from the surrounding narrative. Thucydides already exploits this flexibility (e.g. Thuc. 4.74.2; 8.89.2 and related passages), and fourth-century oratory can intensify the effect by aligning “sharing in affairs” with responsibility or entitlement. An early instance where μετέχειν already shades toward “conspiratorial participation” is Hdt. 8.132, where οἱ μετέχοντες designates those implicated in a covert plan (“the participants” = “the accomplices”), anticipating later uses in which the participle can function as a compact label for politically involved actors (Filonik 2025).

Modern debate has asked how far civic metechein language should be anchored in institutional politics versus broader communal belonging. Blok has urged that Athenian citizenship is not adequately captured by an Aristotelian office-holding model, and has emphasised the importance of civic cult and “sharing in hiera and hosia” (the community’s sacred and sanctioned sphere), not least because such sharing can be articulated in ways that are not reducible to participation in male political institutions (Blok 2017).

A contrasting emphasis, developed in different ways in recent work, is that formulas like τῆς πόλεως μετέχειν/μετεῖναι (and much fourth-century political usage with πολιτεία, τὰ κοινά, offices, courts, τὰ πράγματα) are most naturally read through the lens of civic standing and rights, even if civic life is inseparable from religious practice (Joyce 2023 [2024]). While citizens certainly participated in religious rites, the specific locution metechein tōn hierōn is surprisingly rare in classical texts as a definition of citizenship compared to political formulations. Priesthoods and civic rites in such sources seem secondary to citizen status. The lexicographical point is not to deny “rites”, but to avoid letting cultic sharing override the semantic signals supplied by object, genre, and pragmatic setting – especially in legal – constitutional and institutional contexts (Faraguna 2025a; 2025b; Filonik 2025).

In inscriptions, a clearly participatory met– idiom is securely attested from the mid-fourth century onward. Later the civic collocations of μετέχειν/μετεῖναι become increasingly visible in documentary Greek, especially in citizenship grants and isopoliteia / sympoliteia arrangements, where “having a share” can be used to articulate (i) admission to the politeia, (ii) eligibility to participate in civic institutions, and (iii) limits on dual participation. Thus, a Hellenistic honorific decree can combine the grant of politeia with the right to “have a stake” in all the affairs in which the community itself has a share (e.g. SIG³ 426; early 3rd c.), while an isopoliteia treaty can formulate dual civic standing as permission “to have a share in the politeia in both cities” and penalise those “sharing in the politeia” contrary to the agreement (e.g. SIG³ 633 = I.Milet. 3.150; 2nd c.). Comparable formulae can even echo the institutional specification familiar from classical political theory, as in clauses allowing those who are active as citizens (πολιτεύονται) elsewhere to “share in offices and lawcourts” there (RO 93; late 4th c.). In Pergamum, the granting of citizenship is explicitly framed as metechein tēs politeias, and the registered genē are required to “have a share in the politeia” (OGIS 338, ll. 8–9; 133 BCE). In this epigraphic afterlife, μετέχειν and μετεῖναι function as a durable, easily extensible idiom for defining civic membership and participatory entitlements across the Hellenistic and later polis-world (Saba 2020; Müller 2023; Filonik 2023; 2025).

• Baumert, N. (2003), Koinōnein und metechein – synonym? Eine umfassende semantische Untersuchung, Stuttgart.
• Blok, J.H. (2017), Citizenship in Classical Athens, Cambridge, esp. 47–99.
• Faraguna, M. (2025a), “Aristotele, la polis, il cittadino: prospettive storiche e filosofiche”, in M. Canevaro – C. Zizza (eds.), Aristotele. La Politica. Guida, Roma 2025, 215–46.
• Faraguna, M. (2025b), “Citizenship in the Greek Polis: An Institutionalist Approach”, in M. Barbato – M. Canevaro – A. Esu (eds.), Rediscovering Greek Institutions: New Institutionalist Approaches to Greek History, Edinburgh 2025, 111–31.
• Filonik, J. (2023), “Sharing in the Polis: Conceptualizing Classical Greek Citizenship,” in J. Filonik – Ch. Plastow – R. Zelnick-Abramovitz (eds), Citizenship in Antiquity: Civic Communities in the Ancient Mediterranean, London – New York, 264–80.
• Filonik, J. (2025), “The Concept of Sharing in the Polis: Its Origins and Early Developments,” Erga-Logoi 13.2, 2025, 9–43.
• Fröhlich, P. (2016 [2017]), “La citoyenneté grecque entre Aristote et les modernes,” CCG 27, 2016 [2017], 91–136.
• Joyce, Ch.J. (2023 [2024]), “Civic Rights, Not Civic Rites: The Meaning of τῆς πόλεως μετέχειν/μετεῖναι and the Language of Participation in Democratic Athens,” Rivista di Diritto Ellenico 13, 2023 [2024], 1–44.
• Müller, C. (2023), The making of the citizen in Hellenistic poleis, in J. Filonik – Ch. Plastow – R. Zelnick-Abramovitz (eds), Citizenship in Antiquity: Civic Communities in the Ancient Mediterranean, London – New York, 487–501.
• Saba, S. (2020), Isopoliteia in Hellenistic Times, Leiden – Boston 2020.

[J. Filonik]

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Metoikion (μετοίκιον)

The metoikion (scil. telos) was a residence tax paid by metics in Athens (cf., e.g., Xen. Vect. 2.1; Demosth. 57.55; Schol. Aristoph. Pax296b; Harpocr., Phot., Suda s.v. μετοίκιον; Bekker, Anec. Gr. 1.298.27). It was a poll tax that amounted to twelve drachmas a year for men and six drachmas a year for women (Harpocr., Phot., Suda s.v. μετοίκιον). Regarding the metoikion payment by women, lexicographical sources specify that, “if a woman has a son who pays the tax, she is exempt from it; but if her son does not pay the tax, she must pay it” (τοῦ υἱοῦ τελοῦντος ἡ μήτηρ οὐκ ἐτέλει· μὴ τελοῦντος δ’ ἐκείνου αὐτὴ τελεῖ). It is therefore implied that those subject to the metoikion were unmarried women; these, however, were exempt from it in case they had an adult male child who acted as their guardian (kyrios) and paid the tax for them. It should be noted that all other taxes in Athens – e.g. taxes on commerce – were indirect; the only forms of direct taxation were either individual services, such as liturgies, or extraordinary levies, such as the eisphora. Even though the metoikion does not appear to have been particularly financially burdensome, imposing a direct and regular tax on metics was a powerful statement of their subordinate status. This tax set metics apart not only from Athenian citizens, who were not subject to any regular direct taxation, but also from non-resident foreigners, who by law were regarded simply as visitors. The metoikion was one of the distinctive features of metic status. It was added to other financial obligations to which metics were usually subject in Athens, such as liturgies and eisphorai (IG II² 141, ll. 30–36). Failure to pay the metoikion could result in enslavement (Demosth. 25.57; Diog. 4.14; Harpocr., Phot., Suda s.v. μετοίκιον). The date of introduction of the metoikion is not mentioned in the sources and therefore cannot be determined precisely. According to Whitehead (1977, 152–153), it may have been established during the Peloponnesian War. It is also not known for how long the tax remained in force. Its most recent attestation is in a decree from around 321/0 BCE granting some Thessalian exiles a series of privileges including exemption from the metoikion (IG II² 545, l. 12). The persistence of the tax at least until the first half of the third century BCE is indirectly attested by a few honorific decrees from this period which include the granting of isoteleia. Niku (2002, 51–54) speculates that the metoikion may have remained in force beyond this period and was eventually abolished in the second half of the second century BCE. With a total of eleven occurrences, epigraphic evidence for the metoikion is rather scarce and almost exclusively limited to the fourth century BCE (IG II² 61; 141; 245; 545; IG II³ 1 316; 470; 503; Agora XVI 51; Agora XIX P 26). Epigraphic evidence consists mostly of honorific decrees; an exception is Agora XIX P 26, an account of the poletai that records the selling off of a house belonging to one Meixidemos of the deme of Myrrhinous. Meixidemos stood surety for a number of individuals including one Philistides of the deme of Aixone, who under the archonship of Pythodotos (343/2) had contracted to raise the metoikion (ll. 470-471: μετασχόντα τέλους μετοικίου) but failed to produce the cash. The other exception, Agora XVI 51, records an agreement between Athens and a Cretan city (perhaps Kydonia) that comprises the granting of exemption from the metoikion to members of the Cretan community who resided in Athens, “under the same conditions as the citizens of Knossos” (ll. 11-12: μετο[ικίο δὲ ἀτέλειαν (τοῖς)]-[Κυδωνιάταις(?) δίδοσ]θαι καθάπερ Κνωσ[ίοις — —]). Fifth-century evidence includes two fragmentary decrees dating to 409/8 BCE and around that year, respectively, which probably conferred honours on some exiles (IG I³ 106 and 107). In both cases the term metoikion was restored, yet on entirely plausible grounds. The earliest certain occurrence of to metoikio in epigraphic sources is a fragmentary honorific decree for a Siceliot individual attributable to before 378/7 BCE (IG II² 61, ll. 8–12). A metoikion – presumably an analogous residence tax which Athenian sources refer to with this name – is attested for Oropos (Lys. 31.9), Megara (Demosth. 29.3) and Aegina (Demosth. 23.211). In Plato’s ideal city of Magnesia, metics would not have paid “even the smallest residence tax except good behaviour” (μετοίκιον μηδὲ σμικρὸν τελοῦντι πλὴν τοῦ σωφρονεῖν; Plat. Leg. 9.850B). It is thus plausible to assume that a tax imposed on foreign residents existed in other Greek cities in addition to Athens.

• F. Luppa, Die ansässigen Fremden im klassischen Athen, Stuttgart 2023, passim.
• E.A. Meyer, Metics and the Athenian Phialai-Inscriptions: A Study in Athenian Epigraphy and Law, Stuttgart 2010, passim (spec. 29–30).
• M. Niku, ‘Aspects of the Taxation of Foreign Residents in Hellenistic Athens’, Arctos 36 (2002), 80–85.
• S.C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law, Oxford 1993, 197–198.
• M. Valente, “L’imposta del metoikion ad Atene: uno strumento per il controllo dell’immigrazione?”, Historika 11 (2021), 95–114.
• D. Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, Cambridge 1977, 75–77 e passim.

[I. Bultrighini]

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Metoikos (μέτοικος)

The term generically indicates a foreigner, an immigrant. Etymologically, metoikos seems to refer to someone who “moved oikos” (meta with the accusative) – an immigrant who left his home and moved to a new city. According to another interpretation, a metoikos is someone who “lives with” (meta with the genitive) the members of the civic body where he settled. Some lexicographical and scholiastic sources use metoikos as a generic term referring to servile populations who lived in the territory of a civic community (Paus.Gr., Phot., Suid. s.v. Κλαρόται: μέτοικοι, ὡς Μαριανδυνοὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ τῇ Ποντικῇ καὶ Εἵλωτες ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ ἐν Θετταλίᾳ Πενέσται καὶ Καλλικύριοι ἐν Συρακούσαις). In most cases, however, a metic is defined as a foreigner who has taken up residence in a city, with reference mainly to Athens, which is the context we are best informed about (Ar.Byz. fr. 38 Nauck; Harp., Phot., Suid. s.v. μετοίκιον; Ammon. s.v. ἰσοτελὴς καὶ μέτοικος; Schol. Pl. Leg. 8.850, etc.). According to these sources, a metic differs from a simple visitor (parepidemos) by the longer duration of his stay, by having established his residence in the city, and by the payment of the metoikion, a poll tax paid by resident foreigners. The status of metoikos is defined as superior to the status of xenos but inferior to that of polites (Ptol. ἰσοτελὴς καὶ μέτοικος. Cf. Eust. Comm. Hom. Il. 10.59). According to Aristotle, whilst metics share their place of residence with citizens, they do not participate in courts and magistracies (κρίσεως καὶ άρχῆς) (Arst. Pol. 1275a 5-23). In addition to not being eligible to hold archai (Demosth. 57.48), metics were required to pay the metoikion and other contributions (eisphora: Isoc. 17.41; IG II² 141), had the obligation to perform liturgies (Demosth. 20.18; Lys. 12.20-21; Schol. Ar. Pl. 593), needed to have an Athenian citizen as their patron (Isoc. 8.53; Arst. Pol. 1275a 7-14; Harp. s.v. προστάτης), had to serve in the army (Th. 2.13.7; 2.31.1-2; Xenoph. Vect. 2.2-4), could not own real estate (Arst. Oec. 1347a; Xenoph. Vect. 2,6; Poll. 7. 15) nor take possession of properties pledged as security for a loan (Demosth. 36.6), and they were only allowed to participate in a very limited way in public rituals and sacrifices (e.g. IG I³ 82; 244). Certain laws applied exclusively to metics (Hyp. Ath. 29, 33; [Arst.] Ath. 57.3). According to some sources, metics did not enjoy full freedom of speech (Men. fr. 191 K; Zen. Paroem. 5.93; Plu. Prov. 12). However, the anonymous author of the Constitution of the Athenians, who opposes the democratic regime, points out that the city granted metics full freedom of expression before citizens, due to the indispensable role that metics played in the economy and in the navy ([Xenoph.] Ath. Pol. 1.12). Likewise, although some evidence seems to indicate that metics in general did not enjoy a good reputation (e.g., [Xenoph.] Ath. Pol. 1.10; Lys. 22.5; Aesch. 1.195; Sch. Aristoph. Ran. 418; Sch. Il. 16.59; Luc. 24.27; Eust. Comm. Hom. Il. 9.648), there is no doubt that some of them –such as the Syracusan Cephalus, father of the orator Lysias– moved in the most elite circles of Athenian society (Lys. 12.4; Pl. R. 328b). Xenophon’s Poroi, too, reflects the view that the presence of metics constituted an indispensable source of income for the city and as such it had to be encouraged and valued (Vect. 2). Metics could be granted various privileges, including isoteleia. The term metoikos appears for the first time in the form metaoikos around 500 BCE in the funerary epigram of Anaxilas of Naxos found at Ceramicus, where it has the generic meaning of “immigrant”, who is being praised for his wisdom (sophrosyne) and his virtue (arete) (IG I³ 1357, l. 3. Contra Ginestí Rosell 2012, 240, who believes that the term metaoikos should be interpreted as metic in the technical sense). The earliest epigraphic attestation of the status of metic –i.e. a free foreigner who resides permanently in Athens– is probably found in an inscription dating from 475-450 BCE and containing sacrificial regulations of the urban deme Skambonidai (IG I³ 244, C l. 8). The metoikoi who are assigned sacrificial portions here appear to be foreign residents, even though the social and legal status of this group of immigrants cannot be determined. Beyond Athens, the term occurs in the form μεταϝοικέοι in a treaty between Chaleion and Oiantheia (Opuntian Locris), which can be dated approximately between 475 and 450 BCE (IG IX 1² 3, 717, l. 6). The text includes the provision that citizens of one of the two communities who emigrate (μεταϝοικέοι) to the other and stay there for longer than a month will be subject to the judicial system of the host city. As in the case of the metoikoi of Skambonidai, it is plausible to identify the μεταϝοικέοι of Chaleion and Oiantheia with resident foreigners rather than with generic “immigrants” (cf. Cataldi 1983, 65). In The Suppliants, at the end of the 60s of the fifth century, Aeschylus may have alluded to the status of metic (vv. 609-614). From the last quarter of the fifth century onwards, the term metoikos appears with increasing frequency in epigraphic and literary sources, mostly with the meaning of “metic”. Literary sources refer predominantly to the Athenian context and range across different genres, from tragedy to comedy, to historiography, with a particular frequency of attestations in oratory (e.g., Lys. 31.28-29; And. 1.15, 144; Aeschin. 1.195; Demosth. 24.166, 35.51). The most recent mention of metics in literary sources is by Athenaeus (6.272c) in dealing with the census carried out by Demetrius of Phaleron in the 10s of the fourth century. Epigraphic occurrences, from various areas of the Greek world, date between the fifth century BCE and the second/third century CE. As mentioned, the earliest attestations originate from Athens and in one case from Locris. As far as Athens is concerned, in addition to the inscriptions referred to above it is worth mentioning a decree from 421/0 BCE concerning the celebrations in honour of Hephaestus, where metics are remembered as recipients of sacrificial allocations (IG I³ 82, l. 23). Yet another significant inscription from Athens is an account of the poletai that records the sale of property confiscated from those individuals who were condemned for mutilating the Herms and profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries in 415 BCE, which reports the sale of at least sixteen slaves belonging to the metoikos Kephisodoros, ἐμ Περα[ιεῖ οἰκο͂ντος] (IG I³ 421, col. 1 l. 33). The formula composed of proper name, οἰκῶν ἐν, and name of the deme of residence, is used in official Athenian documents to identify metics (e.g., IG I³ 475, ll. 101-102; Agora XIX L6, ll. 6-7; Agora XIX P26, l. 478; I.Eleusis 177, l. 56). This way, metics are distinguished from citizens, who are identified by their demotic. Beyond Athens, the largest number of epigraphic attestations of the term metoikos are found on Delos, on Rhodes, and at various locations in Asia Minor, with a concentration of occurrences in the Hellenistic period (e.g., IG XI 2 106-116; ASAA 8-9 (1925-26) 322, no. 5; 17-18 (1939-40) 156, no. 18; I.Kaunos 38; AJP 1935, 359-372, no. I, 377-79, no. III; SEG XXXIX 1244). Among the earliest examples is a document detailing the perquisites of the priest of Zeus Megistos at Iasos, which has been dated on paleographical grounds to ca. 425-375 BCE. The text mentions sacrifices performed by citizens (astoi) as well as by metics (metoikoi) and foreigners (xenoi) (CGRN 42). A list of contributions from Rhodes from the late second century BCE records the names of over twenty women, both citizens and foreigners. The onomastic formula of foreigners includes the ethnic and the mention of metoikos status for those who had gained the right to settle on Rhodes (SEG XLIII 526). In addition to metoikos, other terms are attested, such as epoikos, pedoikos, and synoikos, which indicate the condition of individuals of free status who had moved from their homeland and resided permanently in another polis, where they did not enjoy citizen status (see Whitehead 1977, 4-5).

• M. Adak, Metöken als Wohltäter Athens. Untersuchungen zum sozialen Austausch zwischen ortsanssässigen Fremden und der Bürgergemeinde in klassischer und hellenistischer Zeit (ca. 500-150 v. Chr.), München 2003
• J. Blok, Citizenship in Classical Athens, Cambridge 2017, 265–275
• S. Cataldi, «Symbolai» e relazioni tra le città greche nel V secolo a.C., Pisa 1983
• M. Clerc, Les métèques athéniens: étude sur la condition légale, la situation morale et le rôle social et économique des étrangers domiciliés à Athènes, Paris 1893
• Ph. Gauthier, Symbola: les étrangers et la justice dans les cités grecques, Nancy 1972, cap. 3
• A. Ginestí Rosell, Epigrafia funerària d’estrangers a Atenes (segles VI-IV aC), Tarragona 2012
• R. Guicharrousse, Athènes en partage: les étrangers au sein de la cité (Ve-IIIe siècle avant notre ère), Paris 2022
• F. Luppa, Die ansässigen Fremden im klassischen Athen, Stuttgart 2023
• M. Niku, The Official Status of the Foreign Residents in Athens, 322-120 B.C., Helsinki 2007
• D. Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, Cambridge 1977
• D. Whitehead, ‘Immigrant communities in the classical polis: some principles for a synoptic treatment’, L’Antiquité Classique 53 (1984), 47-59

[I. Bultrighini]

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Nautodikai (ναυτοδίκαι)

The Athenian office of the nautodikai is mentioned in fragmentary sources (IG I³ 41, ll. 76–77; Cratin. fr. 251 K-A; Aristoph. fr. 237 K-A; Crater. FGrHist 342 F4a) as well as in ancient lexica (Harpocr. s.v. ναυτοδίκαι; Poll. 8.126). The earliest attestations date to the 440s BC, and the nautodikai appear initially to have been involved in cases concerning the verification of citizenship status (graphai xenias), at least until the final decades of the fifth century BC.

The office was likely established in response to the increasing number of fraudulent attempts to obtain Athenian citizenship after the restrictions introduced by Pericles’ citizenship law of 451/0 BC, which limited citizenship to those born of two Athenian parents. The sources emphasize the short interval between summons and hearing, which took place on the last day of the month. This may explain why the nautodikai were often forced to dismiss cases without referring them to the appropriate court, thereby earning the derogatory nickname hybristodikai (“insolent judges”), and rendering their role essentially ineffective (Erdas 2021).

By the early fourth century BC, the function of the nautodikai appears to have changed. In Lysias’ On the Property of Eraton (Lys. 17.5), they are found acting as judges in cases involving emporoi (merchants; cf. Cohen 1973, pp. 158–198; Maffi 2016). This judicial role, confirmed by lexicographical sources (Harpocr. ad loc.; Suda ν86 s.v. Ναυτοδίκαι), may have been assigned to the nautodikai because many merchants were foreigners. The structural incapacity to deliver swift justice in cases involving emporoi was likely a key factor in the office’s abolition, which had ceased to exist by the mid-fourth century BC.

• E. Cohen, Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts, Princeton NJ 1973
• D. Erdas, I nautodikai. Note su una magistratura ateniese tra cause di xenia e giurisdizione sugli emporoi, Dike 24, 2021, 33-62
• A. Maffi, Riflessioni su dikai emporikai e prestito marittimo, in D. Leão, G. Thür (eds.), Symposion 2015. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Coimbra, 1‒4. September 2015), Wien 2016, 199-208

[D. Erdas]

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Νοthos (νόθος)

The Greek term nothos/nothe denotes the person of illegitimate birth, either because of birth outside of a lawful wedlock or because of the lack of other requirements necessary for legitimacy. These prerequisites may vary according to different social contexts: in Athens, for example, a distinction must be made between the status of nothos ex xenes and nothos ex astês. The nothos ex xenes was the child of a foreign parent (patroxenos/metroxenos) and therefore, after Pericles’ citizenship law of 451/0, which restricted citizenship to children of parents who were both Athenians, no longer legitimizable and consequently ineligible for citizenship rights (whereas in the past illustrious Athenians such as Themistocles and Cimon, given the habit of Athenian aristocrats of contracting marriages with women of great foreign lineages, had been metroxenos, sons of non-Athenian mothers). The nothos ex astês, on the other hand, was such because he was born out of legitimate wedlock, but was still the son of a citizen: the situation of those in this category is difficult to pin down

The nothoi were undoubtedly of free status, but in an inferior situation with respect to the enjoyment of citizenship rights. Those who were nothoi because patroxenoi or metroxenoi tended to maintain residence in Athens, where there was a gymnasium reserved for them, the Cynosarges, dedicated to the nothos Heracles. All the more so were those who were nothoi to remain in Athens because, for various reasons, they had not been legitimized by their father (for example, because they were born of irregular relationships), although they were the children of free Athenian women and therefore in good standing under the law of citizenship: there is very little evidence about them.

Although the positions of critics are divided in this regard, it is not ruled out that nothoi ex astês were legitimizable, at least under certain conditions: first of all, that of not prejudicing the expectations of legitimate heirs, defined by a law of Solon (Dem. 43, 51; cf. Aristoph. Av. 1651 ff.); however, since the law did not provide for the right to inheritance for nohoi, cases, must have been rather rare because of the difficulty of obtaining the heirs’ consent.

In any case, the position of a nothos is that of a metaxy, of one who “stands in between”: he is neither citizen nor foreigner. The nothoi do not have access to full citizenship, but neither can they be considered tout court foreigners or metics, as has also been assumed, being at least partially Athenian or even fully Athenian: so much so that, in emergency situations, the nothoi can be made accessible again to full citizenship status, as happened during the Peloponnesian War, with the suspension of Pericles’ law. They are thus “potential” citizens, as can be inferred from Aristotle, who states that in some democracies not only legitimate children or gnêsioi, but also nothoi are citizens (Politics III, 1278 a 26 ff.; VI, 1319 b 6 ff. ) and appears with this “well aware of the peculiar position of those who, although excluded from political activity, are nonetheless not assimilated to foreigners because they can in theory be admitted among the politai in the event of a broadening of the criteria for access to the polity” (Gallo 2004, 225). In many non-Athenian contexts it appears from the epigraphic record that the nothoi, though inferior to citizens, are placed in an intermediate position between citizens and foreigners.

It is significant that the nothoi would have access, as has been said, to a gymnasium reserved for them, the Cynosarges, where they were subjected to an evaluation (krisis) and perhaps “registered”; it is possible that access to the Cynosarges procured them some forms of integration, on a religious level but also, probably, on a civil and military level. Since the gymnasium is an institution intended for the military training of free young men, access to the Cynosarges could in fact indicate the inclusion of the paides nothoi in a specific social “class” and their military destination; evaluation and census replaced the inclusion in the lists of the demes, to which the nothoi had no right, and made available to the city the data relating to an integrative military potential. The nothoi were thus guaranteed a sort of inclusion in the community and those limited rights that perhaps belonged to them; but it also allowed the city the necessary control over the residents and the different legal situations that characterized them.

The nothoi, in short, constitute an intermediate category that leads one to believe that the rigid opposition between citizens and non-citizens does not account for the complex nature of Athenian society. Nothoi (patroxenoi and metroxenoi), nothoi ex astes, xenoi, metics, apeleutheroi contribute to constituting, alongside the politai, a complex social reality, within which the different statuses had to be distinguished with greater accuracy than is usually done. It is no coincidence that Athens kept, alongside the registers of citizens drawn up in the demes and phratries (which were also subject to periodic diapsephismoi), a list of those entitled to access the assembly (the pinax ekklesiastikos) that did not have to coincide with the demotic lexiarchikon grammateion; it kept, in the demotic sphere, lists of metics drawn up on the basis of residence; it probably registered, through the inclusion in the Cynosarges, the nothoi patroxenoi and metroxenoi.

• M. Bertazzoli, I nothoi e la polis: il ruolo del Cinosarge, RIL 137 (2003), 211-232
• M. Bertazzoli, Giuste nozze e filiazione legittima da Dracone agli oratori, Mediterraneo Antico 8 (2005), 641-686
• L. Gagliardi, Per un’interpretazione della legge di Solone in materia successoria, Dike 5 (2002), 5-59
• L. Gallo, I cittadini “passivi” nelle poleis greche, in Poleis e politeiai. Esperienze politiche, tradizioni letterarie, progetti costituzionali (Atti del Convegno, Torino 29-31 maggio 2002), Alessandria 2004, 217-227
• C. Joyce, Citizen nothoi? The cases of Phile (Isaeus 3) and the two ‘Mantitheuses’ (Dem. 39 and [Dem.] 40), Dike 28 (2025), cds.
• S.C. Humphreys, The Nothoi of Kynosarges, JHS 94 (1974), 88-95
• D. Ogden, Greek Bastardy in the Classical and Hellenistic Period, Oxford 1994
• V. Saldutti, Temistocle e i nothoi del Cinosarge. Il ginnasio tra integrazione ed esclusione, in Essere sempre il migliore. Concorsi e gare nella Napoli antica, Napoli 2022, 321-336

[C. Bearzot]

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Parepidemeo/parepidemia/parepidemos (παρεπιδημέω/παρεπιδημία/παρεπίδημος)

Neither the verb nor the corresponding nouns are attested in sources from the Classical period. The earliest secure occurrences of these terms date to around the second half of the third century BC, and are found in epigraphic documents from Calymna (IG XII.4 5 3987, ll. 3–4: πα[ρεπ]ιδαμεύντων), Pharos (SEG 41.545 fr. B, l. 9: παρεπιδημ[ῶσι]), Histria (SEG 51.934, ll. 18–19: παρε[πιδημίαν]), and, in literary sources, in Callixenus of Rhodes (FGrHist 627 F 2 = Ath. Deipn. 5.25: παρεπιδήμων) and the comic poet Machon (frr. 15 Gow v. 232; 17 Gow v. 333: παρεπιδημήσας). The only explicit definition available is provided by Aristophanes of Byzantium (fr. 98 Nauck), who distinguishes the παρεπίδημος from the μέτοικος: any foreigner would be regarded as a παρεπίδημος within one month of arrival, after which he would be considered a μέτοικος and thus liable for payment of the μετοίκιον. The difference between the two terms—and thus between the two statuses—was determined solely by the length of the stay and the liability to taxation, regardless of whether the foreigner in question intended to reside in the city. This conclusion, upheld among others by Whitehead (1977, 8–11), is reinforced, at least with respect to Classical Athens, by IG II² 141—a decree recently dated with a high degree of plausibility to 388/7 or shortly thereafter, on the basis of the lapicide’s hand and several formulaic details (AIUK 11, 2.2, 13–14). One of its additional clauses, proposed by a certain Menexenos, stipulated that Sidonians visiting Athens for business should be exempt from the μετοίκιον (ll. 29–36). This shows that the μετοίκιον was not levied exclusively on resident foreigners, but also on those who came to Athens for commercial purposes and remained there longer than the period fixed by law to mark the boundary between a simple ξένος and a μέτοικος.

In several literary sources, the participle παρεπιδημῶν occurs attributively with ξένος (Mach. frr. 15, 17 Gow; Diod. 4.27.3; Ath. Deipn. 10.52; 13.44). Alternatively—both in literary and epigraphic sources—the substantivized participle appears alongside the partitive genitive τῶν ξένων (Plut. Tim. 38.2), in which case it denotes a category juxtaposed, in epigraphic evidence, on the one hand to πολῖται, and on the other to other groups of non-citizen residents. These may be generically referred to as οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν κατοικούντων τὴν πόλιν (OGIS 339, ll. 29–30) or οἱ οἰκοῦντες (IG XII.7 389, ll. 14–15), or enumerated individually: μέτοικοι, πάροικοι, κάτοικοι, and ἀπελεύθεροι (cf. IG XII.7 515, ll. 72–73; IG XII.5 1 721, ll. 19–20; IK Priene 69, ll. 43–44; SEG 39.1243). Assigning precise and constant meanings to these terms is not always straightforward, as their usage appears to be determined by specific chronological and geographical contexts (Papazoglou 1997, 174–177 and passim). It is nevertheless important to stress that these sources do not present a strict dichotomy between παρεπιδημοῦντες and resident foreigners, as presupposed in Aristophanes of Byzantium’s definition (πάροικοι, for instance, especially in the Hellenistic Asia Minor context, do not necessarily denote foreigners; see s.v. πάροικος). The more accurate contrast appears to be between settled/resident categories (citizens and non-citizens alike) and foreigners in transit.

In some sources, moreover, παρεπιδημοῦντες are juxtaposed—and thus implicitly opposed—solely to πολῖται (IG XII.5 818, ll. 10–12; IG XII.5 864, ll. 12–13; IG XII.5 865, ll. 20–21; IG XII.9 236, ll. 40–41). Since it is inconceivable that resident foreigners could be included among πολῖται in such a contrast, the expression ξένοι παρεπιδημοῦντες in all likelihood encompassed them as well—a point corroborated by Poll. 3.55, where παρεπιδημῶν occurs as a synonym for μέτοικος, and in Roman-period contexts (Plb. 30.4.10; 32.6.4–6; Diod. 1.4.3), where παρεπιδημῶν denotes the status of a resident foreigner. Further clarification is provided by IG XII.7 22, ll. 10–11, where the citizens of Arkesine, designated by their ethnicon, are opposed to ξένοι οἱ ἐνδημοῦντες, seemingly a category encompassing both resident and transient foreigners (Papazoglou 1997, 226–227; for semantic equivalence of ἐνδημία and παρεπιδημία, see IG XII Suppl. 200, ll. 9, 11). This aligns with the idea that even the stay of resident foreigners was, in principle, conceived as temporary and that they too might one day return to their homeland (Luppa 2023, 172–181). In other words, metoikia was by no means thought to preclude an esprit de retour. That the notion of transience was inherent in παρεπιδημία is further confirmed by the metaphorical use in the pseudo-Platonic Axiochus ([Pl.] Ax. 365b: παρεπιδημία τίς ἐστιν ὁ βίος, “life is but a temporary sojourn”).

A narrower use of παρεπιδημέω / παρεπιδημία / παρεπίδημος thus served to distinguish the “unregistered” and non-resident foreigner from the registered and/or resident foreigner, as well as from resident non-citizens of indigenous origin; while a broader use referred to the stay of a non-native in a city other than their own, without distinctions as to duration or fiscal-administrative status. Even the element of duration, however, is not necessarily decisive in determining the application of these terms: there are numerous instances in which παρεπιδημέω is accompanied by temporal qualifiers indicating a relatively long stay (IG IX.2 11, ll. 19–20: χρόνον καὶ πλείονα; IG XI.4 789, ll. 6–7: πλείω χρόνον; IG XI.4 790, ll. 3–4: πλείω χρόνον; Syll.³ 707: ἔτη πλείω; Plb. 4.4.2: πάλαι). In all such cases, however, the stays are connected to diplomatic or military missions, or to specific professional services requested by the host city—all situations in which lengthening of the stay was often inevitable. Indeed, the verb παρεπιδημέω and the noun παρεπιδημία frequently refer to the stay of ambassadors (Plb. 28.19.2; Diod. 32.15.3; SEG 23.489 b1, l. 9), foreign judges (IK Priene 119, l. 15; IG VII 21, l. 7; IG XII Suppl. 139, ll. 74–75), theōroi (IK Priene 72, ll. 14–15; SEG 39.1243, ll. 38–40), artists (Diod. 5.5.1), physicians (IG IX.2 11, ll. 19–20; IG V.1 1145, l. 21; IG IX.12 3 370, l. 18), and garrisons (OGIS 139, ll. 4–5). In these instances, the difference between resident foreigners and παρεπιδημοῦντες is clear: the former were those who, of their own volition and initiative, stayed in a city for a given period or relocated there permanently for business or professional purposes, without being summoned by the host city or performing an official mission on behalf of their home city or a third party (Gauthier 1988, 37; Niku 2007, 153–174; Coskun 2014, 104).

A particular usage of παρεπιδημέω is found in Delian inscriptions from the period after 167, when the island reverted to Athenian control. In these texts, the verb is employed quite consistently to denote sojourn without residence (as opposed to κατοικέω, which indicates permanent settlement on the island), regardless of the legal status of the individuals or groups in question. Accordingly, Athenians—who, as citizens of the metropolis, also enjoyed citizenship rights on the island—could be counted among both the κατοικοῦντες and the παρεπιδημοῦντες, exactly as Romans and other ξένοι (cf. ID 1508, l. 6; ID 1645, l. 3; ID 1646, l. 4). In the context of Athenian-controlled Delos, therefore, παρεπιδημοῦντες do not constitute a category necessarily opposed to πολῖται, as elsewhere, but rather one that could also overlap with citizenship.

• A. Coşkun, Griechische Polis und Römisches Reich: Die politische und rechtliche Stellung Fremder in der Antike in A. Coşkun, L. Raphael (Hgg.), Fremd und rechtlos? Zugehörigkeitsrechte Fremder von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Ein Handbuch, Köln-Weimar-Wien 2014, 85-120
• Ph. Gauthier, Métèques, perièques et paroikoi: bilan et points d’interrogation in R. Lonis (éd.), L’étranger dans le monde grec. Actes du colloque organisé par l’Institut d’Études Anciennes (Nancy, may 1987), Nancy 1988, 23-46
• J. Hatzfeld, Les Italiens résidant à Délos, BCH 36, 1912, 1-208.
• J. Hatzfeld, Les trafiquants italiens dans l’Orient hellénique, Paris 1919.
• F. Luppa, Die ansässigen Fremden im klassischen Athen, Stuttgart 2023.
• C. Müller, Les Athéniens, les Romains et les autres Grecs»: groupes et phénomènes de recomposition sociale dans la “colonie” athénienne de Délos après 167 av. J.-C. in A.D. Rizakis, F. Camia, S. Zoumbaki (eds.), Social Dynamics under Roman Rule Mobility and Status Change in the Provinces of Achaia and Macedonia Proceedings of a Conference Held at the French School of Athens, 30-31 May 2014, Athens 2017, 85-118
• M. Niku, The Official Status of the Foreign Residents in Athens, 322-120 B.C., Helsinki 2007
• F. Papazoglou, Laoi et paroikoi. Recherches sur les structures de la société hellénistique, Beograd 1997.
• N. K. Rauh, The Sacred Bonds of Commerce. Religion, Economy and Trade Society at Hellenistic Roman  Delos. 167-87 BC, Amsterdam 1993.
• P. Roussel, Délos, colonie athénienne, Paris 1916.
• D. Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, Cambridge 1977.

[G. Falco]

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Paroikeo/paroikos (παροικέω/πάροικος)

The term πάροικος takes on different meanings depending on the chronological and geographical context in which it is used, as well as the type of source in which it occurs. In literary sources, it generally carries a non-technical, generic sense, referring to a condition of proximity or “dwelling beside” (Soph. Ant. 1155; Men. Dysc. 445; Str. 1.2.24; Paus. 5.14.8; Poll. 6.113; 9.37). In epigraphic sources, by contrast, it is more often employed with various technical-legal meanings to denote distinct civic categories. For a long time, scholarship regarded πάροικος as the Hellenistic–Roman equivalent of μέτοικος (for an excellent bibliographical survey, see Papazoglou 1997, 144–155). A smaller but persuasive body of scholarship has shown that the term began to acquire a technical-legal value in the cities of the Asia Minor littoral from the early third century onwards, designating indigenous populations (ἔθνη) inhabiting parcels of βασιλικὴ χώρα annexed to the chōra of the poleis. These individuals were granted civil rights but not political rights (Svenstiskaja 1959, 146–153; Gauthier 1988, 23–46; Papazoglou 1997, 235–248; Bertrand 2005).

This is, in all likelihood, the sense of the term in a number of documents where it appears alongside other categories of non-citizens that already seem to convey the meaning of resident foreigners (cf. e.g. OGIS 338, ll. 10–20, where the “metics” are in all probability οἱ κατοικοῦντες; IK Priene 69, ll. 38–39, 42–43, where πάροικοι are clearly distinguished from κάτοικοι, who may well be resident foreigners). Moreover, when πάροικοι are mentioned as a homogeneous group possessing some degree of collective decision-making capacity, the term cannot possibly denote resident foreigners, who, as a rule, could not form such a corporate body (cf. Annuario 1921–1922 no. 33, ll. 8–13).

That said, in a number of documents where no category appears that can plausibly be identified as resident foreigners, it is difficult to determine whether πάροικος is used as a synonym for “metic” or solely in the sense of an indigenous non-citizen resident (Syll.³ 742 II, ll. 22–26; IG XII.4 1 175, ll. 7–12; SEG 32.1243, ll. 16–18, 36–38, 42–45). In these cases, it is unclear whether the category of ξένοι encompassed resident foreigners or only transients. Conversely, when the term occurs alongside πολῖται alone (IG XII.1 1033, ll. 8–11) or alongside πολῖται and ξένοι παρεπιδημοῦντες, it seems beyond doubt that it also encompassed resident foreigners (IG XII.5 1 721, ll. 16–19, 25–27; IG XII.7 515, ll. 55–57, 71–74).

If we accept that the specific sense of πάροικος as “indigenous non-citizen dwelling in the rural territories of the polis” developed in Asia Minor—whose cities, such as Ephesos or Priene, possessed extensive chōrai—it becomes understandable that the term was exported to other Greek poleis lacking the same geomorphological and administrative configuration, where it came to designate resident foreigners on the basis of their exclusion from the civic body, a condition common to both categories. This is, without doubt, the meaning the term assumes in documents from Macedonia and mainland Greece (IG VII 1862, ll. 1–3; IG VII 190, ll. 15–16; IG VII 2712, ll. 27–28; Hatzopoulos – Leukopoulou 1992–1996 I, no. A2), as well as—according to Gagliardi 2017, 391–397—in some inscriptions from the Aegean islands, even if in these latter contexts the meaning cannot be established with certainty (cf. e.g. Syll.³ 398, ll. 34–38 with Papazoglou 1997, 184–185; SEG 33.675, ll. 5–7 with Papazoglou 1997, 186). Gagliardi proposes to understand here the participles οἱ ἐνδαμεῦντες / οἱ ἐπιδαμεῦντες, mentioned alongside πολῖται and πάροικοι, as referring exclusively to transients.

The term acquires a distinct meaning in Attic inscriptions from the late third century. These are documents from Rhamnous issued by what must have been the community formed by former Macedonian soldiers belonging to the garrison stationed in Athens by Antigonos Gonatas prior to 229. These veterans were designated as πάροικοι. The ad hoc term was likely adopted to distinguish them from metics (even though the term μέτοικος disappears from Attic sources after the late fourth century) and to avoid repeating the politically charged designation ἰσοτελεῖς, which would have recalled to Athenians the period of Macedonian occupation (cf. SEG 15.1958, 113, ll. 1–2; Pouilloux 1954 no. 19; Petrakos 1999 no. 43). The term πάροικος would have seemed particularly apt for these veterans, as they, too, represented a homogeneous community of non-citizens settled in an area distant from the urban centre—precisely like the πάροικοι of the Asia Minor coastal cities.

• J.M. Bertrand, “À propos des πάροικοι dans les cités d’Asie Mineure”, in P. Fröhlich, C. Müller (éds.), Citoyenneté et participation à la basse époque hellénistique, Genève 2005, 39-49.
• L. Gagliardi, I πάροικοι di Grecia e Macedonia in età ellenistica e nella prima età romana in A.D. Rizakis, F. Camia, S. Zoumbaki (eds.), Social Dynamics under Roman Rule Mobility and Status Change in the Provinces of Achaia and Macedonia Proceedings of a Conference Held at the French School of Athens, 30-31 May 2014, Athens 2017, 389-406
• Ph. Gauthier, Métèques, perièques et paroikoi: bilan et points d’interrogation in R. Lonis (éd.), L’étranger dans le monde grec. Actes du colloque organisé par l’Institut d’Études Anciennes (Nancy, may 1987), Nancy 1988, 23-46
• M. B. Hatzopoulos, L.D. Loukopoulou, Recherches sur les marches orientales des Téménides (Anthémonte, Kalindoia), I-II, Athènes 1992-1996.
• D. Kah, Paroikoi und Neubürger in Priene, in L.M. Günther (Hg.), Migration und Bürgerrecht in der hellenistischen Welt, Wiesbaden 2012, 51-71.
• F. Papazoglou, Laoi et paroikoi. Recherches sur les structures de la société hellénistique, Beograd 1997.
• B.C. Petrakos, Ὁ Δῆμος τοῦ Ῥαμνοῦντος: Σύνοψη τῶν ἀνασκαφῶν καὶ τῶν ἐρευνῶν (1913-1998), II, Οἱ ἐπιγραφές, Athens 1999.
• J. Pouilloux, La forteresse de Rhamnunte, Paris 1954

[G. Falco]

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Phratria (φρατρία)/ Phrater (φράτηρ)

• L. Boffo, M. Faraguna, Le poleis e i loro archivi. Studi su pratiche documentarie, istituzioni e società nell’antichità greca, Trieste 2021.
• F. Cordano, Le istituzioni delle città greche di Sicilia nelle fonti epigrafiche, in M. I. Gulletta (a cura di), Sicilia Epigraphica. Atti del convegno internazionale (Erice, 15-18 Ottobre 1998), Quaderno 7 Pisa 1999, 149-158.
• S. De Vido, Spazio civico e spazio urbano. Ancora sulla lamina di Imera, Kokalos 60, 2023, 33-51.
• M. Guarducci, L’istituzione della fratria nella Grecia antica e nelle colonie greche d’Italia, Roma 1937.
• C.W. Hedrick, Phratry Shrines of Attica and Athens, Hesperia 60, 1991, 241-268.
• S.C. Humphreys, Kinship in Ancient Athens: An Anthropological Analysis (2 vols.), Oxford-New York 2018.
• P. Ismard, La cité des réseaux. Athènes et ses associations, VI^e-I^er siècle av. J.-C., Paris 2010.
• C. Joyce, Citizenship or Inheritance? The Phratry in Classical Athens, in Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought 36, 3, 2019, 466-487.
• J. Kierstead, S. Letteri, Appeals to Associations and Claims to Citizenship in Athenian Oratory, in J. Filonik – C. Plastow – R. Zelnick-Abramovitz (eds.), Citizenship in Antiquity, London-New York 2023, 387-399.
• S.D. Lambert, The Phratries of Attica, Michigan 1993.
• M. J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens, Brussel 1981.
• M. Piérart, Phratries et « Kômai » d’Argos,  Bulletin de correspondance hellénique 107, 1, 1983, 269-275.
• M. Polito, I decreti dei Demotionidi/ Deceleesi ad Atene, IG II² 1237, Testo, traduzione e commento, Milano 2020.
• D. Roussel, Tribu et Cité. Études sur les groupes sociaux dans les cités grecques aux époques archaïque et classique, Paris 1976.
• D. Russo, Le ripartizioni civiche di Atene. Una storia archeologica di tribù, demi e fratrie (508/7-308/307 A.C.), Annuario della Scuola archeologica di Atene e delle missioni italiane in Oriente, Supplemento10, Roma-Atene 2022.
• O. Tribulato, La legge tardo-arcaica di Himera (SEG 47, no 1427; IGDS II n° 15). Un riesame linguistico ed epigrafico, in Pallas 109, 2019, 167-193.

[G. Ingarao]

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Politeia (πολιτεία); politeuo (πολιτεύω)

The term belongs to the same lexical family as the denominative verb πολιτεύω, first attested in the form πολιατεύω in a law from Gortyn dating to the first half of the fifth century BCE, where it refers to young men who have passed puberty and are therefore able ‘to act as citizens’ and to swear an oath before the gods (Gagarin–Perlman G51, l. 7). The verb is attested with the same meaning in the Great Inscription (Gagarin–Perlman G72.9, l. 33, mid-fifth century BCE) and, in Elis, in a federal context, in the decree granting citizenship to thirteen (or more) individuals issued by the koinon of the Triphylians (Minon, IED 28, 399–369 BCE). In lines 3–8, the decree states that ‘if anyone deprives [them] of politeia and removes from public offices those who act as citizens (πολιτειομένοις) justly and according to the law, he is impious toward Athena.’ Particular attention should also be drawn to the verbal expression οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, which may be used either to denote the civic body as a whole, that is, all those who share in political rights, or those who most actively exercise citizenship and thus, in essence, ‘those who govern’ (cf. e.g. Isoc. 15.132–133).

Like the verb πολιτεύω, πολιτεία also displays a considerable variety of meanings and a high number of attestations; nevertheless, its semantic core consistently refers to the political and collective dimension of the polis, never to its physical or spatial aspect. The noun begins to be used from the fifth century BCE onward and is characterized, from its earliest attestations, by marked polysemy. Despite this, ‘citizenship’ and ‘the right of citizenship’ constitute its primary and most widespread meaning. This is first attested by Herodotus, in connection with the seer Tisamenos’ request for citizenship from the Spartans (Hdt. 9.33.5–34.1 – link to texts and documents), as well as by Thucydides, with reference to the citizenship of the father of Gylippus, and by Xenophon, regarding the grant of citizenship by Ephesus to the Selinuntians after the destruction of their city (Thuc. 6.104.2; Xenoph. Hell. 1.2.10; see also Arist. Ath. Pol. 54.3).

It is therefore not surprising that the term appears – and is widely attested – with this meaning in honorary inscriptions granting citizenship (and civic rights) to foreigners, as well as in other epigraphic documents from the final years of the fifth century BCE onward, both in Athens (Canevaro 2025) and in the rest of the Greek world (Hansen 1986). The grant of politeia is normally accompanied by other honors, such as enktesis (see the entry enktesis), isoteleia, and the like. In particular, politeia may refer both to the civic status of the individual and to citizenship understood in a collective sense. In this latter sense – and especially with the meaning ‘right of citizenship’ – the term is used for the first time in epigraphic evidence in the first of the decrees of the Athenian dossier concerning the Samians, published in 403/2 but already passed in 405/4 BCE. This is the psephisma granting Athenian citizenship en bloc to the Samian democrats (IG I³ 127, ll. 19–20, περὶ τῆς πολι|[τ]είας, ‘concerning the right of citizenship’). It is noteworthy that in the same document the verb πολιτεύεσθαι is used with the meaning ‘to adopt a constitution’ (IG I³ 127, ll. 12–13: Σαμίος ’Αθηναίος εἶναι, | πολιτευομένος ὅπως ἂν αὐτοὶ βόλωνται, ‘that the Samians be Athenians, adopting whatever constitution they themselves wish’).

Politeia is already employed in this latter sense in the treaty between Athens and Selymbria of 408/7 BCE (IG I³ 118, ll. 10–12), which states: καταστέσασθαι δὲ Σελυμ]β̣ριανὸς τὲμ πολι|[τείαν αὐτονόμος τρόποι Η]ότοι ἂν ἐπίστοντ|[αι, ‘that the Selymbrians establish their constitution autonomously, in whatever way they wish.’ With this meaning, politeia is also used by Thucydides in the opening of the most famous section of Pericles’ Funeral Oration (Thuc. 2.37.1: Χρώμεθα γὰρ πολιτείᾳ οὐ ζηλούσῃ τοὺς τῶν πέλας νόμους, ‘For we have a political system that does not seek to imitate the laws of our neighbours’).

By contrast with the earliest Gortynian occurrences, which preserve – both in the noun and in the verb – the meaning connected with the status of the citizen (polites), the earliest Athenian epigraphic attestations already employ both values from the outset: on the one hand ‘citizenship’ and ‘the granting of citizenship,’ on the other ‘constitution’ and ‘the establishment or adoption of a constitution.’ It is therefore reasonable to assume that the elaboration of the concept of politeia as ‘citizenship’ first took place in Crete, whereas the evolution of the use of the term and of the verb – and their resulting polysemy – developed at Athens, which from the second half of the fifth century BCE became the centre of elaboration on the term and the concept of politeia. Evidence for this is provided by the further meaning of government” ‘or ‘administration of the city,’ derived from that of ‘constitution,’ attested in Aristophanes’ Knights (Aristoph. Eq. 219: ἔχεις ἅπαντα πρὸς πολιτείαν ἃ δεῖ, ‘you have everything required for governing’), but also found in Thucydides, with reference to Pericles and the government of Athens (Thuc. 1.127.3), in Aeschines (Aeschin. 3.37), and in Lycurgus (Lyc. 1.79). With the meaning of ‘constitution of a state,’ and thus ‘form of government,’ the term underwent further development – again in an Athenian context – from the final decades of the fifth century BCE onward, eventually coming to denote the ensemble of laws and shared social and cultural practices of the polis. This is the sense found, for example, in Aristotle (Pol. 1295a40), where politeia is described as ‘the way of life of the polis,’ or in Isocrates’ Panathenaicus, where politeia is said to be ‘the soul of the city’ (Isoc. 12.138).

Of particular significance is the emergence and diffusion of politeia as an autonomous literary genre. Its earliest attestation is the anonymous Constitution of the Athenians, whose much debated dating may go back to the 420s BCE. The use of the term in the sense of ‘form of government’ subsequently found extensive development in Platonic philosophical thought (see e.g. Plato, Resp. 562a and 544a–b) and, above all, in Aristotle, with the publication of the Constitutions of the Greek poleis. The literary genre of the Politeiai appears in a wide variety of forms, some of which focus not – or not primarily – on the institutional aspects of the polis, but rather on the way of life of a political community. This is partly the case for the Aristotelian politeiai (Erdas 2017), but also for Xenophon’s Lakedaimonion Politeia, where attention is directed to the customs of the community. From this usage also derives the meaning of politeia as a ‘system’ or ‘way of life’ (Dem. 20.122).

At a theoretical level, the term is instead subjected to systematic analysis in Aristotle’s Politics. Here politeia is employed across the full range of the semantic nuances discussed above, including the sense – derived from its original meaning – of “body of citizens” (Arist. Pol. 1292a34; see Bordes 1980). In Aristotle’s elaboration of its multiple meanings, several aspects are particularly significant: the use of the term to denote a specific form of government, according to the well-known definition at Pol. 1278a37–39; the relationship between politeia and the civic body, politeuma (Lévy 1993; Maffi 2018, on the role of laws); the use of politeia as an expression of the unity of the city and as a principle guiding the actions of citizens toward a common purpose (Poddighe 2022); and, above all, the inquiry into the very definition of politeia that permeates Book III, especially Pol. 1274b38–41, which has given rise to differing interpretations concerning the meaning of ‘citizen’ itself and the parameters of inclusion within the polis (Blok 2017; Faraguna 2025; see the entry polites).

Alongside philosophical reflection, the reconsideration of the Athenian constitution, arising from the codification of the patrios politeia in the last years of the 5th century BCE, exerted a strong influence on the usage and dissemination of the term (Loddo 2025). From the first occurrence of the expression in a fragment of the sophist Thrasymachus of Chalcedon (D-K 85 B1), the nebulous character of the ancestral constitution allowed individuals with different political orientations to invoke the past to mask institutional changes, presenting them under the guise of continuity between past and present. This discourse applies both to the poleis (Xen. Hell. 3.4.2) and to federal entities (Xen. Hell. 5.2.14), without interruption from the Classical age (Thuc. 8.76.6; Arist. Ath.Pol. 29.3, 34.3) to the Hellenistic period (Nikouria: IG XII 7, 506, ll. 11–15; Miletus: Milet VI 3, 1049, ll. 10–12; Ios: IG XII (5) Suppl. 168, ll. 1–5).

From the intensive efforts of research, expansion, and systematization of ancestral laws that took place in Athens, the concept of politeia emerges more clearly defined; at the same time, it gradually diverges from its original meaning of ‘citizenship’ and acquires an increasingly political connotation, as evidenced by the sense of ‘democratic government’ that began to spread in the early decades of the 4th century BCE (see, in addition to Arist. Pol. 1279a 39, for example, Isocr. 4.125 and Demosth. 6.21; 1.5).

At the same time, however, reflection on the citizen and his participation in the polis emerges and develops also through the use of the expressions μετέχειν or μεταδοῦναι τῆς πολιτείας (see lemma metechein tes politeias; Filonik 2025), a theme explored in depth in Aristotle’s Politics (e.g., Arist. Pol. 1290a7–13), but already present in Lysias (Lys. 12.77) and in the works of Isocrates, particularly in the Panegyricus, the Areopagiticus, and the Panathenaicus. In fact, Isocrates delineates in some passages of these works the figure of a sort of archomenos polites (cf. Arist. Pol. 1277a20; see lemma polites), which entails a significant limitation of the rights of citizens who do not belong to the beltistoi and of participatory engagement: the people may elect magistrates and hold them accountable, but they do not enjoy passive suffrage; they may exercise judicial power, but they apparently have no access to deliberative authority. Concerning himself, Isocrates conceives the exercise of his own role as a citizen not so much as a frequent attendee of assemblies and courts, but rather as a counselor and teacher (σύμβουλος […] καὶ διδάσκαλος: 15.95; cf. Ep. 8.7) of the more politically active fellow citizens.

The consolidation of the concept of politeia in historical-political reflection, and its presence in honorary decrees from the 4th century BCE onwards, gradually led to the specialization of the term into two main meanings: that of ‘citizenship,’ attested in epigraphic documentation as an honorary grant, and that of ‘constitution’ or ‘form of government,’ documented, for example, in the sixth book of Polybius’ work dedicated to constitutional forms (see, e.g., Pol. 6.3.5; 6.9.10). Elsewhere, this second sense takes on a more general meaning, which is also widely attested in Hellenistic sources, namely ‘state’ (Pol. 12.25g.1; 22.4.2).

• J. Bordes, La place d’Aristote dans l’évolution de la notion de politeia, «Ktema», 5, 1980, 249-256
• J. Bordes, Politeia dans la pensée grecque jusqu’à Aristote, Paris 1982
• M. Canevaro, Honour(s) for Citizens: Egalitarianism and Social Distinction, in L. Cecchet – C. Lasagni (eds.), Democratic Athens, in Citizenship Practised, Citizenship Imagined: Multiple Ways of Experiencing Citizenship in the Greek World, Stuttgart 2025, 89-127
• D. Erdas, Frammenti sulle costituzioni, costituzioni di frammenti. Ipotesi per una struttura delle politeiai aristoteliche, «PdP», 72, 2017, 45-74
• M. Faraguna, Citizenship in the Greek Polis: An Institutional Approach, in M. Canevaro, M. Barbato (eds.), Rediscovering Greek Institutions. New Institutionalist Approaches to Ancient Greek History, Edinburgh 2025, 111-131
• J. Filonik, The concept of sharing in the polis, its origins, and development, «Erga/Logoi» 12.2, 2025 cds.
• M. Gagarin – P.J. Perlman, The Laws of Ancient Crete, c. 650-400 BCE, Oxford 2016
• M.H. Hansen, Politeia in Greek Inscriptions, «GRBS» 27, 1986, 121-147
• E. Lévy, Politeia et Politeuma chez Aristote, in M. Piérart (éd.), Aristote et Athènes, Paris 1993, 65-90
• L. Loddo, The Discourse of the Ancestral Constitution in the Early Hellenistic Period, in M. Canevaro, M. Barbato, A. Esu (eds.), Rediscovering Greek Institutions. New Institutionalist Approaches to Ancient Greek History, Edinburgh 2025, 65-90
• A. Maffi, Politeia, politeuma e legislazione nella Politica di Aristotele, «Teoria Politica» 8, 2018 online (http://journals.openedition.org/tp/286)
• E. Poddighe, Politeia and the historical account of the polis in Aristotle, in F. Pezzoli, E. Poddighe (eds.), «Monográficos de Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales», 1, 2022, 1-29

[C. Bearzot, D. Erdas, L. Loddo, P.A. Tuci]

Polites (πολίτης)

The term πολίτης (πολιάτας, πολιήτης) primarily refers to citizens as members of the political community and holders of political rights. In its earliest attestations, the term is always used in the plural and it is employed generically to refer to the «inhabitants of the city» (e.g., Hom. Il. 15.557-558; Od. 7.131), while in some instances the community of πολῖται is expressly linked to the authority of a leader, particularly in the military sphere (e.g., Hom. Il. 2.806). The political dimension of the actions of the πολῖται, notably in the context of bitter rivalry between factions, comes to the fore in archaic lyric poetry. For example, Alcaeus laments in his rustic and wild exile that he is unable to hear the convocation of the assembly and the council, which his father and grandfather enjoyed, growing old among πολῖται ἀλλαλόκακοι, «who hurt each other» (fr. 130 Lobel-Page). Along the same lines, Theognis offers Cyrnus advice with overt political undertones, suggesting that he should not concern himself with «citizens embroiled in disputes» (ταρασσομένων πολιητέων), but instead take the middle path (ll. 219-220) (Lévy 1985). While there was a wider range of terms referring to politically active citizens in the archaic period (Davies 2004), from the 5th century onwards, πολῖται increasingly appear as members of the city’s political community, whether they are subject to the power of a tyrant (e.g., Hdt. 3.45.4; 7.155.1; Aesch. Ag. 1638-1639; Soph. Ant. 78-79, 907-908) or unequivocally hold decision-making power themselves (e.g., Hdt. 6.85.2; 8.46.3; Aesch. Eu. 693; Eurip. Or. 756). This political and institutional function is associated with a military dimension, with πολῖται being identified as members of both the city’s army and the political community (e.g., Aesch. Th. 1-35) (Falco 2024). Even the earliest secure epigraphic evidence from late archaic Crete, refers to a context in which the πολιάται are those who participate in political life, as in the section of the Gortyna code that stipulates that adoptions must be announced «in the agora when the citizens are gathered, from the stone from which one speaks» (Gagarin – Perlman, Laws of Crete G72, X, ll. 34-36; see also G72, XI, 10-14; L2, l. 5; Lyktos1A, l. 1-2, where ἀλοπολιάταν signifies «citizen of another city») (Faraguna 2025). In the sense outlined here, πολῖται tend to differ from ἀστοί in attestations from the Classical Age, despite some cases of semantic overlap (e.g. Hdt. 7.237.2-3; Eurip. Or. 746, 871-878). In fact, starting from this period, the term ἀστοί seems to indicate mostly citizens as inhabitants of the polis, regardless of their political rights (see entry). As the status of ἀστός originally implied belonging to the community by birth (e.g. Hom. Il. 11.242-243; Aesch. Ag. 403-406), it is unsurprising that, in the Classical period, it was πολίτης that was used when a citizen or citizens were ‘created’ (e.g., Hdt. 1.150.2; 5.57.2; 9.33.4), while ἀστός occurs in contexts where citizenship by birth is mentioned (e.g., Hdt. 1.173.5; Arst. Ath. Pol. 26.4). Although the ethnic term is used more frequently in epigraphic formulas for granting of citizenship (e.g., εἶναι αὐτὸν ’Αθηναῖον), in one of the oldest Athenian examples, the decree in honor of Sthorys of Thasos (IG II² 17, 394/3), the previous granting of citizenship, along with the titles of proxenoi and benefactors of the city already held by his ancestors, is recalled precisely with the clause αὐτὸν δὲ καὶ πο]λίτην ἐποιησάντο Ἀθηναῖοι (ll. 7-8). In light of the above, it follows that ἀστός is most frequently contrasted with ξένος and μέτοικος (see entry) to highlight the dichotomy between a citizen and a foreigner (e.g., Soph. OT 813-819; Th. 2.34.4; Xenoph. Oec. 6.17), as well as between a citizen and an immigrant or a resident alien (e.g., Aesch. Eu. 1044-1045; Aristoph. Ach. 508; Xenoph. Vect. 2.2). However, as πολίτης became more prevalent from the height of the Classical period onwards, alongside the decline in the use of ἀστός, the often tripartite contrast between πολίτης, ξένος, and μέτοικος became more common (e.g., And. 1.144; Arst. Pol. 3.1277b.39-40; Demosth. 23.23). Similarly, while ἀστοί can include men, women, and children belonging to the citizenry by birth, in the Classical Age πολίτης generally refers to an adult male citizen who is not subject to ἀτιμία (see entry), so much so that the feminine πολῖτις (see entry) is relatively uncommon compared to ἀστή. Nevertheless, in everyday language the meanings of the two terms could overlap, as seen in Plato’s works, where πολῖται often refers to all members of the civic community bound by solidarity (Fouchard 1984). On the other hand, the political content of the term is strongly emphasized by Aristotle, who, while recognizing that, in current usage, a πολίτης is someone born to two citizen parents, defines it in his analysis as «someone who has the possibility of exercising deliberative and judicial offices» (Pol. 3.1275b17-24). Through this overview, it is more difficult to see the πολῖται of the Classical Age as members of a community to which one belongs on the basis of common descent, whose membership implies generic participation in civic life – of which the political component would be only one aspect (as Blok 2017, 149-156 would have it). Secure epigraphic attestations of πολίτης remain rare in the 5th century. In addition to the aforementioned cases and the anthroponyms attested in IG I³ 1162, l. 23 (ca. 447) and 1186, l. 66 (ca. 411), examples can be found in Athens, in IG I³ 91 (ca. 420) and 1453B (ca. 414), and in Thasos, in I.Thasos III 1 (late 5th-early 4th century). Their number increases significantly from the end of the 4th century and into the Hellenistic period, in parallel with the proliferation of public epigraphy in the Greek world. In Hellenistic and Hellenistic-Roman documents, the only term used to unequivocally refer to a citizen is πολίτης, which designates individuals who hold political rights. This category is often juxtaposed with, and contrasted against, a variety of others, including foreigners passing through (παρεπιδημοῦντες: see entry), resident aliens (κάτοικοι/παροικοῦντες/πάροικοι: see entries), and, in cities whose urban centers were associated with vast χῶραι (as in the case of the Greek poleis of Asia Minor), a special category of non-citizen natives (πάροικοι).

• J. Block, Citizenship in classical Athens, Cambridge 2017.
• J.K. Davies, The concept of the ‘citizen’, in S. Cataldi (ed.), Poleis e politeiai. Esperienze politiche, tradizioni letterarie, progetti costituzionali, Alessandria 2004, 19-30
• G. Falco, Politēs/politis, astos e metoikos: il lessico della cittadinanza nel teatro ateniese di V secolo a.C., Hormos 16, 2024, 133-200
• M. Faraguna, Citizenship in the Greek polis: an institutional approach, in M. Canevaro, M. Barbato, A. Esu (eds.), Rediscovering Greek institutions. New institutionalist approaches to ancient Greek history, Edinburgh 2025, 111-131
• A. Fouchard, Astos, politès et épichôrios chez Platon, Ktema 9, 1984, 185-204
•  É. Lévy, Astos et polites, d’Homère à Hérodote, Ktema 10, 1985, 53-66

[C. Carusi]

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Politis (πολῖτις)

The term is comparatively rare when set against the other noun used to designate a female citizen, ἀστή (astē), especially in Attic sources (for a recent overview of the particularly problematic concept of female citizenship in the Athenian context, see Joyce 2023). In certain cases, the use of polîtis seems to reflect the writer’s intention to emphasise a more specifically political dimension—rather than the domestic or familial sphere—in which the woman or women in question are mentioned. Such is the case, for example, in Soph. El. 1227, where the polîtides are the women addressed by Electra to announce Orestes’ return, an event foreshadowing the onset of a new political regime after that of Clytaemnestra and Aegisthus (cf. Eur. El. 1137 with Joyce 2023, 350). Operating within a similar political-ideological framework is the orator in [Demosth.] 57.30 and 43, where he uses polîtis, alongside astē, to qualify his mother’s status, in parallel to his father, who is described in the speech both as astos and polîtēs (cf. Mossé 1985, 78).

In a context that is not political but military, Plato in Leg. 814c envisages a law requiring both politai and polîtides to concern themselves with war. Here too, the term is situated in a sphere distinct from the strictly private and domestic, which would seem to explain the use of polîtis rather than astē.

More problematic is the occurrence of the term in [Demosth.] 59.107, where it is stated that Neaera was neither an astē (as she was not Athenian by birth) nor a polîtis (as she had not been granted citizenship by the demos). Although the Greek world of poleis and koina yields examples of citizenship being granted by decree to women (e.g. SEG 15.384; 18.264, 370/68 BC; IG IX.1² 1.9, l. 6, 300–250 BC), we have no such case for Classical Athens (the only reference to the granting of citizenship to a woman by the Athenian demos appears in a funerary epigram of the first century AD: IG XII.5 307, ll. 7–8). It is therefore likely that here we are dealing with a rhetorical device applying a typically male contrast to a female individual, in order to underscore further the impossibility of considering Neaera an Athenian citizen (see Kapparis 1999, 399–400).

In other cases, polîtis appears interchangeable with astē, being used simply to indicate descent from a citizen mother (Isoc. 14.51; Demosth. 23.213; Is. 8.43; cf. Arist. Pol. 1275b 33; 1278a 28). Outside the Athenian context, the term often designates female citizens who, together with politai, form a group clearly distinguished from other categories inhabiting the same city: IG XII.4 1.75 A, ll. 9–10 (Cos, 202/1 BC: politai and polîtides distinguished from nothōi, paroikoi and xenoi); IG XII.4 1.320, ll. 11–12 (Cos, late second century BC: politai and polîtides distinguished from others who katoikousi the city); IG XII.7 386, ll. 17–18, 21–22 (Amorgos, third century BC: politai and polîtides distinguished from douloi and exeleutheroi).

The term also appears in religious and cultic contexts: IG XII.4 1.304, l. 19 (Cos, 200–150 BC) and IG XII.4 1.326, l. 24 (Cos, 100–50 BC), where the priestess of Dionysos Thyllophoros was entitled to appoint a polîtis as hyphiereia; cf. Milet VI.2 733 (third–second century BC), which mentions the Bacchai polietides of Miletus greeting the priestess of Dionysos.

• C. Joyce, Could Athenian Women be counted as citizens in Democratic Athens in J. Filonik, C. Plastow, R. Zelnick-Abramovitz (eds.), Citizenship in Antiquity. Civic Communities in the Ancient Mediterranean, London – New York 2023, 342-354
• K. A. Kapparis, Apollodoros. Against Neaera, Berlin – New York 1999
• C. Mossé, Ἀστὴ καὶ πολῖτις. La dénomination de la femme athénienne dans les plaidoyers démosthéniens, Ktèma 10, 1985, 77-79

[G. Falco]

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Prostates (προστάτης)

The term prostates (προστάτης) has a multiplicity of meanings: it can be employed to identify a political leader, notably on the democratic side (προστάτης τοῦ δήμου), the president of a board (e.g. προστάτης προβούλων in IG IX 12.4 798, ll. 116-117, an inscription from Corcyra, 2nd cent.), more generally a role of leader or chief (e.g. Xenophon in HG 3. 1.3 defines the Spartans as τῆς Ἑλλάδος προστάται) or the one who stands as a defender of something (Demosth. 15.30: προστάται τῆς πάντων ἐλευθερίας); in the context of citizenship issues, it designates the warrant that metics and freedmen were required to have in order to reside in the host city.

The prostates of metics, for whom we possess information almost exclusively from the Athenian context (outside of it, see e.g. Lys. 31.9; Lycurg. 1.21; Gauthier 1972, 128-136), was the citizen who acted as guarantor for a resident foreigner. The metic freely chose his prostates (Isocr. 8.53), possibly based on prior acquaintance, and the latter was present when the metic’ name was transcribed in the registers of the demos in which he would reside.

Regarding his duties, a metic had to pay the residence tax (μετοίκιον), under the supervision of the prostates (see e.g. Demosth. 25.56-58; Suid. s.v. νέμειν προστάτην); it is likely that the latter accompanied his client before the officials in charge and that, in case of dispute, in order to avoid the ἀπαγωγή of the allegedly insolvent metic, he was entitled to guarantee before the polemarch that the contribution had been regularly made.

Lexicographic sources attest that the prostates assisted the metic περὶ πάντων τῶν ἰδίων καὶ τῶν κοινῶν (see e.g. Harp. s.v. ἀπροστασίου). Regardless of the vagueness of the reference, scholars have wondered whether, as would seem to emerge mainly from lexicographical sources, the prostates was a permanent figure during the Athenian residence period of the metic and what role it specifically played in the judicial sphere. With regard to the first issue, although some scholars believed that the prostates was a mere “godfather” who intervened only at the time of the metic’s registration (e.g. Wilamowitz 1877, 232), it is perhaps more likely that the warrant was a continuous presence in the foreigner’s life (e.g. Gauthier 1972, 126-136; Whitehead 1977, 89-92; Tuci 2023, 103 ff.), as suggested both by fourth-century sources (such as Isoc. 8.53) and authors such as Haprocration, who was certainly very well documented on Athenian legal system.

Concerning specifically the role of the prostates in the judiciary field, the main source is a passage from Aristotle’s Politics (1275a11-13), in which, attempting to define the concept of the citizen, the author states that in several cases the metics do not participate fully in judicial life, but are required to resort to a guarantor (πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ τούτων τελέως οἱ μέτοικοι μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ νέμειν ἀνάγκη προστάτην). Moreover, numerous lexicographical sources attest to the existence of a γραφὴ ἀπροστασίου (cf. also Arist. Ath. Pol. 58.3) that affected the resident foreigner who did not have a prostates, who did not pay the μετοίκιον, or who had illegally enrolled as an ἀστός (cf. e.g. Harp. s.v. ἀπροστασίου). It is likely that in the 5th and up to the middle of the 4th century the guarantor was necessary in all cases in which the metic had to appear before the polemarch, in order to attest, at the stage of the ἀνάκρισις, the legal status of his client and that afterwards, in the case of the δίκαι ἐμπορικαί, the metic, just like the ξένος, no longer needed to be introduced by his prostates because in this case the magistrates acted ratione rei and not ratione personae (Gauthier 1972, 132 ff. ). The role of the guarantor must therefore have gradually declined, as is also shown by the fact that at the beginning of the 3rd century Dinarchus of Corinth, brought a private lawsuit in Athens against his friend Proxenus and appeared in person in court (Dion. Hal. Din. 3.1; [Plut.] Mor. 850e). However, the figure was probably not entirely suppressed, since the prostates also had competences beyond those related to the judiciary; moreover, a series of φιάλαι from the second half of the 4th century seem to attest cases of γραφὴ ἀπροστασίου in which metics were acquitted (Meyer 2010, 11-80), which would lead to confirm the persistence of an active role for the prostates.

On the prostates of the freedmen (ἀπελεύθεροι or, if they were freemen who had become slaves and then freed, ἐξελεύθεροι: cf. Et. Gud. s.v. ἀπελεύθερος καὶ ἐξελεύθερος) we possess little information: it is possible that the freedman was obliged to have as prostates his former master, whose role was protected by the δίκη ἀποστασίου (Harp. s.v. ἀποστασίου), but the issue is debated (Sosin 2016, 8 ff.). In the theoretical speculation of Plato’s Laws (915a) we read that, among the various obligations of the freedman, there was also to appear three times a month before his prostates, thus showing, at least in the Platonic conception, a continuity in the relationship between the two.

• M. Adak, Metöken als Wohltäter Athens. Untersuchungen zum sozialen Austausch zwischen ortsansassigen Fremden und der Burgergemeinde in klassischer und hellenistischer Zeit (ca. 500-150 v. Chr.), München 2003
• P. Gauthier, Symbola. Les étrangers et la justice dans les cites grecques, Nancy 1972
• E.A. Meyer, Metics and the Athenian Phialai-Inscriptions: A Study in Athenian Epigraphy and Law, Wiesbaden 2009
• J.D. Sosin, A metic was a metic, Historia 65.1 (2016), 2-13
• P.A. Tuci, Tra il meteco e la polis: ricerche sul ruolo del prostates, RIL 141 (2007) 237-281
• P.A. Tuci, La crusca e la farina. Attualità del pensiero di Philippe Gauthier sui meteci, Dike 26 (2023), 101-126
• D. Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, Cambridge 1977
• U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Demotika der attischen Metoeken, I-II, Hermes 22 (1887) 107-128; 211-259

[P. A. Tuci]

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Proxenos (πρόξενος)

A proxenos (πρόξενος) is a citizen who, while continuing to reside in his own city, represents the foreign community that granted him that title. Etymologically, the term is a compound of ξένος and thus indicates one who acts according to the relations of ξενία: more precisely, a proxenos guarantees the bonds of hospitality not to a single individual, but to an entire community. The institution of proxenia is widespread throughout the Greek world, across a very broad chronological span, reaching into the Roman era. It is mainly attested through epigraphic, but also by literary sources. One of the oldest testimonies is an inscription from Corcyra dating to the beginning of the 6th century, the cenotaph of a certain Menekrates, son of Tlasia, from Eantea (in Locris Ozolia), who is qualified as πρόξενϝος δάμου φίλος (IG IX 1².4 882).

Several categories of inscriptions mention proxenoi: a particular but noteworthy case are lists of names (collected in Mack 2015, 286-361), while the most frequent are the decrees of proxenia, by which a city bestows this honour (and possibly others related to it) on an individual for special merits. We possess decrees of this kind promulgated by more than 180 cities, including especially Delphi, Delos, Oropo, Athens, but also by political entities of a different nature such as federations (Mack 2015, 9; 14).

The form of these texts is mostly standard: almost always the reason for the concession is mentioned, introduced by the conjunction ἐπειδή. For example, an inscription from 349/8 (IG II² 294 = IG II³ 1, 552) states that the Athenians grant proxenia to Theogenes of Naucratis because he is ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός towards the demos of the Athenians and both his ancestors and himself have acted well towards the Athenians coming to Naucratis for public and private matters. The adjectives most frequently used to characterise the honorand are ἀγαθός, εὔνους, πρόθυμος, φίλος, which emphasise his good disposition and always refer not to generic qualities, but to his behaviour towards the community that grants the proxenia; worth mentioning are also χρήσιμος and εὔχρηστος, which emphasise more concretely their “utility” to the community of which they are proxenoi.

The kind of assistance the proxenos offers to the community can be illustrated by various expressions: for instance, a third-century inscription from Tenos states that the Mytilenian Melesias son of Melesias always offers services to the Tenians who come to him for public or private matters (IG XII 5, 798: διατελεῖ χρείας παρεχόμενος καὶ κοινεῖ τῆι πόλει καὶ ἰδίαι Τηνίων τοῖς ἐντυνχάνουσιν ἑαυτῶι); elsewhere we find expressions such as ποιῶν ὅ τι δύναται ἀγαθόν (IG IX.4 639, da Delo, III sec.), λέγων καὶ πράττων ἀεὶ τὰ συμφέροντα τῶι δήμωι (IG XII.9 221, from Eretria, 3rd cent.), or similar ones.

Obviously, the status of the proxenos could in some way influence the services he could provide. Many of the proxenoi are unknown to us, but sometimes we find names of people with institutional roles, even of a certain importance: for example, kings, dynasts, royal officials, military officers, magistrates, envoys, judges, priests; alongside these we encounter individuals linked to the world of culture, such as philosophers, poets, artists, and of business and finance, such as merchants and bankers (for a more complete list, Mack 2015, 59).

Another characteristic aspect of the decrees of proxenia is the emphasis on the fact that the community issuing them expects the proxenos to continue acting with the diligence shown thus far: in this respect, the verb διατελέω followed by the participle or expressions emphasising the temporal aspect are often used (cf. the already mentioned IG II² 294 = IG II³ 1, 552).

A forward-looking perspective is also found in inscriptions such as IG II² 1137, a decree dated 193/2 by which the Athenians granted proxenia to Charmion, son of Eumaridas of Cidonia (in Crete): it not only mentions his past behaviour to justify the grant of proxenia (ll- 51-59), but also states that in the future (εἰς τὸ λοιπόν) Charmion, by showing his good disposition (αἵρεσις) towards Athens, will be able to obtain further benefits if deemed worthy (ll. 67-70).

The typical formula πρόξενος καὶ εὐεργέτης can be found not only in epigraphic texts (e.g. IG I³ 126, from Athens; IG IX.4 543, from Delos), but also in literary ones (e.g. Hdt. 8.136.1; Xenoph. HG 6.1.4). More generally, the importance of evergetism in the context of proxenia grants is evident; however, it should be noted that not all εὐεργέται also have the title of proxenoi.

Literary attestations are less numerous, but provide interesting perspectives: for instance, they show how proxenoi could engage in espionage (cf. Thuc. 3.2.3); more generally, they could be suspected of treason, facing particular risks especially in the event of conflicts between the community of origin and the community for which they were proxenoi. In the theatre, there are multiple echoes of the role of proxenoi in welcoming foreigners or foreign delegations (Aesch. Supp. 234 ff.; Aristoph. Av. 1021), although other literary genres provide more abundant and important information. For historiography, see for instance the numerous passages of Thucydides (2.29.1; 2.85.5; 3.2.3; 3.52.5; 3.70.1; 4.78.1; 5.43.2; 5.59.5; 5.76.3; 6.89.2) and Xenophon (HG 1.135; 4.5.6; 5.4.22; 6.1.4; 6. 3.4; 7.2.16), which are interesting because they offer examples of proxenoi “in action” (as opposed to simply capturing the moment of the grant of proxenia, as is the case with proxenia decrees). For oratory, the main witness is Demosthenes (but see e.g. also Aeschin. 3.138; Din. 1.45); oration 52 of the corpus Demosthenicum features Callippus, proxenos of the Heracleesians, in a charge initiated by Apollodoros concerning a sum of money that the Heracleote Lycon had deposited at the bank of Pasion. Finally, a significant passage from Plato mentions Megillos, a Spartan proxenos of the Athenians, stating that the proxenoi nurture benevolence towards the city that appointed them as such, and that they regard it almost as a δεύτερα πατρίς (Pl. Lg. 642b).

• E. Culasso Gastaldi, Le prossenie ateniesi del IV secolo a.C.: gli onorati asiatici, Alessandria 2004
• A. Gerolymatos, Espionage and Treason. A Study of the Proxenia in Political and Military Intelligence Gathering in Classical Greece, Amsterdam 1986
• W. Mack, Proxeny and Polis. Institutional Networks in the Ancient Greek World, Oxford 2015
• C. Marek, Die Proxenie, 1984
• M.B. Walbank, Athenian Proxenies of the Fifth Century B.C., Toronto-Sarasota 1978

[P. A. Tuci]

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Sympoliteia (συμπολιτεία)

Sympoliteia (sympoliteuein, sympoliteuesthai) indicates shared citizenship (= koinonein tes poleos), even in a city context (e.g., in Isocr. 16.44). In the federal context it can be translated as “common citizenship” or “dual citizenship” and expresses the coexistence of a federal citizenship with a local (polis or village) citizenship. In the official sphere, it is expressed in the onomastic definition of citizen, which juxtaposes the ethnicity of the koinon (e.g., Thessalos, “Thessalian”) with the specification of the locality (town or village) of origin, expressed with a complement of origin (ek Larisses, “from Larissa”). Literary attestations of the formula also exist.

The earliest occurrences of the term sympoliteia (in the verbal form sympoliteuein) recur in two essentially contemporary fourth-century texts whose mutual chronological relationship is difficult to establish. The first is chapter 19.2-4, pp. 32-33 Chambers of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, in which the technical term sympoliteuein is used to identify the relationship between the Boeotian city of Plataea and the choria of Scolus, Erithrai, and Scafe (i.e., a secondary sympolitical relationship within the larger Boeotian League). The second, taken from Xenophon’s Hellenica (5.2.11-19) and relating to the process of empowerment of the Chalcidian League (i.e., the league of Chalcidian cities of Thrace) by the city of Olinthos in 382, not only attests to the terminology of sympoliteia, but also clarifies what it concretely entailed: common laws, common army, pooling of economic resources and rents from ports and markets, exchange of marriage rights (epigamia) and property rights (enktesis). The term is used by Polybius, who also tries to innovate the lexicon of federalism, for the Achaeans (20.6.7; 22.8.9; 23.17.1) and other federations, including in the almost pleonastic form koine sympoliteia (24.8.3; 27.2.10) and in the form ethnike sympoliteia (2.44.5), which makes explicit beyond doubt the reference to the federal state. There is, however, modest trace of the sympoliteia in the sources, especially at the epigraphic level: to identify the federal states and their citizens, the use of the ethnic is more frequently employed.

• C. Bearzot, Il federalismo greco, Bologna 2014
• M. Sordi, Il federalismo greco nell’età classica, in Federazioni e federalismo nell’Europa antica (Atti del Convegno Bergamo, 21-25 settembre 1992), Milano 1994, 3-22

[C. Bearzot]

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Synteleia (συντέλεια)

Synteleia (syntelein) properly denotes the sharing of fiscal burdens, but it can have a broader meaning, of the union of communities gathered together in a larger state. In Herodotus the terminology of synteleia is already applied to the federal context: regarding the events of 519, the Corinthians, called upon to settle the dispute between Thebes and Plataea, declared that it was not possible to force a city to syntelein, that is, to join a federation, if it did not want to (Her. 6.108). Syntelein is used in chapter 19.2-4, pp. 32-33 Chambers of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia to denote a federation-like relationship between certain Boeotian cities and Thebes. Also in Polybius it finds application to indicate the Achaean federation (5.94.1 synteleia patriké). In Diodorus it is normally used to denote the Boeotian league refounded in the fourth century and reunited around Thebes (e.g. 12.41.3; 15.38.4; 15.50.4-5; 15.79.2) or the Arcadian league (15.59.1), sometimes in the form mia synteleia. The term seems to accentuate, in federations, the concept of dependence on a central power.

• S.C. Bakhuizen, Thebes and Boeotia in the Fourth Century B.C., Phoenix 48 (1994), 307-330
• C. Bearzot, Il federalismo greco, Bologna 2014

[C. Bearzot]

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Systasis (σύστασις)

The term denotes “coming together” for various purposes. These include the formation of a political union (e.g. Isocr. 3.54) or a constitutional structure (Plat. Resp. 546a, Leg. 702d). The term systasis is used by Polybius, in Book VI, in the sense of “constitutional structure,” especially about the process of formation (with auxesis). In three occurrences it indicates “federations” (23.1.4; 30.13.6; 32.4.2; in the last two cases with the specification ethnikai, to make it less generic). Systasis seems to want to emphasize the existence of a political “structure” with specific characteristics, the outcome of a consistent development.

• C. Bearzot, Ancient Theoretical Reflections on Federalism, in H. Beck and P. Funke (eds.), Federalism in Greek Antiquity, Cambridge 2015, 503-511

[C. Bearzot]

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Systema (σύστημα)

The term denotes a whole composed of different well-harmonized parts, like the English “system.” One of its meanings is “organized government, constitution” (Plat. Leg. 686b, Arist. EN 1168b32; Polyb. 6.4.5; 6.5.10; 6.10.14). Polybian usage in the sense of “federation” is based on this meaning (2.38.6; 2.41.15; 4.60.10, for the Achaeans; 9.28.2, for the Chalcidians of Thrace). Systema seems to highlight, in the context of Polybius’ desire to innovate the lexicon of federalism, the complexity of the federal state, which brings together and harmonizes different entities. Strabo (14.3.3) uses it for the Lycian koinon; cf. TAM II 175 and 508.

• C. Bearzot, Ancient Theoretical Reflections on Federalism, in H. Beck and P. Funke (eds.), Federalism in Greek Antiquity, Cambridge 2015, 503-511

[C. Bearzot]

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Xenikon/Xenika tele (ξενικόν/ξενικὰ τέλη)

An ancient Athenian law, probably dating to Solon and renewed by Aristophon of Azenia, prohibited foreigners from working in the agora (Dem. 57.31) unless they paid a special tax known as ξενικόν or ξενικὰ (scil. τέλη, Dem. 57.34). Its exact amount is not known, but it may have been a tax on the occupation of public land. Resident foreigners were exempt from this payment (Lex. Seg. s.v. ἰσοτελεῖς).

• L. Loddo, La legge ateniese sull’interdizione degli stranieri dal mercato: da Solone ad Aristofonte di Azenia, Klio 100.3, 2018, 667-687
• L. Migeotte, Les finances des cités grecques aux périodes classique et hellénistique, Paris 2014
• D. Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, Cambridge 1977

[L. Loddo]

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Xenodikai (ξενοδίκαι)

The office of the xenodikai is attested only rarely. It is known exclusively from epigraphic sources, both in the Athenian context (IG I³ 439, l. 75 and 440, l. 26, the Parthenon accounts for the years 444/3 and 443/2 BCE; Agora XVI 47, convention between Athens and Stymphalos, 368/7 BCE; IG II² 46, convention between Athens and Troizen, first half of the 4th century BCE) and in central Greece (an arbitration involving Megara, Thebes, and Eleutherai from the second half of the 6th century BCE, preliminary report in Matthaiou 2014, 213–215; IG IX 1² 3 717, a Locrian treaty between Oianthea and Chaleion, ca. 450 BCE; and IG IX 1 32, homologia between Stiris and Medeon in Phocis, ca. 170 BCE). Their mention in the Parthenon accounts may be connected to the presence of numerous foreigners among the workforce listed in those records, and to the possible existence of formal agreements between Athens and the poleis from which those workers originated—according to a procedure that might also be assumed for the two Athenian cases of the 4th century BCE. However, there is no certainty about this. The earliest attestation of the term appears in the arbitration between Megara, Thebes, and Eleutherai, from which it may be inferred that the xenodikai were magistrates of the city acting as arbiter (Matthaiou 2014, 214). The convention between Chaleion and Oianthea is, in fact, the only document that clearly shows the xenodikai as judicial officials from Chaleion with investigatory functions, to whom the legal cases of the inhabitants of Oianthea—xenoi in Chaleion—were entrusted. Given that these magistrates, with the sole exception of the Parthenon accounts, always appear in the context of international conventions between poleis, it seems reasonable to conclude that they were officials appointed to adjudicate cases concerning foreigners, namely citizens of the other polis involved in a symbola (treaty); in arbitrations, they acted similarly on behalf of the city serving as intermediary in the disputes involving the citizens of the contracting poleis. It therefore seems unlikely that the xenodikai were ever responsible in Athens (or elsewhere) for cases of fraudulent claims to citizenship (graphai xenias). There appears to be no overlap of jurisdiction between the nautodikai and the xenodikai (contra Körte 1993, who argued that the two offices succeeded one another in Athens during the 5th century BCE; for discussion of the two offices, see already Cavaignac 1908, LXVII–LXVIII; Cohen 1973, 163–176; Erdas 2021, 48–49).

• E. Cavaignac, Études sur I’histoire financière d’Athènes au Ve siècle, Paris 1908
• E. Cohen, Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts, Princeton NJ 1973
• D. Erdas, I nautodikai. Note su una magistratura ateniese tra cause di xenia e giurisdizione sugli emporoi, Dike 24, 2021, 33-62
• A. Körte, Die Attischen Ξενοδίκαι, Hermes 68, 1933, 238-242
• A. Matthaiou, Four Inscribed Bronze Tablets from Thebes: Preliminary Notes, in N. Papazarkadas (ed.), The Epigraphy and History of Boeotia. New Finds, New Prospects, Leiden 2014, 211-222

[D. Erdas]

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Xenodokoi (ξενοδόκοι)

Hesychius (s.v. ξενοδόκος) defines the term ξενοδόκος in two ways: as ‘one who receives foreigners’ (ὑποδεχόμενος ξένους) – its literal meaning– and as ‘witness’ (μάρτυς), although the latter likely represents an evolution from the original sense. Xenodokoi are primarily mentioned in inscriptions from the Thessalian region, such as acts of manumission and honorary decrees, but two epigraphic documents that record the text of agreements between contracting parties are also significant: the convention of the syngeneia of the Basaidai (SEG 35.548) and the agreement between two poleis in Achaea Phthiotis, Thebes and Halos (FD III 4, 355). Typically, the xenodokoi appear in the final lines of the inscriptions, often in conjunction with the magistrates of the polis (strategoi and tagoi), seemingly acting as guarantors for the transactions.

In acts of manumission, freed slaves make a payment to the polis in the presence of xenodokoi (e.g. SEG 29.532; BCH 95 (1971), 562), but there are also instances where magistrates other than xenodokoi act as guarantors of the transaction (IG IX 2, 359-550); additionally, the role of xenodokos is sometimes assigned to a tagos. The distinction between idioi xenodokoi (in the form ἰδιοξενοδόκοι in IG IX 2, 1282 III and IV), as attested, for example, at Pythion, and koinoi xenodokoi is not always clear, nor is the nature of their duties: Xenodokoi appear to be not so much magistrates of the polis, but rather private citizens chosen as official guarantors by the community for a specific task, a role that could also be performed by civic magistrates as needed.

Xenodokoi are found in honorary decrees from various Thessalian cities: Phayttos, Mopsion, Atrax, and Metropolis. These are mostly koinoi xenodokoi, but the form συνξενοδόκων is also attested (e.g. in the proxenia decree of the polis of Atrax for Orthotimos of Tylissos, SEG 33.448), suggesting the existence of a kind of board of xenodokoi. The hypothesis that best explains their function in these documents is that they serve as guarantors of relations between foreigners and the polis.

The role of the xenodokoi in the aforementioned agreements between Thessalian poleis appears more elusive. In the convention between Thebes and Halos, where the cities submit to the arbitration of a citizen of Larisa, Makon, regarding a territorial dispute, the term xenodokoi is followed by a list of four names belonging to citizens of Meliteia (ll. 22-23). Zelnick-Abramovitz (2000, 113) has argued that the xenodokoi from Meliteia act as guarantors for both the parties’ decision to submit to arbitration and the judgment rendered by Makon. The need to employ xenodokoi can be explained by their role in receiving the representatives of the poleis who agreed to the outcome of the arbitration whenever they visited Meliteia to lodge complaints regarding the implementation of the arbitral verdict. It is not surprising that the xenodokoi come from Meliteia rather than Larisa, Makon’s homeland, since the parties, contrary to the norm, are relying on the services of a single individual rather than a polis. The presence of the Meliteians indicates the involvement of the koinon, reconstituted after 196 BC, in the agreement, as evidenced by the mention of the federal calendar (l. 13) and the presence of federal magistrates such as the tagoi. Furthermore, as Ager has pointed out, it is not unusual for the guarantors of interstate treaties to come from cities different from those directly involved in the agreement, as seen in the case of Delphi in the treaty between Chaleion and Tritea (IG IX,1² 3, 739).

Similarly, in the convention of the Basaidai of Metropolis – an agreement among syngeneis aimed at regulating the admission of new members – the xenodokoi serve as guarantors because the agreement concerned foreigners naturalised at the time of admission to the syngeneia (Loddo), rather than due to the new members being perceived as xenoi (Zelnick-Abramovitz).

• S. Ager, Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World, 337-90 B.C., Berkeley 1996
• C. Habicht, Eine Bürgerrechtsverleihung von Metropolis, Klio 52, 1970, 139-148
• B. Helly, La Convention des Basaidai, BCH 94, 1970, 161-189
• L. Loddo, Considerazioni su cittadinanza e isotimia in alcuni decreti tessalici, Dike 27, 2024, 243-274
• R. Zelnick-Abramovitz, The Xenodokoi of Thessaly, ZPE 130, 2000, 109-120

[L. Loddo]

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Xenos (ξένος)

The term xenos, used as a noun, encompasses a spectrum of meanings that can essentially be grouped around three poles: it can identify the foreigner, but also the guest (understood as one who is hosted, for example, in Il. 6.215, and sometimes also as the host, Il. 15.532; both meanings coexist in Pl. Lg. 953d) and the mercenary (Xenoph. An. 1.1.10). There are also instances where the term is employed to identify a specific type of foreigner, namely an ally (Aristoph. Eq. 1408) or a metic (Isoc.2.22; at times, particularly in certain judicial speeches, it is not straightforward to ascertain whether an individual being discussed holds metic status or is merely a xenos). Naturally, all these various semantic fields are closely linked to the first, which is the one of primary interest in this context.

The Greek world recognises various types of foreigners, depending on the duration of their condition and their ethnic identity. Regarding the first aspect, the foreigner in a general sense, that is, the free individual who is temporarily abroad, must be distinguished in legal terms from the specific case of the metic, who resides with a certain degree of stability (usually for more than a month: Whitehead 1977, 7-9) in a foreign location (for further information on metics, see the dedicated entry). Concerning the second aspect, the foreigner in the strict sense, namely the Greek from a community different from the one in which he resides, should be distinguished from the barbarian, that is, the foreigner of non-Greek descent (cf. Vlassopoulos 2013). The following discussion will focus on the Greek foreigner who is temporarily abroad (naturally, the most well-known context is that of Athens, to which this discussion will primarily refer).

The condition of xenos was quite common due to both the extreme political fragmentation of the Greek world, divided into a myriad of city-states and federations, and the dense network of relationships of various kinds that existed among these communities. Movements could occur for a multitude of reasons, including commercial, religious (such as visiting sanctuaries and participating in festivals), military, and diplomatic purposes. Indeed, there are numerous categories of travellers and, consequently, foreigners: merchants, pilgrims, mercenaries, ambassadors, heralds, theorists, as well as actors, musicians, artists, architects, diviners, teachers, sophists, philosophers, and doctors. Particular categories of foreigners include exiles and stateless individuals (cf. Loddo 2022). Some communities are more open towards these foreigners, usually because they need them or benefit from their presence (for example, Athens); others, however, are less tolerant of the presence of foreigners (see e.g. the xenelasiai practised in Sparta, cf. Hdt. 3.148 and Th. 1.144.2, as well as in other contexts, cf. Ael. VH 13.16).

Foreigners were clearly distinguished from citizens, as evidenced at the lexical level by the fact that in the sources the term ξένος is frequently contrasted or at least juxtaposed with ἀστός and, to a lesser extent, with πολίτης (for further discussion, see Cohen 2000, 50-55; Blok 2017, 153-154, 162-172; and specifically regarding Athenian tragic and comic theatre, Falco 2024). Regarding ἀστός, the dualism with ξένος appears both in poetry in its various forms (e.g., Pi. Ol. 13.1-3; Soph. OC 12-13; Eurip. Med. 222-223; Aristoph. Av. 32) and in prose, across different genres like history (Hdt. 2.160.4; Th. 6.30.2), oratory (Andoc. 4.10), and philosophy (Pl. Men. 91c; Arist. Pol. 4.1300b31-32); for epigraphic evidence, see e.g. Rhodes-Osborne 2003, 69, l. 3. Similarly, there are analogous examples for πολίτης: Hdt. 7.237.2-3; Lys. 12.35; and for inscriptions, see Rhodes-Osborne 2003, 51, l. 5.

The free man who is in the position of a ξένος is deprived of a number of rights: for example, he cannot own real property (land is closely tied to citizenship: cf. Arist. Pol. 7.1329a13-19; 1329b36-38) and, starting from Pericles’ law of 451/50, he cannot produce legitimate offspring through marriage with an ἀστή. Furthermore, the condition of minority for the ξένος is also marked by the fact that, according to a law attributed to Solon, foreigners were required to pay a fee to enter the marketplace of the agora (Demosth. 57.31 = Leão – Rhodes 117). Some prohibitions could be lifted through special concessions: for instance, the right of ἐπιγαμία could be granted (see the dedicated entry), and sometimes, even if only temporarily, the right of ἔγκτησις γῆς καὶ οἰκίας could be permitted (e.g., IG II² 80, 9-11), potentially extended to descendants (IG II² 373, 29-30: εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶι καὶ ἐγγόνο[ις γῆς καὶ] [οἰ]κίας ἔγκτησιν) or granted upon request (IG II² 907, ll. 5-8: δεδό[σθαι] [δὲ αὐτῶι κ]αὶ [πρ]οξε[ν]ία[ν] καὶ γῆς καὶ ο[ἰκίας ἔγκτησιν] αἰτησαμ[έ]νωι κατὰ τὸ[ν νόμον; for general information on ἔγκτησις, see Faguer 2021 and Faraguna 2024).

Beyond specific concessions, the separation from citizens is so marked that in cases where, following a γραφὴ ξενίας, a foreigner was declared guilty of usurping citizenship, he was reduced to slavery (Demosth. Ep. 3.29). The competent magistrates (for a general discussion on the issue, see Erdas 2021) appear to have been the ναυτοδίκαι (as noted in, for example, IG I³ 3, ll. 76-77; Poll. 8.126; cf. also Lys. 17.5), while during the time of the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (cf. 59.3), these matters were managed by the thesmothetai (who were already involved in cases concerning foreigners in the 5th century, as evidenced by the decree for Chalcis: IG I³ 40, ll. 70-76). On the other hand, it seems that the ξενοδίκαι, known both in Athens and elsewhere (cf. for example Agora XVI 47 and IG IX 1² 3 717), did not deal with cases of γραφὴ ξενίας.

Remaining within the framework of law, the foreigner, except in specific cases, could not seek justice in the courts; however, his testimony could be used in both private (Demosth. 35.14, 20, 23, 33ss.; Hyp. 5.33) and public cases (Demosth. 25.62; Aesch. 2.155). Various aspects highlight the otherness of the foreigner in relation to the citizen within the legal context. For instance, if he was accused, guarantees could be taken to ensure his presence at the trial (Isoc. 17.12; Demosth. 32.29). Furthermore, for the murder of foreigners, the competent court was the Palladium (Arist. Ath. 57.3), which also handled cases involving the killing of metics and slaves, as well as cases of φόνος μὴ ἐκ προνοίας and φόνος ἀκούσιος involving citizens. The involvement of this court clearly indicates that the murder of a foreigner was considered a crime of lesser severity than that of a citizen.

Citizens and foreigners were, in fact, largely equated in the dikai emporikai, introduced in the mid-4th century (see Maffi 2016). The sources attesting to these procedures, namely several orations from the Demosthenic corpus (32, 33, 34, 35, 56), demonstrate the direct involvement of foreigners in court (although it is not always easy to distinguish between ξένοι and metics), both as defendants and as plaintiffs. It is significant that in these procedures a foreigner could directly access the Athenian courts (the case had to be presented to the thesmothetai: [Demosth.] 33.1; Aristot. Ath. 59.5), even in the absence of specific agreements between Athens and their communities of origin. These are, in fact, completely different types of legal proceedings from the dikai apo symbolon.

The condition of foreigners remains rather precarious, as, with the partial exception of personnel on diplomatic missions (Nep. Pel. 5, 1; cf. however Mosley 1973, 81-92), they were exposed to the right of reprisal against their property or person. Some institutions aimed to mitigate this precariousness. At the private level, the main one is xenia (Th. 8.6.3; Isoc. 4.43; cf. Iriarte 2007 and Basile 2016): of aristocratic origin and well known since the Homeric poems (e.g. Od. 24.286), it was symbolised by the exchange of symbola and aimed to provide mutual assistance between the contracting parties. However, a community could also resort to proxenia, meaning it could grant the title of proxenos to a foreigner who, in his own city, provided hospitality and assistance to those from the community that conferred that title (see the entry “proxenos”). Finally, there is the institution of asylia, of sacred origin, which protected the foreigner from the risk of being subjected to violent actions (συλᾶν): within the legal framework, inviolability, a characteristic of sacred areas, could be a concession granted due to particular merits or relationships to individual foreigners (for example, IG I³ 98, l. 19-20, with the typical formula ἀσυλίαν εἶναι αὐτῷ) or, reciprocally, to entire communities (for instance, IG IX 1², 717; on asylia, see Gauthier 1972, 209-284; Maffi 2023, 86-98; for a collection of Hellenistic epigraphic texts, see Rigsby 1996). It is superfluous to note that cases of granting citizenship, to individuals or groups, are exceptional and usually arise from reasons of interest.

• G.J. Basile, Xenía: la amistad-ritualizada de Homero a Heródoto, Emerita 84.2, 2016, 229-250
• M.F. Baslez, L’étranger dans la Grèce antique, Paris 1984 
• C. Bearzot,Una città internazionale: stranieri e meteci, in M. Bettalli – M. Giangiulio (a cura di), Atene, vivere in una città antica, Roma 2023, 141-160
• J. Blok, Citizenship in Classical Athens, Cambridge 2017
• E.E. Cohen The Athenian Nation, Princeton 2000
• D. Erdas, I ‘nautodikai’: note su una magistratura ateniese tra cause di ‘xenia’ e giurisdizione sugli ‘emporoi’, Dike 24, 2021, 33-62
• J. Faguer, Statuts et propriété foncière dans l’Athènes des IIIe et IIe siècles av. J.-C.:la question de l’enktésis, in S. Maillot – J. Zurbach (éds.), Statuts personnels et main-d’œuvre en Méditerranée hellénistique, Clermont-Ferrand 2021, 61-91
• M. Faraguna, Land and Citizenship in the Greek Polis: Real Property, Public Control, and Institutionalisation, Dike 27, 2024, 121-174
• G. Falco, Politēs/politis, astos e metoikos: il lessico della cittadinanza nel teatro ateniese di V secolo a. C., Hormos 16, 2024, 133-200
• P. Gauthier, Symbola. Les étrangers et la justice dans les cités grecques, Nancy 1972
• A. Iriarte, La institución de la ‘Xenía’: pactos y acogidas en la antigua Grecia, Gerión Vol. Extra, 2007, 197-206
• L. Loddo, I rifugiati politici nella Grecia antica, Bologna 2022
• A. Maffi, Riflessioni su dikai emporikai e prestito marittimo in D. Leão – G. Thür (eds.), Symposion 2015, Wien 2016, 199-208
• D.J. Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, Wiesbaden 1973
• P.J. Rhodes – R. Osborne, Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC, Oxford 2003
• K. Rigsby, Asylia. Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World, Berkeley 1996
• K. Vlassopoulos, Greeks and Barbarians, Cambridge 2013
• D. Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic, Cambridge 1977.

[P.A. Tuci]

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